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Abstract
Computing a low-rank factorization of an m × n matrix A is a fundamental component in many
applications, such as clustering, data mining, recommendation system, etc. It requires outputting three
matrices: an orthonormal m × k matrix U, an orthonormal n × k matrix V, and a k × k positive
semidefinite diagonal matrix Σ, where UΣVT approximates the matrix A in the Frobenius norm in the
sense that
‖A−UΣVT‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + γ
with constant probability. Here [A]k is the best rank-k approximation of A.
In this paper, we study what price one has to pay to release differentially private low-rank factoriza-
tion of a matrix. We consider various settings that are close to the real world applications of low-rank
factorization: (i) the manner in which matrices are updated (row by row or in an arbitrary manner), (ii)
whether matrices are distributed or not, and (iii) how the output is produced (once at the end of all up-
dates, also known as one-shot algorithms or continually). Even though these settings are well studied
without privacy, surprisingly, there are no private algorithm for these settings (except when a matrix is
updated row by row). We present the first set of differentially private algorithms for all these settings.
Our algorithms when private matrix is updated in an arbitrary manner promise differential privacy
with respect to two stronger privacy guarantees than previously studied, use space and time comparable
to the non-private algorithm, and achieve optimal accuracy. To complement our positive results, we also
prove that the space required by our algorithms is optimal up to logarithmic factors. When data matrices
are distributed over multiple servers, we give a non-interactive differentially private algorithm with com-
munication cost independent of dimension. In concise, we give algorithms that incur optimal cost. We
also perform experiments to verify that all our algorithms perform well in practice and outperform the
best known algorithms until now for large range of parameters. We give experimental results for total
approximation error and additive error for varying dimensions, α and k.
There are few key take aways from this paper: (i) maintaining a differentially private sketches of
row space and column space of a matrix already give a sub-optimal accuracy, but this can be signif-
icantly improved by careful inexpensive post-processing, and (ii) even though we can only use linear
sketches when matrices are updated arbitrarily, the structural properties of linear sketches can be care-
fully exploited to get tight bound on the error. While most of the focus has been on careful analysis,
the power of post-processing has been largely ignored in the literature of differentially private low rank
factorization.
Keywords Low-rank approximation, differential privacy, local differential privacy
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1 Introduction
Low-rank factorization (LRF) of matrices is a fundamental component used in many applications, such as
chemometrics [Ste08, WAH+97], clustering [CEM+15, DFK+04, McS01], data mining [AFK+01], rec-
ommendation systems [DKR02], information retrieval [PTRV98a, STC04], learning distributions [AM05,
KSV05], system-control [Mar11], and web search [AFKM01, Kle99]. In these applications, given anm×n
matrix A, a common approach is to first compute three matrices: a diagonal positive semidefinite matrix
Σ˜k ∈ Rk×k and two matrices with orthonormal columns, U˜k ∈ Rm×k and V˜k ∈ Rn×k. The requirement
then is that the product B := U˜Σ˜V˜T is as close to A as possible. More formally,
Problem 1. (α, β, γ, k)-LRF. Given parameters 0 < α, β < 1 and γ, an m × n matrix A and the target
rank k, compute a rank-k matrix factorization U˜k, Σ˜k, and V˜k such that with probability at least 1− β
‖A− U˜kΣ˜kV˜Tk ‖F ≤ (1 + α)∆k + γ,
where ‖·‖F denotes the Frobenius norm, ∆k := ‖A−[A]k‖F with [A]k being the best rank-k approximation
of A. We refer to the parameter γ as the additive error and the parameter α as the multiplicative error.
Unfortunately, most of the applications listed above either does not use any privacy mechanism or use ad
hoc privacy mechanism. This has led to serious privacy leaks as exemplified by denonymization of Netflix
datasets [NS08]. To assuage such attacks, McSherry and Mironov [MM09] suggested that one should use a
robust privacy guarantee, such as (, δ)-differential privacy, defined by Dwork et al. [DMNS06]:
Definition 1. A randomized algorithmM gives (ε, δ)-differential privacy, if for all neighboring datasets A
and A′, and all subsets S in the range of M, Pr[M(A) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε)Pr[M(A′) ∈ S] + δ, where the
probability is over the coin tosses ofM.
All currently known differentially private algorithms [BDMN05, CSS12, DTTZ14, HP14, HR12, JXZ15,
KT13, Upa14a] output a low-rank matrix if a single entity stores a static matrix. One can then factorized
the output in O(mn2) time and O(mn) space. However, practical matrices used in above applications are
often large, distributed over many servers, and are dynamically updated [Mah11, Mar08]. Therefore, for
any practical deployment [App16, EPK14], one would like to simultaneously maintain strong privacy guar-
antee and minimize space requirements, communication between servers and computational time, in order
to reduce bandwidth, latency, synchronization issues and resource overhead.
We initialize the study of space, time, and communication cost efficient differentially private algorithm
for solving Problem 1 under various settings: (i) the manner in which matrices are updated (row by row
or in arbitrary manner), (ii) whether matrices are distributed (local model of privacy) or not (central model
of privacy), and (iii) how the output is produced (once at the end of all updates, also known as one-shot
algorithms or continually). Without privacy, there are many algorithms for solving Problem 1 under all
these settings [BCL05, BWZ16, CMM17, CW13, CW17, DV06, GSS17, MZ11, MM13, NDT09, Sar06].
Surprisingly, there are no private algorithm for these settings (except in central model when matrices
are received row by row [DTTZ14]). For example, known algorithms either use multiple pass over the data
matrix [HP14, HR12, HR13, KT13] or cannot handle arbitrary updates [DTTZ14]. Similarly, known algo-
rithms that continually release output are for monotonic functions [DNPR10], thereby excluding Problem 1.
Private algorithms like [DTTZ14, HR12] that can be extended to distributed setting use multiple rounds of
interaction, large communication cost, and/or result in trivial error bounds. Moreover, known private algo-
rithms are inefficient compared to non-private algorithms: O(mnk) time and O(mn) space compared to
time linear in the sparsity of the matrix and O((m + n)k/α) space [BWZ16, CW13]. In fact, for rank-k
matrices, Musco and Woodruff [MW17] state that Problem 1 is equivalent to the well studied matrix com-
pletion problem for which one can have O˜(n · poly(k)) time non private algorithm [JNS13]. Under same
assumptions, private algorithm takes O(mnk) time [HR12]. This motivates the central thesis of this paper:
can we have non-trivial private algorithms under all these settings, and if yes, do we have to pay for privacy?
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Our Results Updates Output Produced Privacy Additive Error Local?
Theorem 47 Turnstile At the end A−A′ = uvT O˜
((√
mkα−1 +
√
kn
)
ε−1
)
×
Theorem 48 Turnstile At the end ‖A−A′‖F = 1 O˜
((√
mkα−2 +
√
kn
)
ε−1
)
×
Theorem 50 Turnstile Continually A−A′ = uvT O˜
((√
mkα−1 +
√
kn
)
ε−1 log T
)
×
Theorem 51 Turnstile Continually ‖A−A′‖F = 1 O˜
((√
mkα−1 +
√
kn
)
ε−1 log T
)
×
Theorem 49 Row by row At the end ‖A−A′‖F = 1 O˜
(
(αε)
−1√
nk
)
×
Theorem 57 Row by row At the end ‖A−A′‖F = 1 O˜
(
kα−2−1
√
m
) √
Table 1: Our Results for (ε,Θ(n−c))-Differentially Private Algorithms When k > 1/α, c ≥ 2, stream length T ).
Our Results. We give a unified approach and first set of algorithms for solving Problem 1 in all the settings
mentioned above while showing that one does not have to pay the price of privacy (more than what is
required in terms of additive error and space, see Section 1.1.2). Our algorithms are also practical as shown
by our empirical evaluations (see Appendix J). On a high level, we show the following:
1. When a private matrix is streamed, we propose differentially private algorithms with respect to two
stronger privacy guarantees than previously studied. Our algorithms are space and time efficient and
also achieve optimal accuracy. We complement our positive results with a matching lower bound on the
space required (Theorem 3). Section 1.1 covers this in more details.
2. When a private matrix is distributed over multiple servers, we give a non-interactive differentially private
algorithm with communication cost independent of dimension. Section 3 covers this in more details.
Our results relies crucially on careful analysis and our algorithms heavily exploit advance yet inexpen-
sive post-processing. The power of careful analysis was shown by Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] who improved an
earlier result of Blum et al. [BDMN05]. However, only two known private algorithms for Problem 1 use any
form of post-processing: Hardt and Roth [HR12] uses simple pruning of entries of a matrix formed in the
intermediate step, while Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] uses best rank-k approximation of the privatized matrix.
These post-processing either make the algorithm suited only for static matrices or are expensive.
In what follows, we give more details of our result when matrices are streamed and compare it with
previous works. All our results are summarized in Table 1. Unless specified, for the ease of presentation, we
assume that k ≥ 1/α, δ = Θ(n−c) for c ≥ 2, and O˜(·) hides a poly log n factor for the rest of this section.
1.1 Differentially Private Low-Rank Factorization When Matrices are Streamed
All currently known differentially private algorithms to solve Problem 1 assume that a single central server
holds the entire private matrix which is not updated over a period of time (see Figure 1). However, practical
matrices are constantly updated. In this section, we consider when a private matrix is updated arbitrarily,
known as the turnstile update model to capture many practical scenarios (see the survey [Mut05] for further
motivations). Formally, in a turnstile update model, a matrix A ∈ Rm×n is initialized to an all zero-
matrix and is updated by a sequence of triples {i, j,∆}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and ∆ ∈ R.
Server Analyst
Private
Matrix
s
Small sketch Matrix as a stream
Server
(1,5,0) (1,5,0) (3,4,1) (6,1,1) (5,4,0) (1,5,1) (3,4,1) . . . . . .
Analyst
su
Small sketch
Figure 1: The central model (left) and the turnstile model (right).
Each update results in a change in
the (i, j)-th entry of A as follows:
Ai,j ← Ai,j + ∆. An algorithm
is differentially private under turn-
stile update model if, for all pos-
sible matrices updated in the turn-
stile update model and runs of the
algorithm, the output of the server
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is (ε, δ)-differentially private. In the non-private setting, Boutsidis et al. [BWZ16] gave a space-optimal
algorithm for low-rank factorization in the turnstile update model. Unfortunately, a straightforward applica-
tion of known privacy techniques to make their algorithm differentially private incurs a large additive error
(see Appendix K for details). This raises the following natural question:
Question 1. Can we solve Problem 1 with good accuracy while preserving differential privacy
and receiving the matrix in the turnstile update model?
We answer this question positively. To better comprehend the privacy aspect of our results presented in this
section, we first need to define our notion of neighboring datasets (streaming matrices in our context).
We consider two stronger privacy guarantees than previously studied: Priv1 and Priv2 (see Section 1.1.1
for comparison and Section 1.1.3 for discussion). In Priv1, we call two matrices A and A′ neighboring if
A−A′ = uvT for some unit vectors u and v. In Priv2, we consider two matrices A and A′ neighboring if
‖A−A′‖F ≤ 1. We say two data streams are neighboring if they are formed by neighboring matrices. For
these two definitions, we show the following:
Theorem 2. (Theorem 47 and Theorem 48, informal). Let A be an m × n matrix (with nn(A) non-zero
entries and m ≤ n) streamed in a turnstile update model. Then
1. There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm under Priv1 that uses O˜((m + n)kα−1) space and
outputs a rank-k factorization U˜k, Σ˜k, V˜k in time O˜(nn(A) +m2kα−1 + nk2α−2) such that,
‖A− U˜kΣ˜kV˜Tk ‖F ≤ (1 + α)∆k + O˜((
√
mkα−1 +
√
kn)/ε).
2. There is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm under Priv2 that uses O˜((mα−1 + n)kα−1) space,
and outputs a rank-k factorization U˜k, Σ˜k, V˜k in O˜(nn(A) + (mα−2 + n)k2α−2) time such that
‖A− U˜kΣ˜kV˜Tk ‖F ≤ (1 + α)∆k + O˜((
√
mkα−2 +
√
kn)/ε).
1.1.1 Comparison With Previous Works
All the previous private algorithms compute a low rank approximation of either the matrix A or its covari-
ance ATA. One can compute a factorization from their output at the expense of an extra O(mn2) time
and O(mn) space (Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] requires an extra O(n3) time and O(n2) space to output an
LRF of ATA). Some works like [CSS12, KT13, HR12, HP14] compute LRF under the spectral norm in-
stead of Frobenius norm. We state the previously studied problems and their differences with Problem 1
in Appendix ??. To summarize the discussion in Appendix ??, only Hardt and Roth [HR12] and Upad-
hyay [Upa14a] study a problem closest to ours (the differences being that they do not consider turnstile
updates and output a low rank approximation). Therefore, we compare Theorem 2 only with these two
results.
We do not make any assumptions on the input matrix. This allows us to cover matrices of all form in
an unified manner. We cover this in more detail in Section 1.1.3. In what follows, we compare the additive
error, space and time required, and privacy guarantees in more detail. Table 2 enumerates these comparisons.
Both Hardt and Roth [HR12] and Upadhyay [Upa14a] incur a multiplicative error of
√
1 + k/p, where p is
an oversampling parameter (typically, p = Θ(k)), and m ≤ n. Therefore, for a reasonable comparison, we
consider Theorem 2 when α = Θ(1) and m ≤ n.
Our additive error is smaller than Upadhyay [Upa14a] by a factor of O˜(k3/2). To make a reasonable
comparison with Hardt and Roth [HR12], we consider their result without coherence assumption: which
roughly says that no single row of the matrix is significantly correlated with any of the right singular vectors
of the matrix. Then combining Theorem 4.2 and 4.7 in Hardt and Roth [HR12] results in an additive error
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Privacy Notion Additive Error Space Required Streaming
Theorem 47 A−A′ = uvT O˜
((√
kmα−1 +
√
kn
)
ε−1
)
O˜((m+ n)kα−1) Turnstile
Theorem 48 ‖A−A′‖F = 1 O˜
(
(
√
kmα−2 +
√
kn)ε−1
)
O˜((m+ n)kα−2) Turnstile
Hardt-Roth [HR12] A−A′ = esvT O˜
((√
km+ kc
√
n
)
ε−1
)
O(mn) ×
Upadhyay [Upa14a] A−A′ = esvT O˜
((
k2
√
n+m
)
ε−1
)
O˜((m+ n)kα−1) Row-wise
Lower Bounds All of the above Ω
(√
km+
√
kn
)
[HR12] Ω((m+ n)kα−1) (Thm. 52) Turnstile
Table 2: Comparison of Private k-Rank Approximation (‖u‖2, ‖v‖2 = 1, es is a standard basis, k ≤ 1/α).
O˜((
√
km + ck
√
n)ε−1), where c is the maximum entry in their projection matrix. In other words, we
improve the result of Hardt and Roth [HR12] by an O˜(c
√
k) factor.
Our algorithms are more efficient than previous algorithms in terms of space and time even though earlier
algorithms output a rank-k matrix and cannot handle updates in the turnstile model. Upadhyay [Upa14a]
takes more time than Hardt and Roth [HR12]. The algorithm of Hardt and Roth [HR12] uses O(mn) space
since it is a private version of Halko et al. [HMT11] and has to store the entire matrix: both the stages
of Halko et al. [HMT11] require the matrix explicitly. One of the motivations mentioned in Hardt and
Roth [HR12] is sparse private incoherent matrices (see the discussion in Hardt and Roth [HR12, Sec 1.1]),
but their algorithm uses this only to reduce the additive error and not the running time. On the other hand,
our algorithms use sublinear space. In fact, when m · poly(k, 1/α) ≤ nn(A), our algorithm under Priv2
runs in time linear in nn(A) and almost matches the running time of most efficient non-private algorithm in
the turnstile model [CW13, BWZ16], which run in time O(nn(A) + nk2α−2 + k3α−5).
Previous works consider two matrices neighboring either if they differ in one entry [HP14, HR13,
JXZ15] (i.e., A − A′ = eieTj ) or when they differ in one row by a unit norm [DTTZ14, HR12, Upa14a]
(i.e., A−A′ = eivT for some unit vector v), depending on whether a user’s data is an entry of the matrix
or a row of the matrix. Both these privacy guarantees are special case of Priv1 by setting either u (in the
case of [DTTZ14, HR12]) or both v and u (in the case of [HR13, HP14]) as a standard basis vector.
1.1.2 Optimality of Our Results
Tightness of Additive Error. Hardt and Roth [HR12] showed a lower bound of Ω(
√
kn+
√
km) on additive
error by showing a reduction to the linear reconstruction attack [DN03]. In other words, any algorithm that
outputs a low rank matrix with additive error o(
√
kn +
√
km) cannot be differentially private! This lower
bound holds even when the private algorithm can access the private matrix any number of times. Our results
show that one can match the lower bound for constant α, a setting considered in Hardt and Roth [HR12], up
to a small logarithmic factor, while allowing access to the private matrix only in the turnstile model.
Space Lower Bound and Optimality of the Algorithm Under Priv1. Our algorithm under Priv1 uses the
same space as non-private algorithm up to a logarithmic factor, which is known to be optimal for γ =
0 [CW09]. However, we incur a non-zero additive error, γ, which is inevitable [HR12], and it is not clear if
we can achieve better space algorithm when γ 6= 0. This raises the following question:
Question 2. What is the space complexity for computing (α, β, γ, k)-LRF when γ 6= 0?
We complement our positive results by showing a lower bound on the space complexity of computing low-
rank approximation with non-trivial additive error. The result holds for any randomized algorithm; therefore,
also hold for differentially private algorithm. This we believe makes our result of independent interest.
Theorem 3. (Theorem 52, informal). The space required by any randomized algorithm to solve (α, 1/6, O(m+
n), k)-LRF in the turnstile update model is Ω((n+m)kα−1).
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As mentioned above, any differentially private incurs an additive error Ω(
√
km+
√
kn) [HR12]. More-
over, earlier literature in differentially private low-rank approximation (i.e., Hardt and Roth [HR12]) set
α =
√
2− 1. Theorem 3 thus answers Question 3 for all k ≥ 3 for the parameters studied in the literature,
and prove the space optimality of our algorithm. Our proof uses a reduction from the two-party communi-
cation complexity of AIND problem. In the AIND problem, Alice is given x ∈ {0, 1}N and Bob is given an
index i together with xi+1, · · · , xN . The goal of Bob is to output xi. We use the input of Alice and Bob to
construct an instance of low-rank approximation and show that any algorithm for LRF in the turnstile update
model for this instance yields a single round communication protocol for AIND.
1.1.3 Some Discussion on Privacy Guarantees, Assumptions, and Relaxation
The two privacy guarantees considered in this paper have natural reasons to be considered. Priv1 generalizes
the earlier privacy guarantees and captures the setting where any two matrices differ in only one spectrum.
Since Priv1 is defined in terms of the spectrum of matrices, Priv1 captures one of the natural privacy require-
ments in all the applications of LRF. Priv2 is more stronger than Priv1. To motivate the definition of Priv2,
consider a graph, G := (V, E) that stores career information of people in a set P since their graduation. The
vertex set V is the set of all companies. An edge e = (u, v) ∈ E has weight ∑p∈P(tp,e/tp), where tp,e is
the time for which the person p held a job at v after leaving his/her job at u, and tp is the total time lapsed
since his/her graduation. Graphs like G are useful because the weight on every edge e = (u, v) depends on
the number of people who changed their job status from u to v (and the time they spent at v). Therefore,
data analysts might want to mine such graphs for various statistics. In the past, graph statistics have been
extensively studied in the literature of differential privacy for static graph under edge-level privacy (see, for
e.g., [DTTZ14, HR12, HP14, Upa13, Upa14a]): the presence or absence of a person corresponds to a change
in a single edge. On the other hand, in graphs like G, presence or absence of a person would be reflected
on many edges. If we use earlier results on edge-level privacy to such graphs, it would lead to either a large
additive error or a loss in privacy parameters ε, δ. Priv2 is an attempt to understand whether we can achieve
any non-trivial guarantee on the additive error without depreciating the privacy parameters.
Our choice to not make any assumptions such as symmetry, incoherence, or a bound on the Frobenius
norm of the input matrix, as made in previous works [DTTZ14, HR12, HP14, KT13], allows us to give re-
sults as general as possible and cover many practical scenarios not covered by previous works. For example,
this allows us to have a unified algorithmic approach for all the settings mentioned earlier in the introduction
(see Corollaries 4 and 6). Moreover, by not making any assumption on the Frobenius norm or coherence of
the matrix, we are able to cover many general cases not covered by previous results. For example, adjacency
matrices corresponding to graph G can have arbitrary large Frobenius norm. Such graphs can be distributed
over all the companies and updated every time a person changes his job, and the effect is (possibly) reflected
on many edges. On the other hand, one would like to protect private information about an individual in G or
data packets in communication network.
There are practical learning application such as word2vec where private data is used to build a relation-
ship graph on objects (such as words-to-words, queries-to-urls, etc) also share all these properties. Other
applications like recommendation systems, clustering, and network analysis, have their input datasets store
dynamically changing private information in the form of m × n matrices. For example, communication
networks that stores the routing information passing through various nodes of the network and online video
streaming websites that stores users’ streaming history, both store private information in the form of matrix
which is updated in a turnstile manner and has arbitrary large Frobenius norm. These data are useful for
their respective businesses since they can be used for various analyses [DFK+04, LKLS13, New06].
On the other hand, in some practical applications, matrices are more structured. One such special case
is when the rows of private matrix A have bounded norm and one would like to approximate ATA. This
problem was studied by Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] (see Appendix ?? for their formal problem statement). We
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Initialization. Set ρ1 =
√
(1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε and ρ2 =
√
(1 + α)ρ1. Set η = max
{
k, α−1
}
, t =
O(ηα−1 log(k/δ)), v = O(ηα−2 log(k/δ)) and σmin = 16 log(1/δ)
√
t(1 + α)(1− α)−1 ln(1/δ)/ε.
Sample Ω ∼ N (0, 1/t)m×t, and Φ ∈ R(m+n)×m,Ψ ∈ Rt×m such that ΦT ∼ DR, Ψ ∼ DR satis-
fies Lemma 14. Sample S ∈ Rv×m,T ∈ Rv×(m+n) such that S ∼ DA, TT ∼ DA satisfies Lemma 15.
Define Φ̂ = ΦΩ. Sample N1 ∼ N (0, ρ21)t×(m+n) and N2 ∼ N (0, ρ22)v×v. Keep N1,N2, Φ̂ private.
Computing the factorization. On input a matrix A ∈ Rm×n,
1. Set Â =
(
A σminIm
)
by padding a scaled identity matrix σminIm to the columns of A, where Im
denotes an m×m identity matrix. Compute Yc = ÂΦ̂, Yr = ΨÂ + N1, and Z = SÂTT + N2.
2. Compute a matrix U ∈ Rm×t whose columns are orthonormal basis for the column space of Yc and
matrix V ∈ Rt×n whose rows are the orthonormal basis for the row space of Yr.
3. Compute a SVD of SU := U˜sΣ˜sV˜Ts ∈ Rv×t and a SVD of VTT := U˜tΣ˜tV˜Tt ∈ Rt×v.
4. Compute a SVD of V˜sΣ˜
†
s[U˜Ts ZV˜t]kΣ˜
†
tU˜
T
t . Let it is be U
′Σ′V′T.
5. Output the matrix U˜ = UU′ comprising of left singular vectors, diagonal matrix Σ˜ = Σ′, and the
matrix V˜ = VTV′ with right-singular vectors.
Figure 2: Space Optimal (ε, δ)-Differentially Private LRF Under Priv1 (PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF)
consider the matrices are updated by inserting one row at a time: all the updates at time τ ≤ T are of the
form
{
iτ ,A
(τ)
}
, where 1 ≤ iτ ≤ m, A(τ) ∈ Rn, and iτ 6= iτ ′ for all τ 6= τ ′. We get the following corollary
by using ATA as the input matrix (see Appendix F for the formal description of the algorithm):
Corollary 4. (Theorem 49, informal). Let A be anm×nmatrix updated by inserting one row at a time such
that every row has a bounded norm 1 and m > n. Then there is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm
under Priv2 that uses O˜(nkα−2) space, and outputs a rank-k matrix B such that with probability at least
9/10, ‖ATA−B‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖ATA− [ATA]k‖F + O˜
(√
nk/(αε)
)
.
We do not violate the lower bound of Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] because their lower bound is valid when
α = 0, which is not possible for low space algorithms due to Theorem 3. Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] bypassed
their lower bounds under a stronger assumption known as singular value separation: the difference between
k-th singular value and all k′-th singular values for k′ > k is at least ω(
√
n). In other words, our result shows
that we do not need singular value separation while using significantly less space—O˜(nk/α2) as compared
to O(n2)—if we are ready to pay for a small multiplicative error (this also happens for both the problems
studied by Blocki et al. [BBDS12] though the authors do not mention it explicitly). There are scenarios
where our algorithm perform better, such as when ‖ATA − [ATA]k‖F = O(
√
kn) with small singular
value separation. For example, a class of rank-ck matrices (for c ≥ 2) with singular values σ1, · · · , σck,
such that σ2k = σ
2
k′ + O(
√
n/k) for k ≤ k′ ≤ ck, does not satisfy singular value separation. Moreover,
‖ATA − [ATA]k‖F = O(
√
kn) and ‖ATA‖F = O(
√
m). In this case, we have ‖ATA − B‖F ≤
O((αε)−1
√
kn). On the other hand, Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] guarantees ‖ATA − B‖F ≤ O(ε−1k
√
n).
That is, we improve on Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] when α = Θ(1) for a large class of matrices. Some examples
include the matrices considered in the literature of matrix completion (see [MW17] for details).
2 A Meta Low Space Differentially Private Algorithm Under Priv1
Our aim in this section is to present a unified algorithmic approach in the form of meta algorithm (see,
Figure 2) for all the settings mentioned in the introduction. This restricts a lot in terms of algorithmic design
especially when privacy is the main focus. For example, since one of our goals is private algorithms under
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turnstile update model, we are restricted to only use linear sketches due to the result of Li et al. [LNW14].
Even though we are restricted by what approach we can take, we show that advance yet inexpensive post-
processing combined with careful analysis can lead to a unified algorithmic approach for outputting LRF
with significantly small error in all the settings mentioned earlier in the introduction. In particular, we make
three key observations: (i) there is a way to maintain differentially private sketches of A (henceforth, we call
such sketches noisy sketches) that give sub-optimal additive error, (ii) one can apply post-processing to these
noisy sketches to obtain optimal additive error, and (iii) even though we can only use linear sketches when
matrices are updated arbitrarily, we can judiciously exploit the properties of these sketches in our analysis
to get tight bounds on the additive error for all the settings considered in this paper.
To illustrate point (i) and why we need post-processing, consider the following vanilla algorithm, which
is reminiscent of Dwork et al. [DTTZ14], for approximating the right singular vector: compute B = ΦA +
N1, where Φ satisfies [MM13, Theorem 1] and N1 ∼ N (0, ρ21)O˜(n
2)×n for ρ1 as defined in Figure 2. The
output is [B]k, the best rank k approximation of B. This already gives a good approximation. Let m n2
and let [U˜]k[Σ˜]k[V˜]Tk be the singular value decomposition of [B]k. Then by [MM13, Theorem 1],
‖A−A[V˜]k[V˜]Tk ‖F ≤ ‖(A + Φ†N1)− (A + Φ†N1)[V˜]k[V˜]Tk ‖F + ‖Φ†N1 + Φ†N1[V˜]k[V˜]Tk ‖F
≤ (1− α)−1 ‖B(I− [V˜]k[V˜]Tk )‖F +O(‖Φ†N1 + Φ†N1[V˜]k[V˜]Tk ‖F )
= (1− α)−1 ‖B− [B]k‖F +O(‖Φ†N1 + Φ†N1[V˜]k[V˜]Tk ‖F )
≤ (1− α) ‖B(I− [V]k[V]Tk )‖F +O(‖Φ†N1 + Φ†N1[V˜]k[V˜]Tk ‖F )
≤ (1 + α) (1− α)−1∆k +O(‖Φ†N1‖F + ‖Φ†N1[V˜]k[V˜]Tk ‖F ).
The term in O(·) can be bounded using the projection property of Φ to get a sub-optimal additive
error. The question is whether we can further improve it to get optimal additive error. We show that with
careful algorithmic design and analysis as pointed out in point (ii) above, we can indeed achieve optimal
additive error. That is, we can extract top-k singular components of the input matrix A from sketches that are
appropriately perturbed to preserve differential privacy. The underlying idea is as follows: suppose we know
the singular value decomposition of [A]k := [U]k[Σ]k[V]Tk , where [A]k is a best rank-k approximation to
A [EY36]. Then for finding a matrix B such that B ≈ A, it suffices to compute U˜ that approximates
[U]k, Σ˜ that approximates [Σ]k, and V˜ that approximates [V]k, and set B := U˜Σ˜V˜T. However, this over
simplistic overview does not guarantee privacy. The question next is which privacy preserving technique
one should use to ensure small additive error (and if possible, optimal additive error).
The two traditional methods to preserve privacy—input perturbation and output perturbation—do not
provide both privacy and small additive error. For example, if we use output perturbation to compute the
sketches Yc = AΦ+N and Yr = ΨA+N′ for appropriate sketching matrices Φ and Ψ and noise matrices
N and N′, then we get an additive error term that can be arbitrarily large (more specifically, depends on the
Frobenius norm of A and has the form ‖NLAN′‖F for some linear function LA of A). On the other hand,
input perturbation of the linear sketches Yr = ΨA and Yc = AΦ followed by a multiplication by Gaussian
matrices Ω1 and Ω2 as in [BBDS12, Upa14a, Upa14b] can leak private data due to a subtle reason. Every
row of Ω1Yc (and columns of YrΩ2) has a multivariate Gaussian distribution if the determinant of YTc Yc
(YrYTr , respectively) is non zero. If m < n, one can prove that computing YcΩ1 preserves privacy, but,
since, Yr is not a full-column rank matrix, the multivariate Gaussian distribution is not defined. The trick to
consider the subspace orthogonal to the kernel space of Yr [BBDS12] does not work because span of ΨA
and ΨA′ may not coincide for neighboring matrices A and A′. If the span do not coincide, then one can
easily differentiate the two cases with high probability, violating differential privacy. In fact, until this work,
it was not even clear whether using input perturbation yields low rank approximation (see the comment after
Theorem IV.2 and discussion in Section V in Blocki et al. [BBDS12]).
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All of this presents a pessimistic picture. However, we show that we incur optimal additive error and
preserve privacy if we use input perturbation with a careful choice of parameter to one of the sketches
(depending on whether m ≤ n or not) and output perturbation to the other two sketches. The intuitive
reason why this incurs small additive error is the fact that only one of the sketches, Yr or Yc, undergoes
output perturbation, so there is no term like ‖NLAN′‖F as above. While helpful to the intuition, this does
not directly yield optimal additive error. This is because, even if we do not get an additive error term with
large value like ‖NLAN′‖F , if not analyzed precisely, one can either get a non-analytic expression for the
error terms or one that is difficult to analyze. To get analytic expressions for all the error terms that are
also easier to analyze, we introduce two carefully chosen optimization problems (see equation (3) below).
We carefully tune our analysis so that the intermediate terms satisfy certain properties (see the proof sketch
below for exact requirements). This allows us to show that Yc and Yr (or equivalently, their orthonormal
bases U and V), as formed in Figure 2, approximates the span of [U]k and [V]k up to a small additive error.
Once we have extracted a “good enough” U and V, our problem reduces to computing argminrk(X)≤k ‖A−
UXV‖F . This would require storing the whole matrix A, something that we wish to avoid. To avoid stor-
ing the whole A, we use the fact that S and T are sampled from a distribution of random matrices with
a property that, for all appropriate X, ‖A − UXV‖F ≈ ‖S(A − UXV)TT‖F . In other words, without
privacy, argminrk(X)≤k ‖S(A−UXV)TT‖F can be used to get a “good” approximation of [Σ]k.
The exact method to perform and analyze the approximation of [Σ]k is slightly more involved because
we only have access to the noisy version of SAT. We show that careful post processing allows one to output
an approximation to Σk under a rotation and a small additive error. Finally, we arrive at the following result
stated for the case when m ≤ n. The result when m > n can be derived by just swapping m and n in the
theorem below.
Theorem 5. Let m,n, k ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters (with m ≤ n). Let κ = (1 + α)/(1− α),
η = max
{
k, α−1
}
, and σmin = 16 log(1/δ)
√
tκ ln(1/δ)/ε. Given an m× n matrix A, PRIVATE-SPACE-
OPTIMAL-LRF, described in Figure 2, outputs a factorization U˜, Σ˜, V˜ such that
1. PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF is (3ε, 3δ) differentially private under Priv1.
2. With probability 9/10 over the random coins of PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF,
‖ (A 0)− U˜Σ˜V˜T‖F ≤ (1 + α)∆k +O(σmin√m+ ε−1√kn ln(1/δ)), where Mk = U˜Σ˜V˜T.
3. The space used by PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF is O((m+ n)ηα−1 log(k/δ)).
4. The total computational time isO
(
nn(A) log(1/δ) + (m2 + nη)ηα−2 log2(k/δ) + η3α−5 log3(k/δ)
)
.
Here
(
A 0
)
is the matrix formed by appending an all zero m×m matrix to the columns of A.
Proof Sketch. The proof of Theorem 5 is presented in Appendix D.1. Here, we give a brief sketch of part 2
(for m ≤ n) to illustrate the key points that helps us in the discussion of other results in this paper. Let Â be
as defined in Figure 2. Part 2 follows from the following chain of inequalities and bounding ‖ÂΦLAN1‖F :
‖Mk −
(
A 0
) ‖F ≤ ‖Mk − Â‖F +O(σmin√m)
≤ (1 + α)‖Â− [Â]k‖F + ‖ÂΦLAN1‖F +O(σmin
√
m)
≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + ‖ÂΦLAN1‖F +O(σmin
√
m), (1)
where the matrix LA satisfies the following properties: (a) ‖ÂΦLAΨÂ − Â‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖Â − [Â]k‖F ,
(b) LA has rank at most k, and (c) ΨAΦLA is a rank-k projection matrix. We use subadditivity of norm
to prove the first inequality and Weyl’s perturbation theorem (Theorem 25) to prove the third inequality.
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Proving the second inequality is the technically involved part. For this, we need to find a candidate LA. Let
suppose we have such a candidate LA with all the three properties. Then we can show that
min
rk(X)≤k
‖UXV −B‖F ≤ ‖ÂΦLAΨÂ− Â‖F + ‖ÂΦLAN1‖F + ‖S†N1(T†)T‖F
≤ (1 + α)‖Â− [Â]k‖F + ‖ÂΦLAN1‖F + ‖S†N2(TT)†‖F , (2)
where B = A + S†N1(T†)T. The first inequality follows from the subadditivity of Frobenius norm, the
fact that U and V are orthonormal bases of Yc and Yr, and property (b) to exploit that minimum on the
left hand side is over rank-k matrices. We then use the approximation guarantee of property (a) to get the
second inequality. Using Lemma 28 and the fact that S and T satisfies Lemma 15, we can lower bound the
left hand side of equation (2) up to an additive term as follows:
‖ (A 0)− U˜Σ˜V˜T‖F − ‖S†N2(TT)†‖F ≤ (1 + α)3 min
rk(X)≤k
‖UXV −B‖F ,
where U˜, Σ˜, and V˜ are as in Figure 2. We upper bound the right hand side of equation (2) by using Markov’s
inequality combined with the fact that both S and T satisfy Lemma 15 and LA satisfies property (c). Scaling
the value of α by a constant gives part 2. So all that remains is to find a candidate matrix LA. To get such
an LA, we construct and solve the following two closely related optimization problems:
Prob1 : min
X
‖Ψ(ÂΦ([Â]kΦ)†X− Â)‖F and Prob2 : min
X
‖ÂΦ([Â]kΦ)†X− Â‖F . (3)
We prove that a solution to Prob1 gives us a candidate LA. This completes the proof.
Adapting to Continual Release Model. Until now, we gave algorithms that produce the output only at
the end of the stream. There is a related model called (ε, δ)-differential privacy under T -continual re-
lease [DNPR10]. In this model, the server receives a stream of length T and produces an output after every
update, such that every output is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Our meta algorithm can be easily modified
to work in this model while incurring an extra log T factor. We utilize the fact that we only store noisy
linear sketches of the private matrix during the updates and low-rank factorization is computed through
post-processing on only the noisy sketches. So, we can use the generic transformation [CSS12, DNPR10]
to maintain the sketch form of the updates. A factorization for any range of time can be then done by aggre-
gating all the sketches for the specified range using range queries. This gives the first instance of algorithm
that provides differentially private continual release of LRF. We show the following.
Corollary 6. (Theorem 51, informal) Let A be an m × n private matrix with m ≤ n streamed over T
time epochs. Then there is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm under Priv1 that outputs a rank-k
factorization under the continual release for T time epochs such that γ = O˜(ε−1(
√
mkα−1 +
√
kn) log T )
with probability 9/10.
From Priv1 to Priv2. If we try to use the idea described above to prove differential privacy under Priv2, we
end up with an additive error that depends linearly on min {m,n}. This is because we need to perturb the
input matrix by a noise proportional to min{√km,√kn} to preserve differential privacy under Priv2. We
show that by maintaining noisy sketches Y = AΦ + N1 and Z = SA + N2 for appropriately chosen noise
matrices N1 and N2 and sketching matrices Φ and S, followed by some post processing, we can have an
optimal error differentially private algorithm under Priv2. Here, we require S to satisfy the same property
as in the case of Priv1. However, the lack of symmetry between S and Φ requires us to decouple the effects
of noise matrices to get a tight bound on the additive error.
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3 Local Differentially Private Algorithm
Till now, we have considered a single server that receives the private matrix in a streamed manner. We
next consider a stronger variant of differential privacy known as local differential privacy (LDP) [DJW13,
DMNS06, EGS03, War65]. In the local model, each individual applies a differentially private algorithm
locally to their data and shares only the output of the algorithm—called a report—with a server that aggre-
gates users’ reports. A multi-player protocol is (ε, δ)-LDP if for all possible inputs and runs of the protocol,
the transcript of player i’s interactions with the server is (ε, δ)-LDP.
One can study two variants of local differential privacy depending on whether the server and the users
interact more than once or not (see Figure 3). In the interactive variant, the server sends several messages,
each to a subset of users. In the noninteractive variant, the server sends a single message to all the users
at the start of the protocol and sends no message after that. Smith, Thakurta, and Upadhyay [STU17]
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Figure 3: LDP with (left) and without (right) interaction.
argued that noninterac-
tive locally private algo-
rithms are ideal for im-
plementation.
The natural exten-
sion of Problem 1 in
the local model is when
the matrix is distributed
among the users such
that every user has one
row of the matrix and users are responsible for the privacy of their row vector. Unfortunately, known private
algorithms (including the results presented till now) do not yield non trivial additive error in the local model.
For example, if we convert Theorem 2 to the local model, we end up with an additive error O˜(
√
kmn). This
is worse than the trivial bound of O(
√
mn), for example, when A ∈ {0, 1}m×n, a trivial output of all zero
matrix incurs an error at most O(
√
mn). In fact, existing lower bounds in the local model suggests that one
is likely to incur an error which is O(
√
m) factor worse than in the central model, where m is the number
of users. However, owing to the result of Dwork et al. [DTTZ14], we can hope to achieve non-trivial result
for differentially private principal component analysis (see, Definition 10) leading us to ask
Question 3. Is there a locally private algorithm for low rank principal component analysis?
This problem has been studied without privacy under the row-partition model [BCL05, LBKW14, LBRB08,
BWZ16, GSS17, PMVdG+13, QOSG02, TD99]). Even though there is a rich literature on local differen-
tially private algorithms [AHP09, BS15, DJW13, EPK14, EGS03, HKR12, KLN+11, MS06, War65], the
known approaches to convert existing (private or distributed non-private) algorithms to locally private algo-
rithms either leads to a large additive error or require interaction. We exploit the fact that our meta algorithm
only stores differentially private sketches of the input matrix to give a noninteractive algorithm for low-rank
principal component analysis (PCA) under local differential privacy.
Theorem 7. (Theorem 57, informal). Let A be an m× n matrix (where m > n) such that every user holds
one row of A. Then there is a noninteractive (ε, δ)-LDP under Priv2 that outputs a rank-k orthonormal
matrix U such that ‖A−UUTA‖F ≤ (1+α)∆k+O(kα−2−1
√
m log(k/δ)
√
log(1/δ)) with probability
at least 9/10. Moreover, every user sends O˜(k2α−4 log2(k/δ)) bits of communication.
The above theorem gives the first instance of non-interactive algorithm that computes low-rank principal
component analysis in the model of local differential privacy. The best known lower bound on additive error
for differentially private PCA is by Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] in the central model in the static data setting.
Their lower bound on the additive error is Ω˜(k
√
n) for squared Frobenius norm and has no multiplicative
error. An interesting question from our result is to investigate how close or far we are from optimal error.
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Roadmap to Appendices. All our proofs and algorithms are in appendices. We prove Theorem 5 in Ap-
pendix D, and, also provide and analyze a space efficient algorithm under Priv2. Appendix E covers the
differentially private LRF in the turnstile update model under both Priv1 and Priv2 answering Question 1.
We extend these algorithms to continual release model in Appendix G. Appendix H gives the space lower
bound when γ 6= 0 answering Question 2 and discussed in Section 1.1.2. Appendix I gives noninteractive
local differentially private LRF algorithm under Priv2 answering Question 3 and discussed in Section 3.
Appendix J gives the empirical evaluation of our results.
Acknowledgement. The author wishes to thank Adam Smith for many useful discussions. Even though he
declined to be coauthor in this paper, this paper would have not existed without his insightful inputs.
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A Related Work
Low-rank approximation (LRA), where the goal is to output a matrix B such that ‖A−B‖F is close to the
optimal LRA, of large data-matrices has received a lot of attention in the recent past in the private as well as
the non-private setting. In what follows, we give a brief exposition of works most relevant to this work.
In the non-private setting, previous works have either used random projection or random sampling (at a
cost of a small additive error) to give low-rank approximation [AM07, CW09, DKM06a, DM05, DRVW06,
FKV04, KN14, PTRV98b, RV07, Sar06]. Subsequent works [CMM17, CW13, CW17, DV06, MZ11,
MM13, NDT09, Sar06] achieved a run-time that depends linearly on the input sparsity of the matrix. In
a series of works, Clarkson and Woodruff [CW09, CW13] showed space lower bounds and almost matching
space algorithms. Recently, Boutsidis et al. [BWZ16] gave the first space-optimal algorithm for low-rank
approximation under turnstile update mode, but they do not optimize for run-time. A optimal space algo-
rithm was recently proposed by Yurtsever et al. [YUTC17]. Distributed PCA algorithms in the row partition
model and arbitrary partition model has been long studied [BCL05, LBKW14, LBRB08, BWZ16, GSS17,
PMVdG+13, QOSG02, TD99].
In the private setting, low-rank approximation LRA has been studied under a privacy guarantee called
differential privacy. Differential privacy was introduced by Dwork et al. [DMNS06]. Since then, many
algorithms for preserving differential privacy have been proposed in the literature [DR14]. All these mech-
anisms have a common theme: they perturb the output before responding to queries. Recently, Blocki et
al. [BBDS12] and Upadhyay [Upa13] took a complementary approach. They perturb the input reversibly
and then perform a random projection of the perturbed matrix.
Blum et al. [BDMN05] first studied the problem of differentially private LRA in the Frobenius norm.
This was improved by Hardt and Roth [HR12] under the low coherence assumption. Upadhyay [Upa14a]
later made it a single-pass. Differentially private LRA has been studied in the spectral norm as well by
many works [CSS12, KT13, HR13, HP14]. Kapralov and Talwar [KT13] and Chaudhary et al. [CSS12]
studied the spectral LRA of a matrix by giving a matching upper and lower bounds for privately computing
the top k eigenvectors of a matrix with pure differential privacy (i.e., δ = 0). In subsequent works Hardt
and Roth [HR13] and Hardt and Price [HP14] improved the approximation guarantee with respect to the
spectral norm by using robust private subspace iteration algorithm. Recently, Dwork et al. [DTTZ14] gave
a tighter analysis of Blum et al. [BDMN05] to give an optimal approximation to the right singular space, i.e.,
they gave a LRA for the covariance matrix. Dwork et al. [DNPR10] first considered streaming algorithms
with privacy under the model of pan-privacy, where the internal state is known to the adversary. They gave
private analogues of known sampling based streaming algorithms to answer various counting tasks. This
was followed by results on online private learning [DTTZ14, JKT12, TS13].
B Notations and Preliminaries
We give a brief exposition of notations and linear algebra to the level required to understand this paper. We
refer the readers to standard textbook on this topic for more details [Bha13]. We let N to denote the set of
natural numbers and R to denote the set of real numbers. For a real number x ∈ R, we denote by |x| the
absolute value of x. We use boldface lowercase letters to denote vectors, for example, x, and x1, . . . , xn to
denote the entries of x, and bold-face capital letters to denote matrices, for example, A. For two vectors x
and y, we denote by 〈x, y〉 = ∑i xiyi the inner product of x and y. We let e1, . . . , en denote the standard
basis vectors in Rn, i.e., ei has entries 0 everywhere except for the position i where the entry is 1. We
denote by
(
A b
)
the matrix formed by appending the matrix A with the vector b. We use the notation
In to denote the identity matrix of order n and 0m×n the all-zero m × n matrix. Where it is clear from the
context, we drop the subscript.
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For a m × n matrix A, we denote by Aij the (i, j)-th entry of A. We denote by vec(A) the vector of
length mn formed by the entries of the matrix A, i.e., for an m × n matrix A, the ((i − 1)n + j)-th entry
of vec(A) is Aij , where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. The transpose of a matrix A is a matrix B such that
Bij = Aji. We use the notation AT to denote the transpose of a matrix A. For a matrix A, we denote
the best k-rank approximation of A by [A]k and its Frobenius norm by ‖A‖F . For a matrix A, we use the
symbol r(A) to denote its rank and det(A) to denote its determinant. A matrix A is a non-singular matrix
if det(A) 6= 0.
B.1 Definitons
Definition 8. (Differentially Private Low Rank Factorizataion in the General Turnstile Update Model). Let
the private matrix A ∈ Rm×n initially be all zeroes. At every time epoch, the curator receives an update in
the form of the tuple {i, j,∆}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and ∆ ∈ R—each update results in a change
in the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix A as follows: Ai,j ← Ai,j + ∆. Given parameters 0 < α, β < 1 and γ,
and the target rank k, the curator is required to output a differentially-private rank-k matrix factorization
U˜k, Σ˜k, and V˜k of A at the end of the stream, such that, with probability at least 1− β,
‖A− U˜kΣ˜kV˜Tk ‖F ≤ (1 + α)∆k + γ,
where ∆k := ‖A− [A]k‖F with [A]k being the best rank-k approximation of A.
Definition 9. (Differentially Private Low Rank Factorizataion in the Continual Release Model). Let the
private matrix A ∈ Rm×n initially be all zeroes. At every time epoch t, the curator receives an update in
the form of the tuple {i, j,∆}, where 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, and ∆ ∈ R—each update results in a change
in the (i, j)-th entry of the matrix A as follows: A(t)i,j ← A(t−1)i,j + ∆. Given parameters 0 < α, β < 1 and
γ, and the target rank k, the curator is required to output a differentially-private rank-k matrix factorization
U˜
(t)
k , Σ˜
(t)
k , and V˜
(t)
k of A at every time epoch, such that, with probability at least 1− β,
‖A(t) − U˜(t)k Σ˜(t)k (V˜(t)k )T‖F ≤ (1 + α)∆(t)k + γ,
where ∆(t)k := ‖A(t) − [A(t)]k‖F with [A(t)]k being the best rank-k approximation of A(t).
Definition 10. (Local Differentially Private Principal Component Analysis Problem). Given an m × n
matrix A distributed among m users where each user holds a row of the matrix A, a rank parameter k, and
an accuracy parameter 0 < α < 1, design a local differentially private algorithm which, upon termination,
outputs an orthonormal matrix U such that
‖A−UUTA‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + γ
with probability at least 1 − β, and the communication cost of the algorithm is as small as possible. Fur-
thermore, the algorithm should satisfies (ε, δ)-LDP.
In this paper, we use various concepts and results from the theory of random projections, more specifi-
cally the Johnson-Lindenstrauss transform and its variants.
Definition 11. Let α, δ > 0. A distribution D over t× n random matrices satisfies (α, β)-Johnson Linden-
strauss property (JLP) if, for any unit vector x ∈ Rn, we have
PrΦ∼D[‖Φx‖22 ∈ (1± α)] ≥ 1− β.
Definition 12. A distribution DR of t × m matrices satisfies (α, δ)-subspace embedding for generalized
regression if it has the following property: for any matrices P ∈ Rm×n and Q ∈ Rm×n′ such that r(P) ≤ r,
with probability 1− δ over Φ ∼ DR, if
X˜ = argmin
X
‖Φ(PX−Q)‖F and X̂ = argmin
X∈Rn×n′
‖PX−Q‖F ,
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then ‖PX˜−Q‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖PX̂−Q‖F .
Definition 13. A distribution DA over v ×m matrices satisfies (α, δ)-affine subspace embedding if it has
the following property: for any matrices D ∈ Rm×n and E ∈ Rm×n′ such that r(D) ≤ r, with probability
1− δ over S ∼ DA, simultaneously for all X ∈ Rn×n′ , ‖S(DX−E)‖2F = (1± α)‖DX−E‖2F .
We use the symbol DR to denote a distribution that satisfies (α, δ)-subspace embedding for generalized
regression and DA to denote a distribution that satisfies (α, δ)-affine subspace embedding.
B.2 Linear Algebra
A matrix is called a diagonal matrix if the non-zero entries are all along the principal diagonal. An m×m
matrix A is a unitary matrix if ATA = AAT = Im. Additionally, if the entries of the matrix A are real,
then such a matrix is called an orthogonal matrix. For an m×m matrix A, the trace of A is the sum of its
diagonal elements. We use the symbol Tr(A) to denote the trace of matrix A. We use the symbol det(A)
to denote the determinant of matrix A.
Let A be an m ×m matrix. Its singular values are the eigenvalues of the matrix
√
ATA. The eigen-
values of the matrix
√
ATA are real because ATA is a symmetric matrix and has a well-defined spectral
decomposition1 [Bha13].
The singular-value decomposition (SVD) of an m × n rank-r matrix A is a decomposition of A as a
product of three matrices, A = UΣVT such that U ∈ Rm×r and V ∈ Rn×r have orthonormal columns
and Σ ∈ Rr×r is a diagonal matrix with singular values of A on its diagonal. One can equivalently write it
in the following form:
A =
r(A)∑
i=1
σiuiv
T
i ,
where ui is the i-th column of U, vi is the i-th column of V, and σi is the i-th diagonal entry of Σ.
One can derive a lot of things from the singular value decomposition of a matrix. For example,
1. The Moore-Penrose pseudo-inverse of a matrix A = UΣVT is denoted by A† and has a SVD
A† = VΣ†UT, where Σ† consists of inverses of only non-zero singular values of A. In other words,
A† =
r(A)∑
i=1
1
σi
uiv
T
i ,
where r(A) is the number of non-zero singular values of A.
2. Let σ1 ≥ · · · ≥ σk ≥ · · · ≥ σr(A) be the singular values of A. Then
[A]k =
k∑
i=1
σiuiv
T
i ,
3. The trace of a matrix A can be represented in form of the singular values of A as follows: Tr(A) =∑
i σi. Similarly, the determinant of a matrix A is det(A) =
∏
i σi. Moreover, the Frobenius norm
of A is
∑
i σ
2
i .
1A spectral decomposition of a symmetric matrixA is the representation of a matrix in form of its eigenvalues and eigenvectors:∑
i λiviv
T
i , where λi are the eigenvalues of A and vi is the eigenvector corresponding to λi.
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We use few unitary matrices, which we define next. Let N be a power of 2. A Walsh-Hadamard matrix
of order N is an N ×N matrix formed recursively as follows:
WN =
1√
2
(
WN/2 WN/2
WN/2 −WN/2
)
W1 := (1).
A Walsh-Hadamard matrix is a unitary matrix. We often drop the subscript wherever it is clear from the
context. A randomized Walsh-Hadamard matrix is a matrix product of a Walsh-Hadamard matrix and a
random diagonal matrix with entries ±1 picked according to the following probability distribution:
Pr[X = 1] = Pr[X = −1] = 1/2.
A discrete Fourier matrix of order n is an n×n matrix such that the (i, j)-th entry is ω(i−1)(j−1), where
ω is the n-th root of unity, i.e., ω = e−2piι/n.
B.3 Gaussian Distribution
Given a random variable x, we denote by N (µ, ρ2) the fact that x has a normal Gaussian distribution
with mean µ and variance ρ2. The Gaussian distribution is invariant under affine transformation, i.e., if
X ∼ N (µx, σx) and Y ∼ N (µy, σy), thenZ = aX+bY has the distributionZ ∼ N (aµx+bµy, aσ2x+bσ2y).
This is also called the rotational invariance of Gaussian distribution. By simple computation, one can verify
that the tail of a standard Gaussian variable decays exponentially. More specifically, for a random variable
X ∼ N (0, 1), we have Pr [|X| > t] ≤ 2e−t2/2.
Our proof uses an analysis of multivariate Gaussian distribution. The multivariate Gaussian distribu-
tion is a generalization of univariate Gaussian distribution. Let µ be an N -dimensional vector. An N -
dimensional multivariate random variable, x ∼ N (µ,Λ), where Λ = E[(x− µ)(x− µ)T] is the N ×N co-
variance matrix, has the probability density function given by PDFX(x) := e
−xTΛ†x/2√
(2pi)r(Σ) det(Λ)
. If Λ has a non-
trivial kernel space, then the multivariate distribution is undefined. However, in this paper, all our covariance
matrices have only trivial kernel. Multivariate Gaussian distributions is invariant under affine transformation,
i.e., if y = Ax + b, where A ∈ RM×N is a rank-M matrix and b ∈ RM , then y ∼ N (Aµ+ b,AΛAT).
C Basic Results Used in This Paper
Our proofs uses various concepts and known results about random projections, pseudo-inverse of matrices
and gaussian distribution. In this section, we cover them up to the level of exposition required to understand
this paper. We refer to the excellent book by Bhatia [Bha13] for more exposition on pseudo-inverses, and
Woodruff [Woo14].
C.1 Random Projections.
Random projection has been used in computer science for a really long time. Some partial application
includes metric and graph embeddings [Bou85, LLR95], computational speedups [Sar06, Vem05], machine
learning [BBV06, Sch00], nearest-neighbor search [IM98, Nir06], and compressed sensing [BDDW08].
In this paper, we use random projections that satisfy Definition 12 and Definition 13. An example distri-
butionDR with t = O(α−2 log(1/δ)) is the distribution of random matrices whose entries are sampled i.i.d.
from N (0, 1/t). Recently, Clarkson and Woodruff [CW12] proposed other distribution of random matrices
that satisfies (α, δ)-subspace embedding for generalized regression and (α, δ)-affine subspace embedding.
They showed the following:
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Lemma 14. ([CW12, Lem 41, Lem 46]) There is a distribution DR over Rt×m such that satisfies
(i) if t = O(α−2 log2m), then for Φ ∼ DR and any m× n matrix Q, ‖ΦQ‖2F = (1± α)‖Q‖2F , and
(ii) if t = O(r/α log(r/δ)), then DR satisfies (α, δ)-subspace embedding for generalized regression for P
and Q.
Further, for any matrix L ∈ Rm×n, ΦL can be computed in O(nn(L) + tn log t) time. Here P, Q, and r
are as in Definition 12.
Lemma 15. [CW12, Thm 39, Thm 42]) There exists a distribution DA over Rv×m such that
(i) if v = Θ(α−2), then for S ∼ DA and any m× d matrix D, ‖SD‖2F = (1± α)‖D‖2F .
(ii) if v = O(p/α2 log(p/δ)), then DA satisfies (α, δ)-affine embedding for D and E.
Further, for any matrix L ∈ Rm×n, SL can be computed in O(nn(L) + nv log v) time. Here E, D, and p
are as in Definition 13.
In the theorems above, Φ and S are oblivious to the matrices P,Q,D, and E. That is, we design the
distribution DA over linear maps such that for any fixed matrices D,E, if we chose S ∼ DA, then S is an
(α, β)-affine embedding for D,E. Similarly, we design the distribution DR over linear maps such that for
any fixed matrices P,Q, if we chose Φ ∼ DA, then Φ is an (α, β) embedding for P,Q.
C.2 Differential privacy
Differential privacy is a very robust guarantee of privacy which makes confidential data available widely for
accurate analysis while still preserving the privacy of individual data. Achieving these two requirements at
the same time seems paradoxical. On one hand, we do not wish to leak information about an individual. On
the other hand, we want to answer the query on the entire database as accurately as possible. This makes
designing differentially private mechanisms challenging.
C.2.1 Robustness of Differential Privacy
One of the key features of differential privacy is that it is preserved under arbitrary post-processing, i.e., an
analyst, without additional information about the private database, cannot compute a function that makes an
output less differentially private. In other words,
Lemma 16. (Dwork et al. [DKM+06b]). Let M(D) be an (α, β)-differential private mechanism for a
database D , and let h be any function, then any mechanismM′ := h(M(D)) is also (α, β)-differentially
private for the same set of tasks.
Proof. Let M be a differentially private mechanism. Let range(M) denote the range the of M.Let R
be the range of the function h(·). Without loss of generality, we assume that h(·) : range(M) → R
is a deterministic function. This is because any randomized function can be decomposed into a convex
combination of deterministic function, and a convex combination of differentially private mechanisms is
differentially private. Fix any pair of neighbouring data-sets DB and D˜B and an event S ⊆ R. Let
T = {y ∈ range(M) : f(r) ∈ S}. Then
Pr[f(M(DB)) ∈ S] = Pr[M(DB) ∈ T ]
≤ exp(α)Pr[M(D˜B) ∈ T ] + β
= exp(α)Pr[f(M(D˜B)) ∈ S] + β.
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C.2.2 Composition
Before we begin, we discuss what does it mean by the term “composition” of differentially private mecha-
nism. The composition that we consider covers the following two cases:
1. Repeated use of differentially private mechanism on the same database.
2. Repeated use of differentially private mechanism on different database that might contain information
relating to a particular individual.
The first case covers the case when we wish to use the same mechanism multiple times while the second
case covers the case of cumulative loss of privacy of a single individual whose data might be spread across
many databases.
It is easy to see that the composition of pure differentially private mechanisms yields another pure differ-
entially private mechanism, i.e., composition of an (α1, 0)-differentially private and an (α2, 0)-differentially
private mechanism results in an (α1 + α2, 0)-differentially private mechanism. In other words, the privacy
guarantee depreciates linearly with the number of compositions. In the case of approximate differential
privacy, we can improve on the degradation of α parameter at the cost of slight depreciation of the β factor.
We use this strengthening in our proofs. In our proofs of differential privacy, we prove that each row of the
published matrix preserves (α0, β0)-differential privacy for some appropriate α0, β0, and then invoke a com-
position theorem by Dwork, Rothblum, and Vadhan [DRV10] to prove that the published matrix preserves
(α, β)-differential privacy. The following theorem is the composition theorem that we use.
Theorem 17. (Dwork et al. [DRV10]). Let α0, β0 ∈ (0, 1), and β′ > 0. IfM1, · · · ,M` are each (α, β)-
differential private mechanism, then the mechanism M(D) := (M1(D), · · · ,M`(D)) releasing the con-
catenation of each algorithm is (α′, `β + 0 + β′)-differentially private for α′ <
√
2` ln(1/β′)α0 + 2`α20.
A proof of this theorem could be found in [DR14, Chapter 3].
Gaussian Mechanism. The Gaussian variant of the Laplace mechanism was proven to preserve differential
privacy by Dwork et al. [DKM+06b] in a follow-up work. Let f(·) be a function from a class of ∆-sensitive
functions. The Gaussian mechanism is
M(D, f(·), α) := f(D) + (X1, · · · , Xk), where Xi ∼ N
(
0,
∆2
2
log(1.25/δ)
)
.
Dwork et al. [DKM+06b] proved the following.
Theorem 18. (Gaussian mechanism [DKM+06b].) Let x, y ∈ Rn be any two vectors such that ‖x−y‖2 ≤ c.
Let ρ = cε−1
√
log(1/δ) and g ∼ N (0, ρ2)n be a vector with each entries sampled i.i.d. Then for any
s ⊂ Rn, Pr[x + g ∈ s] ≤ eεPr[y + g ∈ s] + δ.
C.3 Properties of Gaussian distribution.
We need the following property of a random Gaussian matrices.
Fact 19. ([JL84, Sar06]) Let P ∈ Rm×n be a matrix of rank r and Q ∈ Rm×n′ be an m × n′ matrix. Let
D be a distribution of matrices over Rt×n with entries sampled i.i.d. from N (0, 1/t). Then there exists a
t = O(r/α log(r/β)) such that D is an (α, β)-subspace embedding for generalized regression.
Lemma 20. Let N ∼ N (0, ρ2)m×n Gaussian matrix. Then with probability 99/100, ‖N‖F = O(ρ
√
mn).
Proof. The lemma follows from the following computation.
E[‖CΦ‖2F ] = E
∑
i,j
(N˜1)
2
ij
 = ∑
i,j
E[(N˜1)2ij ] = mnρ2.
20
The result follows using Markov’s inequality.
C.4 Properties of pseudo-inverse of a matrix.
We need the following results about product of pseudo-inverse in the proof of Lemma 26 and Lemma ??.
Fact 21. If A has a left-inverse, then A† = (ATA)−1AT and if A has right-inverse, then A† = AT(AAT)−1.
Theorem 22. Let A and B be conforming matrices and either,
1. A has orthonormal columns (i.e., ATA is an identity matrix) or,
2. B has orthonormal rows (i.e., BBT is an identity matrix),
3. A has all columns linearly independent (full column rank) and B has all rows linearly independent
(full row rank) or,
4. B = AT (i.e., B is the conjugate transpose of A),
then (AB)† = B†A†.
We use the following variant of Pythagorean theorem in the proof of Lemma 28.
Theorem 23. (Pythagorean theorem). Let A and B be two matrices such that ATB is an zero matrix. Then
for any C = A + B, we have ‖C‖2F = ‖A‖2F + ‖B‖2F .
C.5 Linear Algebraic Results Used in This Paper
We also need the following results for the privacy proof.
Theorem 24. (Lidskii Theorem [Bha13]). Let A,B be n × n Hermittian matrices. Then for any choice of
indices 1 ≤ i1 ≤ · · · ≤ ik ≤ n,
k∑
j=1
λij (A + B) ≤
k∑
j=1
λij (A) +
k∑
j=1
λij (B),
where {λi(A)}ni=1 are the eigen-values of A in decreasing order.
Theorem 25. (Weyl’s Pertubation Theorem [Bha13]). For anym×n matrices P,Q, we have |σi(P+Q)−
σi(P)| ≤ ‖Q‖2, where σi(·) denotes the i-th singular value and ‖Q‖2 is the spectral norm of the matrix Q.
We use the notation Rad(p) to denote a distribution with support ±1 such that +1 is sampled with
probability p and−1 is sampled with probability 1−p. An n×nWalsh-Hadamard matrix Hn is constructed
recursively as follows:
Hn =
(
Hn/2 Hn/2
Hn/2 −Hn/2
)
and H1 := 1.
A randomized Walsh-Hadamard matrix Wn is formed by multiplying Hn with a diagonal matrix whose
diagonal entries are picked i.i.d. from Rad(1/2). We drop the subscript n where it is clear from the context.
A subsampled randomized Hadamard matrix is construct by multiplying Π1..r from the left to a randomized
Hadamard matrix, where Π1..r is the matrix formed by the first r rows of a random permutation matrix.
Lemma 26. Let S be a v ×m subsampled randomized Hadamard matrix, where v ≤ m and N ∈ Rv×n.
Then we have,
‖S†N2‖F = ‖N2‖F .
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Proof. One way to look at the action of S when it is a subsampled Hadamard transform is that it is a product
of matrices W and Π1..r, where Π1..r is the matrix formed by the first r rows of a random permutation
matrix and W is a randomized Walsh-Hadamard matrix formed by multiplying a Walsh-Hadamard matrix
with a diagonal matrix whose non-zero entries are picked i.i.d. from Rad(1/2).
Since WD has orthonormal rows, S† = (Π1..vWD)† = (WD)T(Π1..v)†. This implies
‖S†N‖F = ‖(Π1..vWD)†N‖F = ‖(WD)TΠ†1..vN‖F
= ‖Π†1..vN‖F .
Using the fact that Π1..v is a full row rank matrix and Π̂1..vΠ̂T1..v is an identity matrix, we have Π̂
†
1..v =
Π̂T1..v(Π̂1..vΠ
T
1..v)
−1 = Π̂T1..v. The result follows.
We reprove the following theorem of Boutsidis et al. [BWZ16]. Our proof allows us a tighter control on
the intermediate results which helps us to get a tighter bound on the additive error.
Theorem 27. Let DR be an (α, δ)-subspace embedding for generalized regression (Definition 12). Then
with probability 1− 2δ over ΦT ∼ DR and Ψ ∼ DR, for any arbitrary m× n matrix A,
min
X,r(X)≤k
‖AΦXΨA−A‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F . (4)
Our proof uses two optimization problems and uses the solution to those optimization problem in a
clever way. We feel that our proof is simpler. It also has explicit solutions to the two optimization problems,
which makes it easy to extend to the case of private low-rank factorization and get a tight bound.
Proof. Let [A]k = UkΣkVTk . We will use Lemma 14 to prove the theorem. Set Φ = Φ
T, P = [A]Tk ,
Q = AT. Then for X˜ = argminX ‖ΦT([A]TkX−AT)‖F , we have with probability 1− δ over ΦT ∼ DR,
‖[A]Tk X˜−AT‖F ≤ (1 + α) minX ‖[A]
T
kX−AT‖F
≤ (1 + α)‖[A]Tk −AT‖F
where the last inequality follows by setting X = UkUTk . Here X˜ = (Φ
T[A]Tk )
†(AΦ)T. Since Frobenius
norm is preserved under transpose, we have by substituting the value of X˜,
‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†[A]k −A‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F . (5)
We now use Lemma 14 on the following regression problem:
min
X
‖WX−A‖F , where W = AΦ([A]kΦ)†.
Let X̂ = argminX ‖Ψ(WX − A)‖F . Since [A]k has rank k, Lemma 14 and equation (5) gives with
probability 1− δ over Ψ ∼ DR
‖WX̂−A‖F = ‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†X̂−A‖F
≤ (1 + α) min
X
‖(AΦ)([A]kΦ)†X−A‖F
≤ (1 + α)‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†[A]k −A‖F
≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F .
Substituting the value of X̂ = (ΨW)†ΨA, with probability 1− 2δ over ΦT,Ψ ∼ DR, we have
‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†(ΨAΦ([A]kΦ)†)†ΨA−A‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F . (6)
Since ([A]kΦ)†(ΨAΦ([A]kΦ)†)† has rank at most k, this completes the proof because Φ([A]kΦ)†)†Ψ
is a rank-k matrix.
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We prove the following key lemma, which can be seen as a generalization of one of the previous results
of Clarkson and Woodruff [CW09]. This lemma would be required in proving all our results.
Lemma 28. Let R be a matrix with orthonormal rows and C have orthonormal columns. Then
min
X,r(X)=k
‖CXR− F‖F = ‖C[CTFRT]kR− F‖F .
Proof. For any matrix Y of appropriate dimension, we have 〈F−CCTF,CCTF−CYR〉 = 0. This is
because F−CCTF = (I−CCT)F lies in space orthogonal to C(CTF−YR). By Theorem 23,
‖F−CYR‖2F = ‖F−CCTF‖2F + ‖CCTF−CYR‖2F
= ‖F−CCTF‖2F + ‖CTF−YR‖2F , (7)
where the second equality follows from the properties of unitary matrices.
Again, for any matrix Y of appropriate dimensions, we have 〈CTFRTR−YR,CTF−CTFRTR〉 =
0. This is because CTFRTR − YR = (CTFRT − Y)R lies in the space spanned by R, and CTF −
CTFRTR = CTF(I−RTR) lies in the orthogonal space. By Theorem 23, we have
‖CTF−YR‖2F = ‖CTF−CTFRTR‖2F + ‖CTFRTR−YR‖2F (8)
Since ‖CTF−CTFRTR‖2F is independent of Y, we just bound the term ‖CTFRTR−YR‖2F . Sub-
stituting Y = [CFR]k and using the fact that multiplying R from the right does not change the Frobenius
norm and [CTFRT]k is the best k-rank approximation to the matrix CTFRT, for all rank-k matrices Z, we
have
‖CTFRTR− [CTFRT]kR‖2F ≤ ‖CTFRTR− ZR‖2F . (9)
Combining equation (9) with equation (8) and Theorem 23, we have
‖CTF− [CFR]kR‖2F ≤ ‖CTF−CTFRTR‖2F + ‖CTFRTR− ZR‖2F = ‖CTF− ZR‖2F . (10)
Combining equation (10) with equation (7), the fact that C has orthonormal columns, and Theorem 23, we
have
‖F−C[CFR]kR‖2F ≤ ‖F−CCTF‖2F + ‖CTF− ZR‖2F
= ‖F−CCTF‖2F + ‖CCTF−CZR‖2F
= ‖F−CZR‖2F .
This completes the proof of Lemma 28.
D Low Space Differentially private Low-rank Factorization
In this section, we give our basic low space algorithms for various granularity of privacy. These algorithms
serve as a meta algorithm on which we built algorithms in various model of computations, like streaming
model under turnstile update, continual release model, and local model. In Appendix D.1, we analyze the
algorithm presented earlier in Section 1.1. In Appendix D.2, we give our low space differentially private
algorithm under Priv2, a stronger privacy guarantee.
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D.1 Low Space Differentially Private Low-rank Factorization Under Priv1
In this section, we analyze the algorithm presented earlier in Section 1.1. For the ease of the readers, we
first restate Theorem 5 here.
Restatement of Theorem 5. Let m,n, k ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters. Let s = max{m,n}, u =
min {m,n}, κ = (1 + α)/(1 − α), η = max{k, α−1}, and σmin = 16 log(1/δ)√tκ ln(1/δ)/ε. Given
an m× n matrix A, PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF, described in Figure 2, outputs a k-rank factorization
U˜, Σ˜, and V˜, such that
1. PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF is (3ε, 3δ) differentially private under Priv1.
2. Let Mk = U˜Σ˜V˜T. Then with probability 9/10 over the random coins of PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-
LRF,
‖ (A 0)−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F +O(σmin√u+ ε−1√ks ln(1/δ)),
3. The space used by PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF is O((m+ n)ηα−1 log(k/δ)).
4. The total computational time is O
(
nn(A) log(1/δ) + (u
2+sη)η log2(k/δ)
α2
+ η
3 log3(k/δ)
α5
)
.
First note that if we do not aim for run time efficiency, then we can simply use Gaussian random matrices
instead of sampling Φ,Ψ ∼ DR and S,T ∼ DA as per Lemma 14 and Lemma 15. This would simplify
the privacy proof as we will see later. Secondly, the probability of success can be amplified to get a high
probability bound by standard techniques. We leave these details as they are standard arguments.
Proof of Theorem 5. Part 3 follows immediately by setting the values of t and v. Part 4 of Theorem 5
requires some computation. More precisely, we have the following.
1. Computing Yc requiresO(nn(A) log(1/δ))+m(m+n)t time and computing Yr requiresO(nn(A) log(1/δ))+
(m+ n)t2 time.
2. Computing U and V requires O(nt2 +mt2) = O((m+ n)η2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time.
3. Computing a SVD of matrices SU and TVT requires vt2 + tv2 = O(k3α−5 log2(k/δ)).
4. Computing Z requires O(nn(A) log(1/δ) + η2/α2 log2(k/δ) + nη2α−2 log2(k/δ)) Computation of
[U˜Ts ZV˜]k requires O(nn(A) log(1/δ)) + tv2 = O(nn(A) log(1/δ) + k3α−5 log
3(k/δ)) time.
5. Computation of the last SVD requires O((m+ n)η2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time.
Combining all these terms, we have our claim on the running time.
D.1.1 Correctness Proof of PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF
We now prove the correctness guarantee of PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF. In what follows, we analyze
the case when m ≤ n. The case when n ≤ m follows analogously due to the symmetry of PRIVATE-
SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF. First note that appending A with an all zero matrix 0m×m has no effect on its
k-rank approximation, i.e., we can analyze the approximation guarantee for Â :=
(
A 0
)
instead of A.
Let Mk be as defined in Theorem 5. We break our proof in three main steps.
(i) Lower bound ‖Mk − Â‖F by ‖Mk −
(
A 0
) ‖F up to an additive term (Lemma 29).
(ii) Relate ‖Mk − Â‖F and ‖Â− [Â]k‖F (Lemma 30).
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(iii) Upper bound ‖Â− [Â]k‖F by a term linear in ‖A− [A]k‖F up to an additive term (Lemma 32).
Part 2 of Theorem 5 follows by combining these three items together.
Performing step (i). We start by proving a bound on ‖Mk − Â‖F by ‖Mk − A‖F and a small additive
term. The following lemma provides such a bound.
Lemma 29. Let A be an m × n input matrix, and let Â = (A σminIm) for σmin defined in Theorem 5.
Denote by Mk := U˜Σ˜V˜T the output of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF. Then
‖Mk −
(
A 0
) ‖F ≤ ‖Mk − Â‖F + σmin√m.
Proof. The lemma is immediate from the following observation: ‖Mk −
(
A 0
) ‖F − σmin‖Im‖F ≤
‖Mk−
(
A 0
)−(0 σminI) ‖F = ‖Mk− Â‖F , where the first inequality follows from the sub-additivity
of the Frobenius norm.
Performing step (ii). This is the most involved part of the proof and uses multiple lemmas as follows.
Lemma 30. Let Â =
(
A σminI
)
and denote by Mk := U˜Σ˜V˜T. Let Φ̂ = t−1ΩΦ. Then with probability
1−O(δ) over the random coins of the algorithm PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF,
‖Mk − Â‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖Â− [Â]k‖F + 2‖S†N(TT)†‖F + ‖ÂΦ̂([Â]kΦ̂)†(ΨÂΦ̂([Â]kΦ̂)†)†N1‖F .
Proof. Let B = Â+S†N(T†)T and Φ̂ = ΩΦ. We first use the relation between minX,r(X)≤k ‖ÂΦ̂XΨÂ−
Â‖ and (1+α)‖Â−[Â]k‖F from the proof of Theorem 27. Using Lemma 14 and Fact 19, if we set A = Â
in equation (6), then with probability 1 − 3δ over Φ̂T,Ψ ∼ DR, ‖ÂΦ̂([Â]kΦ̂)†(ΨÂΦ̂([Â]kΦ̂)†)†ΨÂ −
Â‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖Â − [Â]k‖F . Now define a rank-k matrix Pk := ([Â]kΦ̂)†(ΨÂΦ̂([Â]kΦ̂)†)†. Let us
consider the following optimization problem:
min
X
r(X)≤k
‖YcXYr −B‖F .
Since Pk is a rank-k matrix, using the subadditivity of the Frobenius norm, we have
min
X,
r(X)≤k
‖YcXYr −B‖F ≤ ‖YcPkYr −B‖F
= ‖YcPkYr − (Â + S†N(T†)T)‖F
≤ ‖YcPkYr − Â‖F + ‖S†N(T†)T‖F
= ‖ÂΦ̂Pk(ΨÂ + N1)− Â‖F + ‖S†N(T†)T‖F
≤ ‖ÂΦ̂PkΨÂ− Â‖F + ‖S†N2(T†)T‖F + ‖ÂΦ̂PkN1‖F
≤ (1 + α)2‖Â− [Â]k‖F + ‖S†N2(T†)T‖F + ‖ÂΦ̂PkN1‖F (11)
Let S2 = ÂΦ̂PkN1. By definition, V is a matrix whose rows are an orthonormal basis for the row space
of Yr and U is a matrix whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space of Yc. Therefore,
min
Y
r(Y)≤k
‖UYV −B‖F ≤ min
X
r(X)≤k
‖YcXV −B‖F ≤ min
X
r(X)≤k
‖YcXYr −B‖F . (12)
Combining equation (11) and equation (12), we have
min
Y
r(Y)≤k
‖UYV −B‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖Â− [Â]k‖F + ‖S†N2(T†)T‖F + ‖S2‖F . (13)
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Claim 31. Let U,V,B,A,S,T and N2 be as above. Let DA be a distribution that satisfies (α, δ)-affine
embedding. Let X˜ = argminX,r(X)=k ‖S(UX−B)‖F . Then with probability 1−O(δ) over S,TT ∼ DA,
‖(UX˜V −B)‖F ≤ (1 + α)4‖Â− [Â]k‖F + 4‖S†N2(T†)T‖F + 4‖S2‖F .
Proof. Set p = t, D = U and E = B in the statement of Lemma 15. Let us restrict our attention to matrices
X with rank at most k and denote by
X̂ = argmin
X,r(X)≤k
‖UXV −B‖F and X˜ = argmin
X,r(X)≤k
‖S(UXV −B)TT‖F .
Then we have with probability 1− 3δ over S ∼ DA,
min
X
r(X)=k
‖UXV −B‖F = ‖UX̂V −B‖F ≥ (1 + α)−1/2‖S(UX̂V −B)‖F . (14)
Substituting D = VT, X = (SUX̂)T and E = (SB)T in the statement of Lemma 15, with probability
1− 4δ,
(1 + α)−1/2‖S(UX̂V −B)‖F = (1 + α)−1/2‖VT(SUX̂)T − (SB)T)‖F
≥ (1 + α)−1‖T(VT(SUX̂)T − (SB)T)‖F
= (1 + α)−1‖S(UX̂V −B)TT‖F
≥ (1 + α)−1 min
X
r(X)≤k
‖S(UXV −B)TT‖F
= (1 + α)−1‖S(UX˜V −B)TT‖F
≥ (1 + α)−2‖(UX˜V −B)‖F . (15)
Combining equation (15) with equation (13), with probability 1 − O(δ) over the random coins of
PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF,
‖(UX˜V −B)‖F ≤ (1 + α)4‖Â− [Â]k‖F + 4(‖S†N2(T†)T‖F + ‖S2‖F ) (16)
as α ∈ (0, 1). This completes the proof of Claim 31.
To finalize the proof, we need to compute
X˜ = argmin
X
r(X)≤k
‖S(UXV −B)TT‖F .
We use Lemma 28 to compute X˜. Recall SU = UsΣsVTs and TVT = UtΣtVTt . Using Lemma 28 with
C = U˜s,R = V˜
T
t and F = Z = SÂTT + N2, we get
[U˜Ts SBT
TV˜t]k = argmin
X
r(X)≤k
‖U˜sXV˜Tt − SBTT‖F
This implies that argminX,r(X)≤k ‖S(UXV −B)TT‖F has closed form
X˜ = V˜sΣ˜†s[U˜
T
s ZV˜t]kΣ˜
†
tU˜
T
t (17)
26
Recall, X˜ = V˜sΣ˜†s[U˜Ts ZV˜t]kΣ˜
†
tU˜
T
t = U
′Σ′V′T. Substituting equation (17) in equation (16) and the
fact that B = Â + S†N2(T†)T, we have
‖UU′Σ′(VTV′)T − Â‖F − ‖S†N2(TT)†‖F ≤ ‖UU′Σ′(VTV′)T −B‖F
≤ (1 + α)6‖Â− [Â]k‖F +O(‖S†N2(TT)†‖F + ‖S2‖F ).
This in particular implies that
‖UU′Σ′(VTV′)T − Â‖F ≤ (1 + α)6‖Â− [Â]k‖F +O(‖S†N2(TT)†‖F + ‖S2‖F ).
Scaling the value of α by a constant completes the proof of Lemma 30.
Performing step (iii). In order to complete the proof, we compute an upper bound on ‖Â − [Â]k‖F . For
this, we need the Weyl’s perturbation theorem (Theorem 25).
Lemma 32. Let d be the maximum of the rank of A and Â. Let σ1, · · · , σd be the singular values of A and
σ′1, · · · , σ′d be the singular values of Â. Then |σi − σ′i| ≤ σ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Proof. The lemma follows from the basic application of Theorem 25. We can write Â =
(
A 0
)
+(
0 σminIm
)
. The lemma follows since, by construction, all the singular values of
(
0 σminIm
)
are σmin.
To compute the additive error, we need to bound ‖S†N2(TT)†‖F and ‖S2‖F . This is done by the
following two lemmas.
Claim 33. LetDR be a distribution that satisfies (α, δ)-subspace embedding for generalized regression. Let
S2 be as defined above. Then with probability 99/100 over Φ̂ ∼ DR, ‖S2‖F = ρ1
√
kn(1 + α).
Proof. Let G = ΨAΦ([Â]kΦ)†. G is an m × k matrix. When α ≤ 1, G has rank k. This implies
that there exist a t × k matrix Û with orthonormal columns such that GG† = ÛÛT. Therefore, ΨS2 =
GG†N2 = ÛÛTN1. From the second claim of Lemma 14 and the choice of the parameter t, ‖S2‖2F ≤
(1 + α)‖ÛÛTN1‖2F . Since every entries of N1 are picked i.i.d. and ÛÛT is an orthonormal projection
onto a k-dimensional subspace, we have ‖S2‖F = O(ρ1
√
kn(1 + α)).
The following claim follows from Lemma 26.
Claim 34. Let S,T ∼ DA. Then for any matrix N2 of appropriate dimension, ‖S†N2(TT)†‖F = ‖N2‖F .
Proof. Let C = S†N2(TT)†. Then SCTT = SS†N2(TT†)T. Now SS† (similarly, TT†) is a projection
unto a random subspace of dimension k. Since every entries of N2 is picked i.i.d. fromN (0, ρ2), SCTT =
N˜2, where N˜1 is an v × v matrix with every entries picked i.i.d. from N (0, ρ22). Using Lemma 20, this
implies that
E[‖SCTT‖2F ] = E
[
‖N˜2‖2F
]
=
∑
i,j
E[(N˜2)2ij ] = v2ρ22.
The result follows using Markov’s inequality and the fact that ‖SCTT‖2F = (1 +α)2‖C‖2F and α ≤ 1.
The above claim implies that ‖N2‖F = O(ρ2v) with probability 99/100.
Since ‖Â − [Â]k‖2F ≤
∑
i>k σ
′2
i and ‖A − Ak‖2F ≤
∑
i>k σ
2
i , combining Lemma 29, Lemma 30,
Claim 33, Claim 34, Lemma 32, and Lemma 20, we have the final utility bound.
Lemma 35. Let ρ1, ρ2, and σmin be as defined in Theorem 5. With probability 99/100 over the coins of the
algorithm PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF, the output of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF satisfies
‖ (A 0)−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F +O(σmin√m+ ρ1√kn(1 + α) + ρ2v).
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Now observe that v = O((η/α2) log(k/δ))  min {m,n} and 1 + α ≤ 2. If former is not the case,
then there is no reason to do a random projection. Therefore, the term ρ2v is subsumed by the rest of the
term. The result follows by setting the values of ρ1 and σmin.
D.1.2 Privacy Proof of PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF
Our privacy result can be restated as the following lemma.
Lemma 36. If σmin, ρ1 and ρ2 be as in Theorem 5, then the algorithm presented in Figure 2, ALGORITHM
2, is (3ε, 3δ)-differentially private.
We prove the lemma when m ≤ n. The case for m ≥ n is analogous after inverting the roles of Φ̂ and
Ψ. Let A and A′ be two neighboring matrices, i.e., E = A−A′ = uvT. Then Â and Â′, constructed by
OPTIMAL-SPACE-PRIVATE-LRF, has the following property: Â′ = Â +
(
E 0
)
.
Claim 37. If ρ1 =
√
(1+α) ln(1/δ)
ε and ρ2 =
(1+α)
√
ln(1/δ)
ε , then publishing Yr and Z preserves (2ε, 2δ)-
differential privacy.
Proof. We use the second claims of Lemma 14 and Lemma 15, i.e., ‖SD‖2F = (1±α)‖D‖2F and ‖ΨD‖2F =
(1 ± α)‖D‖2F for all D, where S ∼ DA and Ψ ∼ DR. Let A and A′ be two neighboring matrices such
that E = A −A′ = uvT. Then ‖S (E 0)TT‖2F ≤ (1 + α)‖ (E 0)TT‖2F ≤ (1 + α)2. Publishing Z
preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy follows from considering the vector form of the matrix SÂTT and N2
and applying Theorem 18. Similarly, we use Theorem 18 and the fact that, for any matrix C of appropriate
dimension, ‖ΨC‖2 ≤ (1 +α)‖C‖2F , to prove that publishing ΨÂ + N1 preserves differential privacy.
We next prove that Yc is (ε, δ)-differentially private. This would complete the proof of Lemma 36 by
combining Lemma 16 and Theorem 17 with the above claim. Let A−A′ = E = uvT and let v̂ = (v 0m).
Then Â− Â′ = uv̂T. Since ΦT is sampled from DR, we have ‖ΦTW‖2F = (1 + α)‖W‖2F for any matrix
W with probability 1 − δ (second claim of Lemma 14). Therefore, uvTΦ = (1 + α)1/2uv˜T = u˜v˜T for
some unit vectors u, v˜ and u˜ = (1 + α)1/2u. We now show that ÂΦΩ1 preserves privacy. We prove that
each row of the published matrix preserves (ε0, δ0)-differential privacy for some appropriate ε0, δ0, and then
invoke Theorem 17 to prove that the published matrix preserves (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
It may seem that the privacy of Yc follows from the result of Blocki et al. [BBDS12], but this is not the
case because of the following reasons.
1. The definition of neighboring matrices considered in this paper is different from that of Blocki et
al. [BBDS12]. To recall, Blocki et al. [BBDS12] considered two matrices neighboring if they differ
in at most one row by a unit norm. In our case, we consider two matrices are neighboring if they have
the form uvT for unit vectors u,v.
2. We multiply the Gaussian matrix to a random projection of Â and not to A as in the case of Blocki et
al. [BBDS12], i.e., to ÂΦ and not to Â.
If we do not care about the run time efficiency of the algorithm, then we can set Φ̂ := Ω instead of Φ̂ := ΩΦ.
In this case, we would not need to deal with the second issue mentioned above.
We first give a brief overview of how to deal with these issues here. The first issue is resolved by
analyzing (Â − Â′)Φ. We observe that this expression can be represented in the form of u˜v˜T, where
u˜ = (1 + α)1/2u for some ‖u‖2 = 1, ‖v˜‖2 = 1. The second issue can be resolved by observing that
Φ satisfies (α, δ)-JLP because of the choice of t. Since the rank of Â and ÂΦ are the same, the singular
values of ÂΦ are within a multiplicative factor of (1 ± α)1/2 of the singular values of Φ with probability
1− δ due to Sarlos [Sar06]. Therefore, we scale the singular values of Â appropriately.
28
We now return to the proof. Denote by Â =
(
A σminIm
)
and by Â′ =
(
A′ σminIm
)
, where
A−A′ = uvT. Then Â′−Â = (uvT 0). Let UCΣCVTC be the SVD of C = ÂΦ and U˜CΣ˜CV˜TC be the
SVD of C˜ = Â′Φ. From above discussion, we know that if A−A′ = uvT, then C− C˜ = (1 +α)1/2u˜v˜T
for some unit vectors u˜ and v˜. For notational brevity, in what follows we write u for u˜ and v for v˜.
Note that both C and C˜ are full rank matrices because of the construction; therefore CCT (respectively,
C˜C˜T) is a full dimensional m ×m matrix. This implies that the affine transformation of the multi-variate
Gaussian is well-defined (both the covariance (CCT)−1 has full rank and det(CCT) is non-zero). That
is, the PDF of the distributions of the rows, corresponding to C and C˜, is just a linear transformation of
N (0, Im×m). Let y ∼ N (0, 1)t.
PDFCY (x) =
1√
(2pi)t det(CCT)
e(−
1
2
x(CCT)−1xT)
PDF
C˜Y
(x) =
1√
(2pi)t det(C˜C˜T)
e(−
1
2
x(C˜C˜T)−1xT)
Let ε0 = ε√
4t ln(1/δ) log(1/δ)
and δ0 = δ/2t, We prove that every row of the published matrix is (ε0, δ0)
differentially private. Let x be sampled either from N (0,CCT) or N (0, C˜C˜T). It is straightforward to
see that the combination of Claim 38 and Claim 39 below proves differential privacy for a row of published
matrix. The lemma then follows by an application of Theorem 17 and our choice of ε0 and δ0.
Claim 38. Let C and ε0 be as defined above. Then
e−ε0 ≤
√
det(CCT)
det(C˜C˜T)
≤ eε0 .
Claim 39. Let C, ε0, and δ0 be as defined earlier. Let y ∼ N (0, 1)m. If x is sampled either from Cy or C˜y,
then we have
Pr
[∣∣∣xT(CCT)−1x− xT(C˜C˜T)−1x∣∣∣ ≤ ε0] ≥ 1− δ0.
Proof of Claim 38. The claim follows simply as in [BBDS12] after a slight modification. More concretely,
we have det(CCT) =
∏
i σ
2
i , where σ1 ≥ · · · ≥ σm ≥ σmin(C) are the singular values of C. Let
σ˜1 ≥ · · · ≥ σ˜m ≥ σmin(C˜) be its singular value for C˜. The matrix E has only one singular value
√
1 + α.
This is because EET = (1 + α)vvT. To finish the proof of this claim, we use Theorem 24.
Since the singular values of C − C˜ and C˜ − C are the same, Lidskii’s theorem (Theorem 24) gives∑
i(σi − σ˜i) ≤
√
1 + α. Therefore, with probability 1− δ,√√√√ ∏
i:σ˜i≥σi
σ˜2i
σ2i
=
∏
i:σ˜i≥σi
(
1 +
σ˜i − σi
σi
)
≤ exp
(
ε
32
√
(1 + α)t log(2/δ) log(t/δ)
∑
i
(σ˜i − σi)
)
≤ eε0/2.
The first inequality holds because Φ ∼ DR satisfies (α, δ)-JLP due to the choice of t (second claim
of Lemma 14). Since C and A have same rank, this implies that all the singular values of C are within a
(1 ± α)1/2 multiplicative factor of Â due to a result by Sarlos [Sar06]. In other words, σi ≥ σmin(C) ≥
(1−α)1/2σmin. The case for all i ∈ [m] when σ˜i ≤ σi follows similarly as the singular values of E and−E
are the same. This completes the proof of Claim 38.
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Proof of Claim 39. Without any loss of generality, we can assume x = Cy. The case for x = C˜y is
analogous. Let C − C˜ = vuT. Note that E[(Ω)i,j ] = 0 for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ m and COV((Ω)i,j) = 1 if and
only if i = j; and 0 otherwise. First note that the following
xT(CCT)−1x− xT(C˜C˜T)−1x = xT(CCT)−1(C˜C˜T)(C˜C˜T)−1x− xT(C˜C˜T)−1x
= xT
[
(CCT)−1(CuvT + vuTC˜T)(C˜C˜T)−1
]
x.
Using the singular value decomposition of C = UCΣCVTC and C˜ = U˜CΣ˜CV˜
T
C, we have(
xT(UCΣ−1C V
T
C)u
)(
vT(U˜CΣ˜
−2
C U˜
T
C)x
)
+
(
xT(UCΣ−2C U
T
C)v
)(
uT(V˜CΣ˜
−1
C U˜
T
C)x
)
Since x ∼ Cy, where y ∼ N (0, 1)m, we can write the above expression as τ1τ2 + τ3τ4, where
τ1 =
(
yTCT(UCΣ−1C V
T
C)u
)
τ2 =
(
vT(U˜CΣ˜
−2
C U˜
T
C)Cy
)
τ3 =
(
yTCT(UCΣ−2C U
T
C)v
)
τ4 =
(
uT(V˜CΣ˜
−1
C U˜
T
C)Cy
)
.
Now since ‖Σ˜C‖2, ‖ΣC‖2 ≥ σmin(C), plugging in the SVD of C and C − C˜ = vuT, and that every
term τi in the above expression is a linear combination of a Gaussian, i.e., each term is distributed as per
N (0, ‖τi‖2), we have the following:
‖τ1‖2 = ‖(VCΣCUTC)(UCΣ−1C VTC)u‖2 ≤ ‖u‖2 ≤
√
1 + α,
‖τ2‖2 = ‖vT(U˜CΣ˜−2C U˜TC)(U˜CΣ˜CV˜TC − vuT)‖2
≤ ‖vT(U˜CΣ˜−2C U˜TC)U˜CΣ˜CU˜TC‖2 + ‖vT(U˜CΣ˜−2C U˜TC)vuT‖2 ≤
1
σmin(C)
+
√
1 + α
σ2min(C)
,
‖τ3‖2 = ‖(VCΣCUTC)(UCΣ−2C UTC)v‖2 ≤ ‖Σ−1C ‖2 ≤
1
σmin(C)
,
‖τ4‖2 = ‖uT(V˜CΣ˜−1C U˜TC)(U˜CΣ˜CV˜TC − vuT)‖2
≤ ‖uT(V˜CΣ˜−1C U˜TC)(U˜CΣ˜CV˜TC‖2 + ‖uT(V˜CΣ˜−1C U˜TC)v‖2 ≤
√
1 + α+
√
1 + α
σmin(C)
.
Using the concentration bound on the Gaussian distribution, each term, τ1, τ2, τ3, and τ4, is less than
‖τi‖ ln(4/δ0) with probability 1− δ0/2. The second claim now follows because with probability 1− δ0,∣∣∣xT(CCT)−1x− xT(C˜TC˜)−1x∣∣∣ ≤ 2(√1 + α
σmin(C)
+
1 + α
σ2min(C)
)
ln(4/δ0) ≤ ε0,
where the second inequality follows from the choice of σmin and the fact that σmin(C) ≥ (1−α)1/2σmin.
Lemma 36 follows by combining Claim 38 and Claim 39.
D.2 Low Space Differentially private Low-rank Factorization Under Priv2
In Appendix D.1, we gave an optimal space algorithm for computing LRF under Priv1. However, we
cannot use the algorithm of Theorem 5 to simultaneously prove differential privacy under Priv2 and get
optimal additive error. This is because we need to perturb the input matrix by a noise proportional to
min
{√
km,
√
kn
}
to preserve differential privacy under Priv2. As a result, the additive error would de-
pend linearly on min {m,n}. We show that by maintaining noisy sketches Y and Z and some basic linear
algebra, we can have a differentially private algorithm that outputs an optimal error LRF of an m×n matrix
under Priv2. More concretely, we prove the following theorem.
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PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF
Initialization. Set η = max
{
k, α−1
}
t = O(ηα−1 log(k/δ)), v = O(ηα−2 log(k/δ)), and ρ =√
(1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε. Sample Φ ∈ Rm×t from DR as in Lemma 14 and S ∈ Rv×n from DR as
in Lemma 15.
Computing the factorization. On input the matrix A,
1. Sample N1 ∼ N (0, ρ2)m×t,N2 ∼ N (0, ρ2)v×n.
2. Compute Y = AΦ + N1 and Z = SA + N2.
3. Compute a matrix U ∈ Rm×t whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space of Y.
4. Compute the singular value decomposition of SU ∈ Rv×t. Let it be U˜Σ˜V˜T.
5. Compute the singular value decomposition of V˜Σ˜†[U˜TZ]k. Let it be U′Σ′V′T.
6. Output U˜ = UU′, Σ˜ = Σ′ and V˜ = V′.
Figure 4: Differentially private LRF Under Priv2
Theorem 40. Let m,n ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters. Let k be the desired rank of the factoriza-
tion, s = max{m,n}, u = min{m,n}, and η = max{k, α−1}. Given a private input matrix A ∈ Rm×n,
the factorization U˜, Σ˜, V˜ outputted by the algorithm, PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF, presented in Figure 4, is
a k-rank factorization and satisfies the following properties:
1. PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF is (ε, δ)-differentially private under Priv2.
2. Let Mk := U˜Σ˜V˜T. With probability 9/10 over the coins of PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF,
‖A−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F +O
((√
ks+
√
uη
α2
) √
log(1/δ)
ε
)
.
3. The space used by PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF is O((m+ nα−1)ηα−1 log(k/δ)).
4. The time required to compute the factorization isO
(
(nn(A) log(1/δ) + (m+nα
−2)η2 log2(k/δ)
α2
+ η
3 log3(k/δ)
αs3
)
.
We present the algorithm when m ≥ n, i.e., s = m and u = n. The case when m < n follows by
symmetry. The space required by the algorithm is the space required to store Y and Z, which is mt +
nv = O((m + nα−1)ηα−1 log(k/δ)). This proves part 3 of Theorem 40. For the running time of part 4
of Theorem 40, we have the following.
1. Computing the sketch Y requiresO(nn(A) log(1/δ))+mt2 time and computing the sketch Z requires
O(nn(A) log(k/δ)) + nv2.
2. Computing the orthonormal basis U requires mt2 = O(mη2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time.
3. Computing a SVD of the matrix SU requires vt2 = O(η3α3 log3(k/δ)).
4. Computation of [U˜TZ]k requires O(nη2α−2 log2(k/δ)).
5. Computing a SVD in Step 4 requires nt2 = O(nη2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time.
Combining all these terms, we have our claim on running time.
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D.2.1 Privacy Proof of PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF
The following lemma proves Part 1 of Theorem 40.
Lemma 41. PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF is (ε, δ) differentially private.
Proof. We use the second claim of both Lemma 14 and Lemma 15, i.e., for all D, ‖DT‖2F ≤ (1−α)‖D‖2F
for T ∼ DA and ‖DΦ‖2F ≤ (1−α)‖D‖2F for Φ ∼ DR. Let A and A′ be two neighboring matrices such that
E = A−A′ has Frobenius norm 1. Then ‖SE‖2F ≤ (1 +α)‖E‖2F = 1 +α. Publishing Z preserves (ε, δ)-
differential privacy follows from considering the vector form of the matrix SA and N2 and Theorem 18.
Similarly, we use the fact that, for any matrix C of appropriate dimension, ‖ΦC‖2 ≤ (1 − α)‖C‖2F , to
prove that publishing AΦ + N1 preserves differential privacy. The lemma follows by applying Lemma 16
and Theorem 17.
D.2.2 Correctness Proof of PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-LRF
We now prove Part 2 of Theorem 40. We first show the following result.
Theorem 42. Let Mk = UV˜Σ˜†[U˜TZ]k be the product of the factorization outputted by the algorithm
in Figure 4. Then with probability 1−O(δ) over Φ ∼ DR and S ∼ DA,
‖Mk −A‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + 3‖S†N2‖F + 2‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F .
Proof. We prove the result by proving a series of results. We provide an upper and a lower bound on
minX,r(X)≤k ‖YX−B‖F in terms of ‖A− [A]k‖F and the output of the algorithm.
Lemma 43. Let A be the input matrix. Let Φ ∼ DR,S ∼ DA be as in Figure 4 . Let Y = ΦA + N1 and
B = A + S†N2 for N1,N2 as defined in Figure 4. Then with probability 1− δ over Φ ∼ DR,
min
X
r(X)≤k
‖YX−B‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + ‖S†N2‖F + ‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F .
Proof. Set r = k, P = [A]Tk , and Q = A
T in Lemma 14. Then using Lemma 14, we have
‖[A]TkX′ −AT‖ ≤ (1 + α) minX ‖[A]
T
kX−AT‖F ,
where X′ = argminX ‖ΦT([A]TkX−AT)‖F . Let [A]k = UkΣkVTk . Taking the transpose and the fact that
the Frobenius norm is preserved under transpose and X′ = (([A]kΦ)T)†(AΦ)T, we have with probability
1− δ over Φ ∼ DR,
‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†[A]k −A‖F ≤ (1 + α) min
X
‖[A]TkX−AT‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F , (18)
where the inequality follows by setting X = UkUTk .
Moreover, since ([A]kΦ)†[A]k has rank at most k, B = A+S†N2, and Y = AΦ+N1, with probability
1− δ over Φ ∼ DR,
min
X
r(X)≤k
‖YX−B‖F ≤ ‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†[A]k + N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k −B‖F
= ‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†[A]k + N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k −A− S†N2‖F
≤ ‖AΦ([A]kΦ)†[A]k −A‖F + ‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F + ‖S†N2‖F (19)
Combining equation (18) and equation (19), we have with probability 1− δ over Φ ∼ DR,
min
X
r(X)≤k
‖YX−B‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + ‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F + ‖S†N2‖F . (20)
This completes the proof of Lemma 43.
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Lemma 43 relates minX,r(X)≤k ‖YX − B‖ with (1 + α)‖A − [A]k‖F , ‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F , and
‖S†N2‖F . Since U is the orthonormal basis for the column space of Y, we further have
min
X
r(X)≤k
‖UX−B‖F ≤ min
X
r(X)≤k
‖YX−B‖F . (21)
Combining equation (20) and equation (21), we have with probability 1− δ over Φ ∼ DR,
min
X
r(X)≤k
‖UX−B‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + (‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F + ‖S†N2‖F ). (22)
Lemma 44. Let U,B,A,S,N1, and N2 be as above, and let X˜ = argminX,r(X)=k ‖S(UX − B)‖F . Let
DA be a distribution that satisfies (α, δ)-subspace embedding. Then with probability 1− 4δ over S ∼ DA,
‖(UX˜−B)‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + (1 + α)(‖S†N2‖F + ‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F ).
Proof. Set p = k/α, D = U and E = B in the statement of Lemma 15. Let us restrict our attention to rank
k matrices X and denote by X̂ = argminX,r(X)=k ‖UX − E‖F and X˜ = argminX,r(X)=k ‖S(UX −B)‖F .
Then we have with probability 1− δ over S ∼ DA,
(1 + α) min
X
r(X)=k
‖UX−B‖F = ‖UX̂−B‖F ≥ (1 + α)1/2‖S(UX̂−B)‖F
≥ (1 + α)1/2 min
X
r(X)
‖S(UX−B)‖F
= (1 + α)1/2‖S(UX˜−B)‖F ≥ ‖(UX˜−B)‖F . (23)
Combining equation (23) with equation (22), we have with probability 1− 2δ over Φ ∼ DR and S ∼ DA,
‖(UX˜−B)‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + (1 + α)(‖S†N2‖F + ‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F ). (24)
This completes the proof of Lemma 44.
To finalize the proof of Theorem 42, we need to compute X˜ = argminX,r(X)≤k ‖S(UX − B)‖F and
lower bound ‖(UX˜−B)‖F . Invoking [CW09, Lem 4.2] with O = U˜ and Z = SB, we get
[U˜TZ]k = [U˜TSB]k = argmin
X
r(X)≤k
‖U˜X− SB‖F .
This in particular implies that
X˜ = V˜Σ˜†[U˜TZ]k = argmin
X
r(X)≤k
‖S(UX−B)‖F . (25)
Using equation (25) in equation (24), and the fact that B = A + S†N2, we have the final result.
‖UV˜Σ˜†[U˜TZ]k −A‖F − ‖S†N2‖F ≤ ‖UV˜Σ˜†[U˜TSA]k −B‖F
≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + (1 + α)(‖S†N2‖F + ‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F ).
This implies that
‖UV˜Σ˜†[U˜TZ]k −A‖F ≤ (1 + 3α)‖A− [A]k‖F + 3‖S†N2‖F + 2‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F .
This completes the proof of Theorem 42.
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Lemma 45. Let N1 ∼ N (0, ρ2)m×t. Then
‖N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k‖F = O(ρ
√
km)
with probability 99/100 over Φ ∼ DR.
Proof. Let C = N1([A]kΦ)†[A]k. Then CΦ = N1([A]kΦ)†[A]kΦ. Now ([A]kΦ)†[A]kΦ is a projection
unto a random subspace of dimension k. Since every entries of N1 is picked i.i.d. from N (0, ρ2), CΦ =
N1([A]kΦ)
†[A]kΦ = N˜1, where N˜1 is an m × k matrix with every entries picked i.i.d. from N (0, ρ2).
This is because we can write ([A]kΦ)†[A]kΦ is a projection unto a random subspace of dimension k.
Using Lemma 20, this implies that
E[‖CΦ‖2F ] = E
[
‖N˜1‖2F
]
=
∑
i,j
E[(N˜1)2ij ] = kmρ2.
The result follows using Markov’s inequality, the fact that ‖CΦ‖2F = (1 + α)‖C‖2F , and α < 1.
Lemma 46. Let N2 ∼ N (0, ρ2)v×n. Then ‖S†N2‖F = O(ρ
√
vn) with probability 99/100 over S ∼ DA.
Proof. Let C = S†N2. Then SC = SS†N2. Now SS† is a projection unto a random subspace of dimension
k. Since every entries of N2 is picked i.i.d. from N (0, ρ2), SC = N˜2, where N˜1 is an v × n matrix with
every entries picked i.i.d. from N (0, ρ2). Using Lemma 20, this implies that
E[‖SC‖2F ] = E
[
‖N˜2‖2F
]
=
∑
i,j
E[(N˜2)2ij ] = vnρ2.
The result follows using Markov’s inequality and the fact that ‖SC‖2F = (1 + α)‖C‖2F and α ≤ 1.
Theorem 40 now follows from Theorem 42, Lemma 45, Lemma 46, and the choice of ρ in Lemma 41.
E Differentially private LRF Under General Turnstile Model
In this section, we are interested in computing a low-rank factorization of a private matrix in the general
turnstile update model while preserving differential privacy. In this setting, we are allowed only one pass
over the private matrix, and by the end of the stream, we are required to output a low-rank factorization.
In Appendix E.1, we give a differentially private low rank factorization under Priv1. We give a differentially
private low rank factorization under a much stronger privacy guarantee, Priv2, in Appendix E.2.
E.1 Space Optimal Differentially private Low-rank Factorization Under Priv1
The main idea behind the differentially private algorithm for low-rank factorization under Priv1 in turn-
stile update model is that the corresponding algorithm (PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF) maintains linear
sketches. It has been shown by Li et al. [LNW14] that in general turnstile update model, it is better off to
just use linear sketches. Together with our low space algorithm, this gives us the insight to develop a private
algorithm in the general turnstile update model. Figure 5 gives the detail description of our algorithm. We
show the following:
Theorem 47. Let m,n, k ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters. Let s = max{m,n}, u = min {m,n},
κ = (1+α)/(1−α), η = max{k, α−1}, and σmin = 16 log(1/δ)√tκ ln(1/δ)/ε. Given anm×nmatrix A
in a turnstile update model, PRIVATE-STREAMING-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF, described in Figure 5, outputs
a factorization U˜, Σ˜, V˜ such that
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PRIVATE-STREAMING-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF
Initialization. Set η = max
{
k, α−1
}
, and the dimension of random projections to be
t = O(ηα−1 log(k/δ)), v = O(ηα−2 log(k/δ)). Let ρ1 =
√
(1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε and ρ2 =
(1 + α)
√
ln(1/δ)/ε. Set σmin = 16 log(1/δ)
√
t(1 + α)(1− α)−1 ln(1/δ)/ε.
1. Sample Ω ∼ N (0, 1)m×t. Let Φ ∈ R(m+n)×m,Ψ ∈ Rt×m such that ΦT ∼ DR, Ψ ∼ DR
satisfies Lemma 14.
2. Let S ∈ Rv×m,T ∈ Rv×(m+n) such that S ∼ DA, TT ∼ DA satisfies Lemma 15.
3. Sample N1 ∼ N (0, ρ21)t×(m+n) and N2 ∼ N (0, ρ22)v×v. Define Φ̂ = t−1ΦΩ ∈ R(m+n)×t.
Update Stage. Set Â =
(
0m×n σminIm
)
. Compute Yc = ÂΦ̂, Y′r = ΨÂ, and Z′ = SÂTT.
Update rule. When (iτ , jτ ,∆τ ), where (iτ , jτ ) ∈ [m] × [n] and ∆τ ∈ R, is streamed, update
the matrices by the following rule: (i) Yc = Yc + Aτ Φ̂, (ii) Y′r = Y′r + ΨAτ , and (iii) Z′ =
Z′+SAτTT, where Aτ is anm×(n+m) matrix with only non-zero entry ∆τ in position (iτ , jτ )..
Computing the factorization. Once the matrix is streamed, we follow the following steps.
1. Compute Yr = Y′r + N1 = ΨÂ + N1, and Z = Z′ + N2 = SÂTT + N2.
2. Output FACTOR(Yc,Yr,Z,S,T,m,m+ n, k, t, v).
FACTOR(Yc,Yr,Z,S,T,m, n, k, t, v)
1. Compute a matrix U ∈ Rm×t whose columns are orthonormal basis for the column space of
Yc and matrix V ∈ Rt×n whose rows are the orthonormal basis for the row space of Yr.
2. Compute a SVD of SU := U˜sΣ˜sV˜Ts ∈ Rv×t and a SVD of VTT := U˜tΣ˜tV˜Tt ∈ Rt×v.
3. Compute a SVD of V˜sΣ˜
†
s[U˜Ts ZV˜t]kΣ˜
†
tU˜
T
t . Let it is be U
′Σ′V′T.
4. Output the matrix U˜ = UU′ compromising of left singular vectors, diagonal matrix Σ˜ = Σ′,
and the matrix V˜ = VTV′ with right-singular vectors.
Figure 5: Differentially private LRF Under Priv1 in Turnstile Update Model
1. PRIVATE-STREAMING-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF is (3ε, 3δ) differentially private under Priv1.
2. Let Mk = U˜Σ˜V˜T. With probability 9/10 over the random coins of PRIVATE-STREAMING-SPACE-
OPTIMAL-LRF,
‖ (A 0)−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F +O(σmin√u+ ε−1√ks ln(1/δ)),
3. The space used by PRIVATE-STREAMING-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF is O((m+ n)ηα−1 log(k/δ)).
4. The initialization time is O((m+ n)u log(k/δ)) and the total computational time is
O
(
nn(A) log(1/δ) +
(m+ n)η2 log2(k/δ)
α2
+
η3 log3(k/δ)
α5
)
.
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PRIVATE-STREAMING-FROBENIUS-LRF
Initialization. Set η = max
{
k, α−1
}
t = O(ηα−1 log(k/δ)), v = O(ηα−2 log(k/δ)), and ρ =√
(1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε. Sample N1 ∼ N (0, ρ2)m×t,N2 ∼ N (0, ρ2)v×n. Sample Φ ∈ Rm×t from
DR as in Lemma 14 and S ∈ Rv×n from DR as in Lemma 15. Initialize an all zero m × t matrix
Y′ and an all zero v × n matrix Z′.
Update rule. Suppose at time τ , the stream is (iτ , jτ ,∆τ ), where (iτ , jτ ) ∈ [m]× [n]. Let Aτ be a
matrix with only non-zero entry ∆τ in position (iτ , jτ ). Update the matrices by the following rule:
Y′ = Y′ + AτΦ and Z′ = Z′ + SAτ .
Computing the factorization. Once the matrix is streamed, we follow the following steps.
1. Compute Y = Y′ + N1 and Z = Z′ + N2.
2. Compute a matrix U ∈ Rm×t whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space
of Y.
3. Compute the singular value decomposition of SU ∈ Rv×t. Let it be U˜Σ˜V˜T.
4. Compute the singular value decomposition of V˜Σ˜†[U˜TZ]k. Let it be U′Σ′V′T.
5. Output U˜ = UU′, Σ˜ = Σ′ and V˜ = V′.
Figure 6: Differentially private LRF Under Priv2 in Turnstile Update Model
Proof. Part 3 follows immediately by setting the values of t and v. Part 4 of Theorem 47 requires some
computation. More precisely, we have the following. Computing Yc requires O(nn(A) log(1/δ)) + mt2
time and computing Yr requires O(nn(A) log(1/δ)) + (m + n)t2 time. Computing U and V requires
O((m + n)η2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time. Computing a SVD of the matrix SU and TVT requires vt2 + tv2 =
O(k3α−5 log2(k/δ)). Computing Z requires O(nn(A) log(k/δ) + η2/α2 log2(k/δ) + nη2α−2 log2(k/δ))
Computation of [U˜Ts ZV˜]k requires Oδ(nn(A)) + tv2 = O(nn(A) + k3α−5 log
3(k/δ)) time. Computation
of the last SVD requires O((m+ n)η2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time. Combining all these terms, we have our claim
on the running time.
Furthermore, combining Lemma 20, Lemma 29, Lemma 30, Claim 33, Claim 34, and Lemma 32, we
have part 2 while part 1 follows from Lemma 36. This completes the proof of Theorem 47.
E.2 Differentially private Low-rank Factorization Under Priv2 in Turnstile Update Model
We describe and analyze the algorithm when m ≥ n, i.e., s = m and u = n in the theorem that follows.
The case when m < n follows by symmetry. We prove the following.
Theorem 48. Let m,n ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters. Let k be the desired rank of the factor-
ization and η = max
{
k, α−1
}
. Let s = max {m,n} and u = min {m,n}. Given a private input matrix
A ∈ Rm×n recieved in a turnstile model, the factorization U˜, Σ˜, V˜ outputted by the algorithm, PRIVATE-
STREAMING-FROBENIUS-LRF, presented in Figure 6, is a k-rank factorization and satisfies the following
properties:
1. PRIVATE-STREAMING-FROBENIUS-LRF is (ε, δ)-differentially private under Priv2.
2. Let Mk := U˜Σ˜V˜T. With probability 9/10 over the coins of PRIVATE-STREAMING-FROBENIUS-
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LRF,
‖A−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F +O
((√
ks+
√
uη
α2
) √
log(1/δ)
ε
)
.
3. The space used by PRIVATE-STREAMING-FROBENIUS-LRF is O((m+ nα−1)ηα−1 log(k/δ)).
4. The time required to compute the factorization is
O
(
(nn(A) log(1/δ) +
(m+ nα−2)η2 log2(k/δ)
α2
+
η3 log3(k/δ)
αs3
)
.
Proof. The space required by the algorithm is the space required to store Y and Z, which is mt + nv =
O((m + nα−1)kα−1 log k log(1/δ)). This proves part 3 of Theorem 48. For the running time of part 4
of Theorem 48, we have the following. Computing the sketch Y requires O(nn(A) log(k/δ)) + mt2
time and computing the sketch Z requires O(nn(A) log(k/δ)) + nv2. Computing the orthonormal basis
U requires mt2 = O(mη2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time. Computing a SVD of the matrix SU requires vt2 =
O(η3α3 log3(k/δ)). Computation of [U˜TZ]k requires O(nη2α−2 log2(k/δ)). Computing a SVD in Step 4
requires nt2 = O(nη2α−2 log2(k/δ)) time. Combining all these terms, we have our claim on running time.
Part 2 follows from Lemma 46, Lemma 45, and Theorem 42. Part 1 follows from Lemma 41. This
completes the proof of Theorem 48.
F Case Study: Normalized Row Matrices
An important class of matrices is matrices with normalized rows. In this section, we give a bound on such
matrices. Figure 7 is the detailed description of the algorithm. It receives the matrix row-wise and computes
the low-rank factorization.
Theorem 49. Let m,n ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters (with m > n). Let k be the desired rank
of the factorization and η = max
{
k, α−1
}
. Given a private input matrix A ∈ Rm×n recieved in a row
wise update model, the factorization U˜, Σ˜, V˜ outputted by the algorithm, PRIVATE-COVARIANCE-LRF,
presented in Figure 6, is a k-rank factorization and satisfies the following properties:
1. PRIVATE-COVARIANCE-LRF is (ε, δ)-differentially private under Priv2.
2. Let Mk := U˜Σ˜V˜T. With probability 9/10 over the coins of PRIVATE-COVARIANCE-LRF,
‖ATA−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖ATA− [ATA]k‖F +O
(√
nη log(1/δ)
εα
)
.
3. The space used by PRIVATE-COVARIANCE-LRF is O(nα−2η log(k/δ)).
Proof. The space required by the algorithm is the space required to store Y and Z, which is mt + nv =
O((m+ nα−1)kα−1 log k log(1/δ)). This proves part 3 of Theorem 49.
Part 2 follows from Lemma 46, Lemma 45, and Theorem 42. For part 1, first notice that since every row
has bounded norm 1, the sensitivity of the function ATA is at most 1; i.e., the sensitivity of the vector form
of ATA is at most 1. Part 1 then follows from Lemma 41. This completes the proof of Theorem 49.
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PRIVATE-COVARIANCE-LRF
Initialization. Set η = max
{
k, α−1
}
t = O(ηα−1 log(k/δ)), v = O(ηα−2 log(k/δ)), and ρ =√
(1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε. Sample N1 ∼ N (0, ρ2)n×t,N2 ∼ N (0, ρ2)v×n. Sample Φ ∈ Rn×t from
DR as in Lemma 14 and S ∈ Rv×n from DR as in Lemma 15. Initialize an all zero n× t matrix Y′
and an all zero v × n matrix Z′.
Update rule. Suppose at time τ , the stream is an index-row tuple (iτ ,Aiτ ), where iτ ∈ [m] and
Aiτ ∈ Rn. Let Aτ be a matrix with only non-zero row Aiτ in the row iτ . Update the matrices by
the following rule: Y′ = Y′ + ATτ AτΦ and Z′ = Z′ + SATτ Aτ .
Computing the factorization. Once the matrix is streamed, we follow the following steps.
1. Compute Y = Y′ + N1 and Z = Z′ + N2.
2. Compute a matrix U ∈ Rm×t whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space
of Y.
3. Compute the singular value decomposition of SU ∈ Rv×t. Let it be U˜Σ˜V˜T.
4. Compute the singular value decomposition of V˜Σ˜†[U˜TZ]k. Let it be U′Σ′V′T.
5. Output U˜ = UU′, Σ˜ = Σ′ and V˜ = V′.
Figure 7: Differentially private Covariance Approximation Under Priv2 in Row-wise Update Model
G Case Study 2: Low-rank factorization Under Continual Release Model
In this section, we are interested in computing a low-rank factorization of a private matrix in the continual
release model while preserving differential privacy. In this setting, we are allowed only one pass over the
private matrix, and at every time epoch, we are required to output a low-rank factorization (see Definition 9
for a formal definition). In Appendix G.1, we give a differentially private low rank factorization under
Priv1. We give a differentially private low rank factorization under a much stronger privacy guarantee,
Priv2, in Appendix G.2.
In past, there are known algorithms for converting any “one-shot” algorithm for any monotonic function
to an algorithm that continually release the output [DNPR10]. Since optimization function like low-rank
factorization are not monotonic, it is not clear whether we can use the generic transformation. Our algorithm
generates and maintains linear sketches during the updates and later compute low-rank factorization using
these sketches. This allows us to use the generic transformation to maintain the updates. For computing the
factorization, we collect all the sketches for any range using range queries.
G.1 Differentially Private Continual Release Low Rank Factorization Under Priv2
We start by giving a differentially private algorithm under Priv2 that continually release a low rank factor-
ization. We first give an overview of our algorithm with the details of the algorithm appearing in Figure 8.
The idea behind our algorithm for continual release is the fact that the factorization stage only uses a
small space sketches of the matrix and the sketches are linear sketches. Since the sketches are linear, we
can use the binary tree mechanism [CSS11, DNPR10] to get low-rank factorization under continual release
model. The algorithm stores the sketches of matrix generated at various time epochs in the form of a binary
tree. Every leaf node τ stores the sketches of Aτ , where Aτ is the stream at time τ . The root node stores
the sketch of the entire matrix streamed in [0, T ], and every other node n stores the sketch corresponding
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PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-CONTINUAL-LRF
Input: A time upper bound T , privacy parameters ε, δ, and a stream s ∈ RT .
Output: At each time step τ , output a factorization Ûk(τ), Σ̂k(τ), and V̂k(τ).
Initialization: Set t, v,Φ,S as in Figure 4. Every Ŷi and Ẑi are initialized to an all zero matrices
for i ∈ [log T ]. Set ε′ = ε/√log T , δ′ = δ/2 log T and ρ = √(1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε′.
Estimating the LRF at time t. On receiving an input (r, c, sτ ) where sτ ∈ R at 1 ≤ τ ≤ T , form
a matrix Aτ ∈ Rm×n which is an all zero matrix except with only non-zero entry sτ at location
(r, c) ∈ [m]× [n].
1. Compute i := min {j : τj 6= 0}, where τ =
∑
j τj · 2j is the binary expansion of τ .
2. Compute Ŷi := AτΦ +
∑
j<i Ŷj and Ẑi := SAτ +
∑
j<i Ẑj .
3. For j := 0, · · · , i−1, set Yj = Ŷj = 0 and Zj = Ẑj = 0. Compute Yi = Ŷi+N (0, ρ2)×n
and Zi = Ẑi +N (0, ρ2)m×v. Compute Y(τ) =
∑
j:τj=1
Yj and Z(τ) =
∑
j:τj=1
Zj .
4. Compute a matrix U ∈ Rm×t whose columns are an orthonormal basis for the column space
of Y(τ).
5. Compute the singular value decomposition of SU ∈ Rv×t. Let it be U˜Σ˜V˜T.
6. Compute the singular value decomposition of V˜Σ˜†U˜T[U˜U˜TZ(τ)]k. Let it be U′Σ′V′T.
7. Output Ûk(τ) := UU′, Σ̂k(τ) := Σ′ and V̂k(τ) := V′.
8. Let Mk(τ) := Uk(τ)Σk(τ)Vk(τ)T.
Figure 8: Differentially private Low-rank Factorization Under Continual Release
to the updates in a time range represented by the leaves of the subtree rooted at n, i.e., Ŷi and Ẑi stores
sketches involving 2i updates to A. If a query is to compute the low-rank factorization of the matrix from
a particular time range [1, τ ], we find the nodes that uniquely cover the time range [1, τ ]. We then use the
value of Y(τ) and Z(τ) formed using those nodes to compute the low-rank factorization. From the binary
tree construction, every time epoch appears in exactly O(log T ) nodes (from the leaf to the root node).
Moreover, every range [1, τ ] appears in at most O(log T ) nodes of the tree (including leaves and root node).
A straightforward application of the analysis of Chan et al. [CSS11] to Theorem 48 gives us the following
Theorem 50. Let A be an m×n matrix with nn(A) non-zero entries with m ≤ n. Let η = max{k, α−1}.
Then there is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm, PRIVATE-FROBENIUS-CONTINUAL-LRF defined
in Figure 8, under Priv2 that receives A as a stream and outputs a rank-k factorization U˜ := Ûk(τ), Σ˜ :=
Σ̂k(τ), V˜ := V̂k(τ) under the continual release for T time epochs such that, with probability 9/10,
‖A−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F +O
((√
km+
√
nη
α2
) √
log(1/δ) log T
ε
)
where Mk = U˜Σ˜V˜T and A(τ) is the matrix received till time τ .
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G.2 Differentially Private Continual Release Low Rank Factorization Under Priv1
We can also convert the algorithm PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF to one that outputs a low-rank fac-
torization under continual release by using less space than PRIVATE-CONTINUAL-FROBENIUS-LRF and
secure under Priv2. We make the following changes to PRIVATE-CONTINUAL-FROBENIUS-LRF: (i) Ini-
tialize (Ŷc)i, (Ŷr)i, and (Ẑ)i as we initialize Yc, Ŷr and Ẑ in Figure 5 for all i ∈ [log T ], (ii) we main-
tain (Yc)j , (Ŷc)j , (Yr)j , (Ŷr)j , Zj , and Ẑj . A straightforward application of the analysis of Chan et
al. [CSS11] to Theorem 47 gives us the following theorem.
Theorem 51. Let A be an m×n matrix with nn(A) non-zero entries with m ≤ n. Let η = max{k, α−1}.
Let s = max{m,n}, u = min {m,n}, κ = (1 + α)/(1 − α), and σmin = 16 log(1/δ)
√
tκ ln(1/δ)/ε.
Then there is an (ε, δ)-differentially private algorithm under Priv1 that receives A as a stream and outputs
a rank-k factorization U˜ := Ûk(τ), Σ˜ := Σ̂k(τ), V˜ := Ûk(τ) under the continual release for T time
epochs such that, with probability 9/10,
‖ (A(τ) 0)−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A(τ)− [A(τ)]k‖F +O ((σmin√u+ ε−1√ks ln(1/δ)) log T) ,
where Mk = U˜Σ˜V˜T and A(τ) is the matrix received till time τ .
H Space Lower Bound for Low-rank Factorization When γ 6= 0
This section is devoted to proving a lower bound on the space requirement for low-rank factorization with
non-trivial additive error. It is well known that any private algorithm (not necessarily differentially private)
incurs an additive error o(
√
k(m+ n)) [HR12] due to linear reconstruction attack. On the other hand, the
only known space lower bound of Clarkson and Woodruff [CW09] holds when γ = 0; therefore, one might
hope to construct an improve space algorithm when we allow γ 6= 0. In this section, we show that for any
non-trivial values of γ, this is not the case. This directly implies that our algorithm uses optimal space for a
large range of parameters.
Theorem 52. Let m,n, k ∈ N and α > 0. Then the space used by any randomized single-pass algorithm
for (α, 5/6, O(m+ n), k)-LRA in the general turnstile model is at least Ω((m+ n)k/α).
Theorem 52 shows that PRIVATE-SPACE-OPTIMAL-LRF uses optimal space when γ = O(m+ n) and
k ≥ 1/α. If we set α = √2− 1 (as in Hardt and Roth [HR12]) and note any non-trivial result implies that
γ = o(m+ n), we have a matching lower bound for all k ≥ 3.
The space lower bound in the turnstile update model is shown by showing that any algorithm Alg in the
turnstile model yields a single round communication protocol for some function f . The idea is as follows.
On input x, Alice invokes Alg on its input to compute Alg(x). She then sends the state st to Bob, who
computes Alg(x‖y) using his input y and st, and uses this to compute the function f . The communication
is therefore the same as the space required by the algorithm. In what follows, we use the notation C:i to
denote the i-th column of the matrix C.
We give a reduction to the augmented indexing problem, AIND. It is defined as follows.
Definition 53. (AIND problem). Alice is given an N -bit string x and Bob is given an index ind ∈ [N ]
together with xind+1, · · · , xN . The goal of Bob is to output xind.
The communication complexity for solving AIND is well known due to the result of Miltersen et
al. [MNSW95].
Theorem 54. The minimum bits of communication required to solve AIND with probability 2/3, when the
message is sent only in one direction, i.e., either from Alice to Bob or from Bob to Alice, is Ω(n). This lower
bound holds even if the index, ind, and the string, x, is chosen uniformly at random.
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Before we state our result and its proof, we fix a notation. For a matrix A and set of indices C, we use
the notation A(C) to denote the submatrix formed by the columns indexed by C.
Proof of Theorem 52. We adapt the proof of Clarkson and Woodruff [CW09] for the case when γ 6= 0.
Suppose m ≥ n and let a = k/20α. Without loss of generality, we can assume that a is at most n/2. Let `
be the word size. We assume Alice has a string x ∈ {−1,+1}(m−a)a and Bob has an index ind ∈ [(m−a)a].
The idea is to define the matrix A with high Frobenius norm. The matrix A is the summation of the matrix
A˜ constructed by Alice and A¯ constructed by Bob. We first define how Alice and Bob construct the instant
A = A˜ + A¯.
Alice constructs its matrix A˜ as follows. Alice partitions the set {1, · · · , a} in to ` disjoint sets I1, · · · , I`
such that Ii := {(i− 1)a/`+ 1, · · · ia/`} . Let M (Ii) be an (m − a) × a/` matrix for all 1 ≤ i ≤ `. We
form a bijection between entries of x and the entries of M in the following manner. Every entry of M (Ii) is
defined by a unique bit of x, i.e., M (Ii)j,k = (−1)xd(10)i for d = (i−1)(m−a)a/`+(k−1)(m−a)+ j.
The matrix A˜ is now defined as follows.
A˜ =
(
0a×a 0a×(n−a)
M 0(m−a)×(n−a)
)
,
where M =
(
MI1 · · · MI`
)
.
Suppose Bob is given an index ind ∈ [(m − a)a] such that xind corresponds to the sub-matrix M (Iθ)
for some 1 ≤ θ ≤ `. Then we can assume that Bob also knows every entry in the sub-matrix M (Iθ′) for
θ′ > θ. Bob forms a second level partition of the columns of M (Iθ) in to equal size groups G1, · · · , Ga/k`.
Due to our construction, there exists a unique r such that xind maps to an entry in the sub-matrix formed
by columns indexed by one of the second level partition Gr. Let C = {c, c+ 1, · · · , c+ k − 1} be the
columns corresponding to the k-size group of Iθ in which ind is present. As its input, Bob streams a matrix
A¯ which is an all-zero matrix, except for entries A¯c+i,c+i = ζ for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and ζ to be chosen later.
In other words, Bob inserts a scaled identity matrix in the stream, where the scaling parameter ζ is large
enough to make sure that most of the error of any randomized algorithm is due to other columns of A. As
we shall see later, we set the value of ζ as a large polynomial in the approximation error of the algorithm.
Let A be the algorithm that computes LRA under the turnstile model. Alice feeds its matrix A˜ to A in
the turnstile manner and send the state of the algorithm by the end of her feed to Bob. Bob uses the state
received by Alice and feed the algorithm A with its own matrix A¯ in a turnstile manner. Therefore, the
algorithm A gets as input a matrix A = A˜ + A¯ and it is required to output a rank-k matrix B with additive
error γ = O(m + n). We will show that any such output allows us to solve AIND. Denote by A(C) the
sub-matrix formed by the columns C := {c, c+ 1, · · · , c+ k − 1}.
Let us first understand the properties of the constructed matrix A. To compute the Frobenius norm of
this matrix, we need to consider two cases: the case for sub-matrices in which ind belongs, i.e, M (Ir),
and the rest of the matrix. For the sub-matrix corresponding to the columns indexed by C, the columns of
A (Iθ) have Euclidean length (ζ2 + (m − a)100θ)1/2. For θ′ < θ, every columns have Euclidean norm
(a(m− a))1/210θ′ . Therefore, we have the following:
‖A− [A]k‖2F ≤
((a− k)(m− a)100θ
`
+
∑
θ′<θ
a(m− a)100θ′
`
≤ ((a− k)(m− a)100
θ
`
+
a(m− a)100θ
99`
≤ 2 · (100)θm2/` = Γ
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In order to solve (α, β, γ, k)-LRF, the algorithm needs to output a matrix B of rank at most k such that,
with probability 5/6 over its random coins,
‖A−B‖2F ≤
[
(1 + α)
√
Γ + γ
]2 ≤ 2(1 + α)Γ + 2γ2
≤ 2Γ + 100θk(m− a)
(
1
10
+
1
99
)
+ 2γ2
≤ 4 · (100)θm2/`+ 100
θk(m− a)
5
+ 2γ2
Let us denote by Υ := 4 · (100)θm2/`+ 100θk(m−a) ( 110 + 199)+ 2γ2. The proof idea is now to show
the following:
(i) Columns of B corresponding to index set in C are linearly independent.
(ii) Bound the error incurred by ‖A−B‖F in terms of the columns indexed by Gr.
The idea is to show that most of the error is due to the other columns in B; and therefore, sign in the
submatrix A(C) agrees with that of the signs of those in the submatrix B(C). This allows Bob to solve the
AIND problem as Bob can just output the sign of the corresponding position.
Let
R := {ra/k + 1, · · · , (r + 1)a/k}
and
C := {c, · · · , c+ k − 1} .
Let Y be the submatrix of B formed by the rows indexed by R and columns indexed by C.
The following lemma proves that when ζ is large enough, then the columns of B corresponding to index
set C are linearly independent. This proves part (i) of our proof idea.
Lemma 55. Let B(C) := [B:c · · ·B:c+k−1] be the columns corresponding to the sub-matrix formed by
columns c, · · · , c+ k − 1 of B. If ζ ≥ 2Υ2, then the columns of B(C) spans the column space of [A]k.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by considering the k × k sub-matrix, say Y. Recall that Y is a submatrix
of B formed by the rows indexed by R and the columns indexed by C. For the sake of brevity and abuse
of notation, let us denote the restriction of B to this sub-matrix Y := [Y:1, · · · ,Y:k]. In what follows, we
prove a stronger claim that the submatrix Y is a rank-k matrix.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction that the vectors {Y:1, · · · ,Y:k} are linearly dependent. In other
words, there exists a vector Y:i and real numbers a1, · · · , ak, not all of which are identically zero, such that
Y:i =
k∑
j=1,j 6=i
ajY:j .
From the construction, since Bob inserts a sub-matrix ζIk, we know that
k∑
j=1
(Yj,j − ζ)2 ≤ ‖A−B‖2F ≤ Υ. (26)
k∑
j=1
∑
p 6=j
Y2p,j ≤ ‖A−B‖2F ≤ Υ. (27)
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From equation (26) and choice of ζ, for all j, we have Yj,j ≥ Υ2. Further, equation (27) implies that
Yp,j ≤
√
Υ. We have
Yi,i =
k∑
j=1,j 6=i
ajYi,j ≥ Υ2
imply that there is an p ∈ {1, · · · , k} \ {i} such that |ap| ≥ Υ2k√Υ .
Let i˜ be the index in {1, · · · , k} \ {i} for which |ai˜| attains the maximum value. We have |a˜iYi˜,˜i| ≥
|a˜i|Υ2 and |ajYi˜,j | ≤ |a˜i|
√
Υ. Now consider the i˜-entry of Y:i. Note that i˜ 6= i. Since Υ depends
quadratically on m and γ, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
j=1,j 6=i
ajYi˜,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥ |a|(Υ2 − k√Υ) ≥ (Υ2 − k√Υ) Υ
2
k
√
Υ
>
√
Υ.
This is a contradiction because Yp,j ≤
√
Υ due to equation (27) for p 6= j. This completes the proof.
For the sake of brevity, let V:1, · · · ,V:k be the columns of B(C) and V˜:1, · · · , V˜:k be the restriction of
these column vectors to the rows a+1, · · · ,m. In other words, vectors V˜:1, · · · , V˜:k are the column vectors
corresponding to the columns in M. We showed in Lemma 55 that the columns B(C) spans the column
space of B. We can assume that the last n − a columns of B are all zero vectors because B is a rank-k
matrix. We can also assume without any loss of generality that, except for the entries in the row indexed by
R, all the other entries of B(C) are zero. This is because we have shown in Lemma 55, we showed that the
submatrix of B(C) formed by rows indexed by R and columns indexed by C have rank k.
Now any row i of B can be therefore represented as
∑
ηi,jV:j , for real numbers ηi,j , not all of which
are identically zero. The following lemma proves part (ii) of our proof idea. For
Lemma 56. Let V:1, · · · ,V:k be as defined above. Then column i of B can be written as linear combination
of real numbers ηi,1, · · · ηi,k of the vectors V:1, · · · ,V:k such that, for all j and i ∈ R, η2i,j ≤ 4/Υ3.
Proof. Let M:1, · · ·M:a be the columns of M, where M is the (m − a) × a submatrix of the matrix A˜
corresponding to the input of Alice. We have
Υ ≥ ‖A−B‖2F
k∑
i=1
(ζ −Vr(a/k)+i,i)2 +
k∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
V2r(a/k)+i,j +
k∑
i=1
‖M:r(a/k)+i − V˜:i‖2
+
∑
i/∈R
k∑
j=1
ηi,jVra/k+j,j + ∑
j′ 6=j
ηi,j′Vra/k+j,j′
2 +∑
i/∈R
∥∥∥∥∥∥M:i −
k∑
j=1
ηi,jV˜:j
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
.
As in the proof of Lemma 55, we have |V2r(a/k)+i,j | ≤
√
Υ and |Vr(a/k)+i,i| ≥ Υ2. Let ji be the index
such that |ηi,ji | is the maximum. Then the above expression is at least |ηi,ji |2(Υ2 − k
√
Υ)2 ≥ |ηi,ji |2Υ4/4.
Since this is less than Υ, the result follows from the definition of ji.
We can now complete the proof. First note that since M is a signed matrix, each V˜i in the third term of
the above expression is at least
√
Υ. Therefore, for all i /∈ S and all j∣∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
j=1
ηi,jV˜:j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 4kΥ
1/2
Υ3/2
=
4k
Υ
.
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As M:i is a sign vector and if γ = O(m+ n) = O(m), this implies that
∑
i/∈R
∥∥∥∥∥∥M:i −
k∑
j=1
ηi,jV˜:j
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
≥
∑
i/∈R
‖M:i‖2
(
1− 4k
Υ
)
≥ O((100)θm2/`)−O(100θa)
k∑
i=1
∥∥∥M:r(a/k)+i − V˜:i∥∥∥2 = k∑
i=1
m−a∑
j=1
(Mj,r(a/k)+i − (V˜i)j)2 ≤
100θk(m− a)
5
+O(100θa)
Now, since there are in total k(m − a) entries in the submatrix formed by the columns indexed by C,
at least 1 − ( 110 + 199 + o(1)) fraction of the entries have the property that the sign of Mj,ra/k+i matches
the sign of V˜j,i. Since ind is in one of the columns of M:ra/k+1, · · ·M:ra/k+k, with probability at least
1−( 110 + 199 + o(1)), if Bob outputs the sign of the corresponding entry in B, then Bob succeeds in solving
AIND. This gives a lower bound of Ω((m− a)a) = Ω(mk`/α) space. The case when m ≤ n is analogous
and gives a lower bound of Ω(nk`/α). Thus, there is a lower bound of Ω((m+ n)k`/α).
I Noninteractive Local Differentially Private PCA
In this section, we give our noninteractive local differentially private principal component analysis (see Def-
inition 10). In the local model [EGS03], each individual applies a differentially private algorithm locally
to their data and shares only the output of the algorithm—called a report—with a server that aggregates
users’ reports. In principle, one could also use cryptographic techniques such as secure function evaluation
to simulate central model algorithms in a local model, but such algorithms currently impose bandwidth and
liveness constraints that make them impractical for large deployments. A long line of work studies what
is achievable by local differentially private algorithms [AHP09, BS15, DJW13, EPK14, EGS03, HKR12,
KLN+11, MS06, War65]. Tight upper and lower bounds known on the achievable accuracy for many prob-
lems; however, low-rank factorization (and even low-rank approximation) has not been studied in this model.
The naive approach to convert existing algorithms to locally private algorithms leads to a large additive error
and are interactive. On the other hand, low-rank factorization is a special optimization problem and the role
of interaction in local differentially private optimization was recently investigated by Smith et al. [STU17].
Theorem 57. Letm,n ∈ N and α, ε, δ be the input parameters. Let k be the desired rank of the factorization
and η = max
{
k, α−1
}
. Let t = O(ηα−1 log(k/δ)) and v = O(ηα−2 log(k/δ)). Given a private input
matrix A ∈ Rm×n distributed in a row-wise manner amongst m users, the output U of the algorithm,
PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF, presented in Figure 9, is a k-rank orthonormal matrix such that
1. PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF is a non-interactive (ε, δ)-local differentially private under Priv2.
2. With probability 9/10 over the coins of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF,
‖A−UUTA‖F ≤ (1 +O(α))‖A− [A]k‖F +O
(
v
√
m log(1/δ)/
)
.
3. The words of communication used by every users in PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF is O(v2) words.
Proof. The local privacy is easy to follow from the Gaussian mechanism and as in Lemma 36 with the
choice of ρ1 and ρ2. For the communication cost, note that every user i has to send a sketch Yi:, Ŷi:, and
Zi:. The sketch Yi: is a real 1 × t matrix, Ŷi: is an t × v real matrix, and Zi: is a v × v real matrix. The
total communication cost is O((tv + v2) log(nm)) words. Since t ≤ v, the result on the communication
cost follows.
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PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF
Initialization. Let η = max
{
k, α−1
}
, t = O(ηα−1 log(k/δ)), v = O(ηα−2 log(k/δ)). Let ρ1 =√
(1 + α) ln(1/δ)/ε, ρ2 = (1 + α)
√
ln(1/δ)/ε. Sample Φ ∼ N (0, 1)n×t, Ψ ∼ N (0, 1)t×m,
S ∼ N (0, 1)v×m, and T ∼ N (0, 1)n×v. Make them public.
User-i computation. On input the row Ai:, user-i does the following:
1. Sample N1,i ∼ N (0, ρ21)1×t, N2,i ∼ N (0, ρ22)t×v and N3,i ∼ N (0, ρ22)v×v.
2. Set Âi: ∈ Rm×n such that every row other than row-i is an all zero vector. Compute Yi: =
Ai:Φ + N1,i, Y˜i: = ΨÂi:T + N2,i, and Zi: = SÂi:T + N3,i.
Server side computation. Once the server receives the reports from all the users, it follows the
following steps.
1. Form Y whose row-i is Yi:. Compute Z =
∑
Zi: and Y˜ =
∑
Y˜i:. Compute Ŷ = SY.
2. Compute X˜ := argminrk(X)≤k ‖ŶXY˜ − Z‖F . Compute a SVD of X˜. Let it is be U′Σ′V′T.
3. Output the orthonormal basis U for the span of YU′.
Figure 9: Non-interactive Local Differentially private LRF Under Priv1
We now prove Part 2 of Theorem 57. Let N1 be a random Gaussian matrices whose row-i is N1,i.
Let N2 =
∑
N2,i,N3 =
∑
N3,i. Note that N1 ∼ N (0, ρ21)m×t, N2 ∼ N (0,mρ22)t×v, and N2 ∼
N (0,mρ22)v×v. Let Y be the matrix whose row-i is Yi:. Further, Z =
∑
Zi: and Y˜ =
∑
Y˜i:. If the matrix
distributed among the users is A, then it means that Y = ΦA+N1, Y˜ = ΨAT+N3 and Z = SAT+N2.
Let the singular value decomposition of [A]k be [A]k = UkΣkVTk . Let C = Ψ(A + Ψ
†N2T†). We
will use Lemma 14 to relate minrk(X)≤k ‖YXC − (A + S†N3T†)‖F with ‖A − [A]k‖F . Set Φ = Ψ,
P = [A]k, Q = A + Ψ†N2T† in Lemma 14. For
X˜ := (Ψ[A]k)†(ΨA + N2T†) = (Ψ[A]k)†C = argmin
X
‖Ψ([A]kX−A + (Ψ†N2T†))‖,
we have with probability 1− δ over Ψ ∼ DR,
‖[A]kX˜− (A + Ψ†N2T†)‖F ≤ (1 + α) min
X
‖[A]kX− (A + Ψ†N2T†)‖F
≤ (1 + α)‖[A]k −A‖F + (1 + α)‖Ψ†N2T†‖F . (28)
In the above, the second inequality follows by setting X = VkVTk .
Let WT := X˜ = (Ψ[A]k)†C. We now use Lemma 14 on the following regression problem:
min
X
‖ΦT(WX−B)‖ and min
X
‖WX−B‖F , where B = (A + N1Φ†)T
with the candidate solutions
X̂ = argmin
X
‖ΦT(WX−A)‖F and X˜ = argmin
X
‖(WX−A)‖F
One of the candidate solutions to argminX ‖ΦT(WX − A)‖F is X̂ := (ΦTW)†(ΦTB). Since [A]k
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has rank k, Lemma 14 and equation (28) gives with probability 1− δ over Ψ ∼ DR
‖X̂TWT −BT‖F ≤ (1 + α) min
X
‖XTWT −BT‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖[A]k(Ψ[A]k)†C−BT‖F
≤ (1 + α)‖[A]k(Ψ[A]k)†C−A‖F + (1 + α)‖N1Φ†‖F
≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + (1 + α)(2 + α)‖Ψ†N2T†‖F + (1 + α)‖N1Φ†‖F
This in particular implies that
‖X̂TWT −A‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + (1 + α)(2 + α)‖Ψ†N2T†‖F + (2 + α)‖N1Φ†‖F .
Let
τ1 = (1 + α)(2 + α)‖Ψ†N2T†‖F + (2 + α)‖N1Φ†‖F
be the additive error due to the effect of noise N1 and N2.
Substituting the value of X̂
T
:= (BTΦ)(WTΦ)† = (AΦ + N1)(WTΦ)† = Y(WTΦ)†, with proba-
bility 1− 2δ over ΦT,Ψ ∼ DR, we have
‖Y(WTΦ)†(Ψ[A]k)†C−A‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + τ1.
Let X∗ := (WTΦ)†(Ψ[A]k)†, i.e.,
‖YX∗C−A‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + τ1.
Let E = A + S†N3T†. Since X∗ has rank at most k, this implies that
min
X
rk(X)≤k
‖(YXC−E)‖F ≤ ‖(YX∗C−E)‖F
≤ ‖(YX∗C−A)‖F + ‖S†N3T†‖F
≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F + τ1 + ‖S†N3T†‖F .
Since α ∈ (0, 1) and substituting the value of τ1, we can get an upper bound on the additive terms.
min
X
rk(X)≤k
‖(YXC−E)‖F ≤ (1 + α)2‖A− [A]k‖F +O
(
τ1 + ‖S†N3T†‖F
)
. (29)
Now consider the following two regression problems:
min
X
rk(X)≤k
‖SYXCT− SET‖F and min
X
rk(X)≤k
‖YXC−E‖F (30)
with candidate solutions X˜ := argmin X
rk(X)≤k
‖SYXCT−SET‖F and X̂ := argmin X
rk(X)≤k
‖YXC−E‖F ,
respectively. Set p = k/α, D = YXC and E = A + S†N3T† in the statement of Lemma 15. Then we
have with probability 1− 2δ over S.T ∼ DA,
min
X
r(X)=k
‖YXC−E‖2F = ‖YX̂C−E‖2F = ‖YX̂C− (A + S†N3T†)‖2F
≥ (1 + α)‖S(YX̂C− (A + S†N3T†))T‖2F
≥ (1 + α) min
X
r(X)
‖SYXCT− S(A + S†N3T†))T‖F
= (1 + α)‖ŶX˜Y˜ − Z‖F . (31)
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The second and last equality follows from the definition, the first inequality follows from Lemma 15 and
the second inequality follows from the fact that minimum is smaller than any other choice of X, more
specifically X = X̂. Since U is in the span of YU′, where U′ is the left singular vectors of X˜, using
Boutsidis et al. [BWZ16] we have ‖(I−UUT)(A+N1Φ†)‖F ≤ ‖ŶX˜Y˜−Z‖F . Combining equation (31)
and equation (29), this implies that
‖(I−UUT)A‖F ≤ (1 +O(α))‖A− [A]k‖F +O
(
‖Ψ†N2T†‖F + ‖N1Φ†‖F + ‖S†N3T†‖F
)
.
As in the proof of Theorem 5, for the choice of v and t, for every matrices D, ‖SD‖F ≤ (1 +α)‖D‖F ,
‖DT‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖D‖F , ‖ΨD‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖D‖F , and ‖DΦ‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖D‖F . In other words,
‖Ψ†N2T†‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖N2‖F , ‖N1Φ†‖F ≤
√
1 + α‖N1‖F , ‖S†N3T†‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖N3‖F . Since
α ∈ (0, 1),
‖(I−UUT)A‖F ≤ (1 +O(α))‖A− [A]k‖F +O (‖N2‖F + ‖N1‖F + ‖N3‖F ) .
The result follows using Lemma 20, Markov’s inequality, and values of ρ1 and ρ2.
J Empirical Evaluation of Our Algorithms
Any algorithm to compute the low-rank factorization In this section, we give the experimental evaluation
of our algorithms and compare it with the best known results. We ran our algorithms on a 2.7 GHz Intel
Core i5 processor with 16 GB 1867 MHz DDR3 RAM. Our algorithms keep on sampling a random matrix
randomly until we sample a matrix with number of columns more than 200.
J.1 Empirical Evaluation of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF
We first start with the discussion on the empirical evaluation of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF (see Fig-
ure 2 for the detail description and Appendix L.2 for the source code). Since the error incurred by PRIVATE-
FROBENIUS-LRF is strictly less than that by PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF, we only concern ourselves
with PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF. For the private setting, we sampled matrices from the following
distributions:
1. All the entries are sampled uniformly from the interval [1, 5000]
2. All the entries are integers sampled uniformly from the interval [1, 5000].
In our experimental set-up, we keep the value of α = 0.25 and k = 10 fixed to get a better understanding of
how the approximation changes with the changing values of dimensions.
We start by explaining what every columns in Table 3 means. The first two columns are the dimension
of the private matrix, the third column is the desired rank of the output matrix, and the fourth column is the
value of multiplicative approximation. For the ease of comparison, we have set k and α to be a constant
parameter in this experiment and let the dimension to be the free parameters.
Recall that the problem of the low-rank factorization is to output a singular value decomposition U˜, Σ˜, V˜
such that Mk = U˜Σ˜V˜T is a rank-k matrix and
‖A−Mk‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + γ,
where γ is the additive error. The fifth and the sixth columns enumerate the value of the expression re-
sulting from running our algorithm PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF and that by Hardt and Roth [HR12],
respectively. The last column represents the optimal low-rank factorization, ‖A− [A]k‖F .
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There is no way to compute the actual additive error, γ, empirically. This is because there is a factor of
multiplicative error and it is tough to argue what part of error is due to the multiplicative factor alone. In
other words, the best we can compute is α∆k+γ or the total approximation error incurred by our algorithm.
From the practitioner point of view, the total error is a much useful parameter than the α∆k + γ. Therefore,
in this section, we use the total approximation error (‖A−Mk‖F ) as the measure for our evaluation.
Distribution of A Rows Columns k α Our error Hardt-Roth [HR12] Optimal Error‖A−Mk‖F ‖A−Mk‖F ‖A− [A]k‖F
Uniform real
535 50 10 0.25 223649.755822 552969.553361 190493.286508
581 57 10 0.25 254568.54093 491061.894752 213747.405532
671 65 10 0.25 295444.274372 470153.533646 250629.568178
705 70 10 0.25 317280.295345 546149.007321 269647.886009
709 68 10 0.25 309627.397618 664748.40864 265799.14431
764 74 10 0.25 344154.666385 529618.155224 291053.598305
777 50 10 0.25 270458.465497 436864.395454 235057.184632
861 57 10 0.25 311968.552859 494331.526734 269761.822539
1020 65 10 0.25 367175.274642 562322.74973 317998.616149
1054 70 10 0.25 389357.219211 490379.45171 338605.316751
1061 68 10 0.25 386772.176623 497648.401337 334581.574424
1137 74 10 0.25 413134.221292 528692.808214 364187.907915
1606 158 10 0.25 736233.063187 848827.366953 654600.528481
1733 169 10 0.25 786963.961154 932695.219591 706550.246496
Uniform integers
522 50 10 0.25 217497.498819 496080.416815 185817.742179
555 51 10 0.25 229555.549295 463022.451669 195569.953293
605 60 10 0.25 267625.256679 525350.686285 225614.671569
714 70 10 0.25 316232.378407 477066.707503 270968.006565
804 51 10 0.25 284102.975661 548426.535153 241720.509615
899 86 10 0.25 402886.168791 554702.285328 346840.731082
906 60 10 0.25 328747.816311 455091.762984 284433.77154
913 90 10 0.25 412114.948358 634520.151202 358345.162361
1061 106 10 0.25 486139.117249 618819.626784 423775.149619
1063 70 10 0.25 395772.128472 485655.074685 339950.706212
1305 86 10 0.25 488729.886028 551863.893152 427234.256941
1383 90 10 0.25 513573.18853 595195.801858 451019.165808
1486 145 10 0.25 677118.945777 776008.62945 600584.597101
1481 146 10 0.25 670290.341074 733574.295922 600877.636254
1635 106 10 0.25 616323.217861 652624.510827 541305.826364
1848 180 10 0.25 836139.102987 884143.446663 755160.753156
1983 194 10 0.25 896926.450848 1005652.63777 814717.343468
Table 3: Empirical Comparison Between PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF and Hardt and Roth [HR12].
The empirical evaluations, listed in Table 3, reflect that our algorithm perform consistently better than
that of Hardt and Roth [HR12] for all the dimension range. This agrees with our analysis and our discussion
in Section 1.1.1. In particular, we showed that theoretically we perform better than Hardt and Roth [HR12]
by a factor of O(c
√
k), where c is the largest entry in their projection matrix.
Another observation that one can make from our evaluation is that the error of our algorithm is quiet
close to the actual error of approximation for all the dimension range. On the other hand, the error of
Hardt and Roth [HR12] is close to optimal error in the large dimensional matrices. For small dimensional
matrices, the error incurred by Hardt and Roth [HR12] is lot more than the actual error. The error of Hardt
and Roth [HR12] starts getting better as the dimension increases. We believe that the fact that our algorithm
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Rows Columns k α Our additive error Hardt-Roth Additive Error Expected Additive Error
546 50 10 0.25 665.797531323 13971.0499468 818.4149601308452
780 50 10 0.25 777.586619111 16772.4716145 915.2974642186384
532 51 10 0.25 719.492368601 23512.4449181 817.9937262895351
808 51 10 0.25 796.220653146 14613.575971 932.3276903711178
655 62 10 0.25 845.550304391 34161.5584705 941.6210056415899
951 62 10 0.25 903.21367849 14101.7225434 1055.244933017033
891 89 10 0.25 1040.90463257 17863.8728746 1190.7199415503355
1344 89 10 0.25 1273.05275389 18646.717977 1342.904603982863
522 50 10 0.25 691.996294265 23193.0915951 806.8851715645378
791 50 10 0.25 764.535817382 16245.8487264 919.3095213779045
1449 140 10 0.25 1392.08606822 20835.1618122 1639.1144500265145
2143 140 10 0.25 1518.90720786 13521.4077062 1827.1906485042728
834 80 10 0.25 969.883327308 22051.2853027 1119.4759720856953
1234 80 10 0.25 1005.64736332 13617.4286089 1257.2282266407094
682 64 10 0.25 833.555604169 19875.8713339 965.2425226826088
967 64 10 0.25 872.993347497 15774.1091244 1073.4637306190796
924 90 10 0.25 1024.67412984 20018.1421648 1208.8365389072335
1374 90 10 0.25 1168.33857697 15267.6596425 1357.3931639793143
1981 194 10 0.25 2845.12484193 19457.1056713 2035.7863227397222
2945 194 10 0.25 1938.83169063 14210.6828353 2263.796573983761
1022 100 10 0.25 1130.29734323 14839.3883841 1298.0001587502882
1530 100 10 0.25 1289.31236852 14886.7349415 1458.2654318931454
1867 182 10 0.25 1806.04962492 13443.8218792 1952.5511080639412
2757 182 10 0.25 1983.37270829 13509.2925192 2168.928742648721
Table 4: Empirical Comparison of Additive Error of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF and Hardt and
Roth [HR12].
performs well over all the range of dimensions makes it more stable with respect to different datasets. In
practice, this is highly desirable as one would like the algorithm to perform well on both large and small
datasets.
The last key observation one can gather from the empirical evaluation is that though the total error
depends on the Frobenius norm, the additive error is independent of the Frobenius norm of the original
matrix. It is expected that the total error depends on the Frobenius norm because of the multiplicative factor,
but if we see the difference between the errors (of both our and Hardt and Roth’s algorithm) and the optimal
error, the difference scales proportional to the dimensions of the matrices.
J.1.1 Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error for various dimension
As we mentioned earlier, if the matrix has rank greater than k, it is not possible to empirically evaluate
the additive error. However, we believe it is still imperative to analyze the effect of differential privacy on
the low-rank approximation of matrices. This in turn implies that one should also define experiments to
empirically evaluate the additive error. One easy way to do this is to take as input a matrix with rank exactly
k and compare the error incurred with that of expected error promised by our theoretical results. In the next
experiment we do the same and prune the last n − k columns of the matrix and make it identically zero
(see Figure 2 for the detail description and Appendix L.3 for the source code). The result of our experiment
is presented in Table 4. Since every entries of the matrix is identically zero, we notice that the same trend as
in Table 3:
1. The additive error incurred by our algorithm is way less than the additive error incurred by Hardt and
Roth [HR12] for all ranges of the dimension. We note that the matrices are highly incoherent as all
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the entries are sampled i.i.d. We believe the reason for this behavior is the fact that the theoretical
result provided by Hardt and Roth [HR12] for incoherent matrices depended on the Frobenius norm
of the input matrix.
2. Our algorithm consistently perform better than the additive error guaranteed by the theoretical results,
but the difference becomes smaller as the dimension increases. This trend can be seen as due to the
fact that our results are asymptotic and we believe as m and n are sufficiently large, our theoretical
result would match the empirical results.
J.1.2 Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error for various values of α.
An important parameter that comes in our bounds and is absent in the bounds of Hardt and Roth [HR12]
is the factor of α. This is because Hardt and Roth [HR12] consider a constant α. Therefore, we feel it
is important to analyze the additive error with respect to the change in α in order to better understand the
effect of differential privacy on the low-rank approximation of matrices. Again, we take as input a matrix
with rank exactly k and compare the error incurred with that of expected error promised by our theoretical
results while keeping the dimensions and the value of k constant (see Figure 2 for the detail description
and Appendix L.3 for the source code). The result of our experiment is presented in Table 5. Since every
entries of the matrix is identically zero, we notice that the same trend as in Table 3:
1. The additive error incurred by our algorithm is way less than the additive error incurred by Hardt and
Roth [HR12] for all ranges of the dimension. We note that the matrices are highly incoherent as all
the entries are sampled i.i.d. We believe the reason for this behavior is the fact that the theoretical
result provided by Hardt and Roth [HR12] for incoherent matrices depended on the Frobenius norm
of the input matrix.
2. Our algorithm consistently perform better than the additive error guaranteed by the theoretical results,
except for certain values of the dimensions and multiplicative error (m = 2800, n = 200, α = 0.24).
Even in these cases, the error is not that far from what is predicted from the theoretical analysis.
J.1.3 Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error for various values of k.
The last parameter that comes in our bounds and in the bounds of Hardt and Roth [HR12] is the factor of
k. Therefore, we feel it is important to analyze the additive error with respect to the change in k in order
to better understand the effect of differential privacy on the low-rank approximation of matrices. Again,
we take as input a matrix with rank exactly k and compare the error incurred with that of expected error
promised by our theoretical results while keeping the dimensions and the value of k constant (see Figure 2
for the detail description and Appendix L.3 for the source code). The result of our experiment is presented
in Table 6. Since every entries of the matrix is identically zero, we notice that the same trend as in Table 3:
1. The additive error incurred by our algorithm is way less than the additive error incurred by Hardt and
Roth [HR12] for all ranges of the dimension. We note that the matrices are highly incoherent as all
the entries are sampled i.i.d. We believe the reason for this behavior is the fact that the theoretical
result provided by Hardt and Roth [HR12] for incoherent matrices depended on the Frobenius norm
of the input matrix.
2. Our algorithm is almost the same as the additive error guaranteed by the theoretical results.
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Rows Columns k α Expected Additive Error Our additive error Hardt-Roth Additive Error
1800 200 10 0.1 7889.477972559828 8056.91337611 18155.7964938
1800 200 10 0.12 7114.371042156239 6986.62461896 16748.9933963
1800 200 10 0.14 6234.5851506132285 6171.60624904 26904.2257957
1800 200 10 0.16 6234.5851506132285 5982.88510433 16983.3495414
1800 200 10 0.18 5190.996544903864 4956.753081 15746.884528
1800 200 10 0.2 5190.996544903864 5044.67253402 14124.190425
1800 200 10 0.22 5190.996544903864 5012.95041479 18030.3508985
1800 200 10 0.24 5190.996544903864 4951.97119364 18013.7573095
2800 200 10 0.1 8690.661799154163 8550.34968943 12281.3954039
2800 200 10 0.12 7846.020358487806 7607.18833498 14296.1174909
2800 200 10 0.14 6887.309251977769 6494.49329799 11674.4990144
2800 200 10 0.16 6887.309251977769 6603.16942717 13860.6899516
2800 200 10 0.18 5750.100760072804 5417.53433303 13425.7590356
2800 200 10 0.2 5750.100760072804 5612.34884207 12731.6645942
2800 200 10 0.22 5750.100760072804 5524.92292528 10703.6065701
2800 200 10 0.24 5750.100760072804 6450.77223767 12610.5718019
Table 5: Empirical Comparison of Additive Error of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF for various values of
α with Hardt and Roth [HR12].
J.2 Empirical Evaluation of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF
In this section, we understand the result of our empirical evaluation of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF (see Figure 2
for the detail description and Appendix L.4 for the source code). Recall that in this case, we output a rank-k
orthonormal matrix U such that UUTA well approximates the matrix A with high probabiliy, i.e.,
‖A−UUTA‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F + γ
with probability at least 1− β.
For empirical evaluation of our locally-private algorithm, we sampled matrices such that every entries
are uniform real number between [0, 500]. In our experimental set-up, we keep the value of α = 0.25 and
k = 10 fixed to get a better understanding of how the approximation changes with the changing values
of dimensions. Our empirical results are listed in Table 7. From the table, we can immediately see the
effect of the role of the dimension m and can see the difference between the optimal approximation and
our approximation scale faster than in the case of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF. However, even in the
case of very large matrices, our approximation error is very small compared to the actual approximation
error. In other words, this evaluation gives us a hint that our algorithm does not pay a lot for local model
of computation. We make this more explicit in our next set of experiments given in the following sections
when we empirically evaluate the additive error to better understand the effect of local differential privacy
on the accuracy of the algorithm.
J.2.1 Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error for Various Dimension
As we argued earlier, it is still imperative to analyze the effect of differential privacy on the principal com-
ponent analysis of matrices. This in turn implies that one should also define experiments to empirically
evaluate the additive error. As earlier, we take as input a matrix with rank exactly k and compare the error
incurred with that of expected error promised by our theoretical results. In the next experiment we do the
same and prune the last n− k columns of the matrix and make it identically zero (see Figure 2 for the detail
description and Appendix L.5 for the source code). The result of our experiment is presented in Table 8.
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Rows Columns k α Expected Additive Error Our additive error Hardt-Roth Additive Error
450 50 10 0.25 1955.5571620375354 1898.46860098 20016.9761114
450 50 11 0.25 1967.6211924065349 2067.40361185 24063.2388836
450 50 12 0.25 1979.148228191017 1915.44710901 23731.1221157
450 50 13 0.25 1990.2041707005583 1975.07412336 28148.8596261
450 50 14 0.25 2000.8424524636212 1937.32846282 44746.5335036
450 50 15 0.25 2395.058604918562 2656.30764859 38466.5764635
450 50 16 0.25 2404.9864394488554 2396.43074838 51068.6496986
450 50 17 0.25 2414.6085814624234 2518.70267919 59951.048053
450 50 18 0.25 2423.9516422006986 2412.15253004 49652.4140161
450 50 19 0.25 2433.0385823622364 2421.29320351 60475.2111995
700 50 10 0.25 2210.505167206932 2137.57732175 18322.4177099
700 50 11 0.25 2225.805492035416 2244.60952111 15915.3100262
700 50 12 0.25 2240.424768215734 2341.16599056 18904.9300369
700 50 13 0.25 2254.4465757300545 2356.95623935 23088.1856217
700 50 14 0.25 2267.9386809066186 2251.25863623 29899.7509467
700 50 15 0.25 2707.304866721297 2948.78705396 33654.4497548
700 50 16 0.25 2719.895940227483 2906.80323902 36885.4983615
700 50 17 0.25 2732.0993162013783 2677.54649011 36275.4890195
700 50 18 0.25 2743.9487446109097 2849.04550002 37581.6388795
700 50 19 0.25 2755.473345587197 2658.52670606 47314.5277845
Table 6: Empirical Comparison of Additive Error of PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF and Hardt and
Roth [HR12] for various values of k.
Recall that the additive error incurred by our algorithm is
γ := O
(
ηα−2 log(k/δ)
√
m log(1/δ)/
)
for η = max {k, 1/α} .
Since every entries of the matrix A−[A]k is identically zero, the error listed in the Table 8 is the additive
error. We note that the trend of Table 8 shows the same trend as in Table 7.
Our algorithm consistently perform better than the additive error guaranteed by the theoretical results
(except for m = 1835 and n = 131), but the difference becomes smaller as the dimension increases. This
trend can be seen as due to the fact that our results are asymptotic and we believe when m is sufficiently
large, our theoretical result would match the empirical results.
J.2.2 Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error for various values of α.
An important parameter that comes in our bounds is the factor of α. Our theoretical result shows a tradeoff
between the additive error and the multiplicative approximation factor. This makes it important to analyze
the additive error with respect to the change in α in order to better understand the effect of differential
privacy on the low-rank approximation of matrices. Again, we take as input a matrix with rank exactly k
and compare the error incurred with that of expected error promised by our theoretical results while keeping
the dimensions and the value of k constant. The result of our experiment is presented in Table 9.
Recall that the additive error incurred by our algorithm is
γ := O
(
ηα−2 log(k/δ)
√
m log(1/δ)/
)
for η = max {k, 1/α} .
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Rows Columns k α Our error (‖A−UUTA‖F ) Optimal Error (‖A− [A]k‖F )
460 50 10 0.25 26730.7062683 18376.5128345
486 50 10 0.25 28080.8322915 18964.3784188
516 55 10 0.25 30526.641347 20870.0427927
553 56 10 0.25 29787.7727748 21862.0631087
568 59 10 0.25 31632.1354094 22760.6941581
616 64 10 0.25 33981.2524409 25159.7572035
709 50 10 0.25 36449.213243 23110.1192303
730 50 10 0.25 35232.7419048 23414.630713
742 50 10 0.25 36167.200779 23613.9643873
805 56 10 0.25 38175.3014108 26613.9920423
817 56 10 0.25 38604.715515 26721.6604408
846 59 10 0.25 39702.5550961 28179.965914
907 64 10 0.25 41889.0912424 30717.3035814
924 101 10 0.25 50376.7374653 40511.7157875
1195 130 10 0.25 66049.3867783 53122.2489582
1262 138 10 0.25 70596.6678822 56526.8303644
1433 101 10 0.25 63976.8587336 50810.8395315
1698 186 10 0.25 91159.7299285 77358.5067276
1857 130 10 0.25 85812.7647106 66588.7353796
1956 138 10 0.25 82720.7186764 70710.4258919
Table 7: Empirical Evaluation of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF.
Since every entries of the matrix A−[A]k is identically zero, the error listed is the additive error incurred
by our algorithm. We notice that the same trend as in Table 7.
We ran our algorithm for m = {450, 700} and n = 50 with k = 10 and α ranging from 0.10 to 0.24
in the step-size of 0.02. Our algorithm consistently perform better than the additive error guaranteed by the
theoretical results. The empirical error is way better than the error predicted by the theoretical result for
small values of α and it starts getting closer as the values of α increases.
J.2.3 Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error for various values of k.
The last parameter that comes in our bounds for local differentially private algorithm is the factor of k.
Therefore, we feel it is important to analyze the additive error with respect to the change in k in order to
better understand the effect of differential privacy on the low-rank approximation of matrices. Again, we
take as input a matrix with rank exactly k for varying values of k and compare the error incurred with that of
expected error promised by our theoretical results while keeping the dimensions and the value of k constant.
The result of our experiment is presented in Table 10.
Recall that the additive error incurred by our algorithm is
γ := O
(
ηα−2 log(k/δ)
√
m log(1/δ)/
)
for η = max {k, 1/α} .
Since every entries of the matrix A − [A]k is identically zero, the error of our algorithm is due to the
additive error. Again as predicted by our results, we notice that the same trend as in Table 7:
We run our algorithm for m = {450, 700} and n = 50 with α = 0.25 and k ranging from 10 to 19.
Our algorithm consistently perform better than the additive error guaranteed by the theoretical results. The
empirical error is way better than the error predicted by the theoretical result for small values of α and it
starts getting closer as the values of α increases.
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Rows Columns k α Our Additive Error Expected Additive Error
454 50 10 0.25 1591.70826988 2236.0029137367846
494 53 10 0.25 1659.12206578 2348.466431926056
511 52 10 0.25 1737.01336788 2395.0391957271527
562 60 10 0.25 2000.5063552 2530.799729601783
622 66 10 0.25 1580.25894963 2683.7137939487484
643 70 10 0.25 1962.46122303 2735.6746706859394
645 70 10 0.25 2172.80349046 2740.583809665359
702 50 10 0.25 1989.93430285 2877.768275821911
728 52 10 0.25 2059.26581077 2938.6953727048567
743 53 10 0.25 1993.78092528 2973.406277353555
844 60 10 0.25 2328.32881246 3199.4689043324324
853 94 10 0.25 2557.29517064 3219.0131110666084
925 66 10 0.25 2484.75888129 3372.181278187486
981 70 10 0.25 2198.25471982 3487.6698882062387
983 70 10 0.25 2597.33562269 3491.7393627228817
1055 113 10 0.25 3217.07445615 3635.863197534171
1190 131 10 0.25 4220.63858322 3894.742583462755
1320 94 10 0.25 2808.85540377 4131.88571345083
1583 113 10 0.25 3870.14181092 4581.675389464531
1713 186 10 0.25 4445.32063486 4791.555177594492
1835 131 10 0.25 5447.86868861 4982.106342591863
1900 206 10 0.25 4732.78855445 5081.305279633226
2213 158 10 0.25 4145.11357428 5539.0037396773205
2888 206 10 0.25 6234.47976474 6436.032325032722
Table 8: Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF for varying values of dimensions.
J.3 Empirical Evaluation of OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF
In this section, we understand the result of our empirical evaluation of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF (see Figure ??
for the detail description and Appendix L.1 for the source code). Recall that in the non-private setting, we
want to output a low-rank factorization such that its product Mk satisfies the following inequality with high
probability:
‖Mk −A‖F ≤ (1 + α)‖A− [A]k‖F .
For the empirical evaluation of our non-private algorithm, we sampled matrices such that every entries
are uniform real number between [0, 5000]. In our experimental set-up, we keep the value of α = 0.25
and k = 10 fixed to get a better understanding of how the approximation changes with the changing values
of dimensions. Our empirical results are listed in Table 11. We see that for all the ranges of dimensions
we evaluated on, the value in the column marked as ‖A −Mk‖F is well within a (1 + α) factor of the
corresponding entries marked under the column ‖A − [A]k‖F . In fact, empirical evidence suggests that
our algorithms gives a much better approximation than α = 0.25 (in fact, it is closer to α = 0.05). This
gives a clear indication that our algorithm performs as the theoretical bound suggests for a large range of
dimensions.
K Analysis of Boutsidis et al. Under Noisy Storage
The algorithm of Boutsidis et al. [BWZ16] maintains fives sketches, M = TlATr, L = SATr, N =
TlAR, D = AR and C = SA, where S and R are the embedding for the generalized linear regression
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Rows Columns k α Our Additive Error Expected Additive Error
450 50 10 0.10 750.710811389 14088.628533821675
450 50 10 0.12 748.91024846 9639.587944193776
450 50 10 0.14 764.598714683 7415.067649379828
450 50 10 0.16 727.388618355 5190.54735456588
450 50 10 0.18 748.286674358 4449.040589627896
450 50 10 0.20 722.269126382 3707.533824689914
450 50 10 0.22 695.354504806 2966.027059751931
450 50 10 0.24 687.993333996 2224.520294813948
700 50 10 0.1 932.294964215 18195.922623848826
700 50 10 0.12 937.676945315 12449.841795264987
700 50 10 0.14 939.872486613 9576.801380973067
700 50 10 0.16 942.039074746 6703.760966681148
700 50 10 0.18 909.247538784 5746.08082858384
700 50 10 0.20 948.147219877 4788.400690486534
700 50 10 0.22 860.725294579 3830.7205523892267
700 50 10 0.24 882.673634462 2873.04041429192
Table 9: Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF for various values of α.
and Tl and Tr are affine embedding matrices. It then computes
X∗ = argmin
r(X)≤k
‖NXL−M‖F
and its SVD as X∗ = U∗Σ∗VT∗ . It then outputs DU∗, Σ∗, and VT∗C. Note that it does not compute a
singular value decomposition of the low-rank approximation, but a different form of factorization.
Boutsidis et al, [BWZ16] prove the following three lemmas, combining which they get their result.
Lemma 58. For all matrices X ∈ Rt×t, with probability at least 98/100, we have
(1− α)2‖ARXSA−A‖2F ≤ ‖Tl(ARXSA−A)Tr‖2F ≤ (1 + α)2‖ARXSA−A‖2F .
Lemma 59. Let X˜ = argminr(X)≤k ‖ARXSA−A‖2F . Then with probability at least 98/100, we have
min
r(X)≤k
‖Tl(ARXSA−A)Tr‖2F ≤ ‖ARX∗SA−A‖2F ≤ ‖ARX˜SA−A‖2F .
Lemma 60. Let X˜ = argminr(X)≤k ‖ARXSA−A‖2F . Then with probability at least 98/100, we have
‖ARX˜SA−A‖2F ≤ (1 + α)∆k(A)2.
To compute the value of X˜, they use a result in generalized rank-constrained matrix approximations,
which says that
N†
[
UNU
T
NMVLV
T
L
]
k
L† = argmin
r(X)≤k
‖NXL−M‖F , (32)
where UN is the matrix whose columns are the left singular vectors of N and VL is the matrix whose
columns are the right singular vectors of L.
Now, in order to make the above algorithm differentially private, we need to use the same trick as we
used in the algorithm for PRIVATE-OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF; otherwise, we would suffer from the problems
mentioned earlier in Section ??. More precisely, we compute Â =
(
A σminI
)
and then store the following
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Rows Columns k α Our Additive Error Expected Additive Error
450 50 10 0.2 739.297184071 2966.027059751931
450 50 11 0.2 792.139775851 3707.533824689914
450 50 12 0.2 827.193502967 3707.533824689914
450 50 13 0.2 857.238846842 4449.040589627896
450 50 14 0.2 881.890196768 4449.040589627896
450 50 15 0.2 877.407208023 5190.54735456588
450 50 16 0.2 955.688935848 5190.54735456588
450 50 17 0.2 942.773082147 5932.054119503862
450 50 18 0.2 1019.96432587 5932.054119503862
450 50 19 0.2 1033.82124639 6673.560884441846
700 50 10 0.2 921.415775041 3830.7205523892267
700 50 11 0.2 903.693226831 4788.400690486534
700 50 12 0.2 961.550364155 4788.400690486534
700 50 13 0.2 1055.58902486 5746.08082858384
700 50 14 0.2 1102.54543656 5746.08082858384
700 50 15 0.2 1139.854348 6703.760966681148
700 50 16 0.2 1188.983938 6703.760966681148
700 50 17 0.2 1216.1836631 7661.441104778453
700 50 18 0.2 1207.76296999 7661.441104778453
700 50 19 0.2 1303.58983727 8619.121242875759
Table 10: Empirical Evaluation of Additive Error of PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF for various values of k.
sketches: M = TlÂTr +N1, L = SÂTr +N2, N = TlÂR+N3, D = ÂR and C = SÂ+N4, where
R = t−1ΩΦ with Ω being a Gaussian matrix.
As in the proof of Theorem 47, there are three terms that contributes to the additive error. The first and
the third term are the same as in the proof of Theorem 47. However, the second term differs. In order to
compute the additive error incurred due to the second term, we note that X in Lemma 58 needs to be
X := X̂ = argmin
r(X)≤k
‖Tl(ÂRXSÂ− Â)Tr‖2F .
The reason for this value of X̂ is the same as in the proof of Claim 31. Moreover, all the occurrence of A is
replaced by Â. In other words, we get the following by combining Lemma 58, Lemma 59, and Lemma 60.
(1− α)2‖ÂRX̂(SÂ + N4)− Â‖2F ≤ (1 + α)∆k(Â)2.
In other words, the additive error incurred by this expression is (1 − α)‖ÂRX̂N4‖F . Using equa-
tion (32), we have γ2 = (1−α)‖ÂRN†
[
UNU
T
NMVLV
T
L
]
k
L†N4‖F , where N,M, and L are as defined
above. This term depends on the singular values of Â and hence can be arbitrarily large.
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Rows Columns k α Total error (‖A−Mk‖F ) Optimal Error (‖A− [A]k‖F )
498 52 10 0.25 203636.487171 197577.81058
565 62 10 0.25 241322.216245 234585.873351
600 66 10 0.25 258293.615653 251581.697045
634 68 10 0.25 272545.864945 265331.39875
701 50 10 0.25 236960.63674 230358.636959
719 76 10 0.25 311278.453125 302812.926139
736 50 10 0.25 243505.180195 236083.969219
775 52 10 0.25 255720.933052 248391.690752
780 86 10 0.25 348405.00368 340148.071775
818 90 10 0.25 364630.812101 355410.694701
888 62 10 0.25 306043.651247 297740.00906
954 66 10 0.25 330351.384387 321254.463405
966 68 10 0.25 337962.399198 329606.663985
1102 76 10 0.25 385372.431742 376530.056249
1149 127 10 0.25 529627.844251 516435.343938
1184 130 10 0.25 545340.762064 531377.485355
1206 86 10 0.25 434705.450777 424823.785653
1288 90 10 0.25 461257.277745 451382.89648
1549 169 10 0.25 729124.244066 701894.583657
1612 113 10 0.25 587309.340404 575305.302626
1802 127 10 0.25 666645.03627 650960.768662
1866 130 10 0.25 686638.036543 669968.400955
2367 169 10 0.25 904435.683545 870912.869511
Table 11: Empirical Evaluation of OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF.
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L Source Codes for Our Experiments
We run our algorithm of random matrices of size that is randomly sampled. In other words, all the private
matrices used in our evaluation are dense matrices. As a result, there is no benefit of using the random
projection matrices of Clarkson and Woodruff [CW13]. Therefore, to ease the overload on the code, we use
random Gaussian matrices with appropriate variance as all our random projection matrices.
L.1 Source Code for OPTIMAL-SPACE-LRF
import math
from numpy import l i n a l g as l a
def r andomGauss i anMat r ix ( rows , columns , v a r i a n c e ) :
G = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( columns ) :
G[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . normal ( 0 , v a r i a n c e )
re turn G
def c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( s i n g u l a r , M a t r i x ) :
Sigma = np . z e r o s ( np . shape ( Ma t r i x ) )
i = 0
whi le i < l e n ( Ma t r i x ) and i < l e n ( Ma t r i x [ 0 ] ) :
Sigma [ i ] [ i ] = s i n g u l a r [ i ]
i += 1
re turn Sigma
def lowrank ( k , A ) :
a = np . z e r o s ( np . shape (A) )
Le f t , s i n g u l a r , R i g h t = np . l i n a l g . svd (A, f u l l m a t r i c e s =1 , compute uv =1)
s i n g u l a r m a t r i x = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( s i n g u l a r ,A)
t o p r i g h t = R i g h t [ : k , : ]
t o p l e f t = L e f t [ : , : k ]
t o p s i n g u l a r = s i n g u l a r m a t r i x [ : k , : k ]
a += np . d o t ( np . d o t ( t o p l e f t , t o p s i n g u l a r ) , t o p r i g h t )
re turn a
def Upadhyay ( Ycolumn , Yrow , Z , S , T ) :
U, sc , Vc = np . l i n a l g . svd ( Ycolumn )
Ur , s r , V = np . l i n a l g . svd ( Yrow )
t = l e n ( Yrow )
v = l e n ( S )
U = U [ : , : t ]
V = V [ : t , : ]
TopU = np . d o t ( S , U)
TopV = np . d o t (V, T )
Us , Ss , Vs = np . l i n a l g . svd ( TopU )
Ut , St , Vt = np . l i n a l g . svd ( TopV )
i n n = np . d o t ( Us . T , np . d o t ( Z , Vt . T ) )
inn low = lowrank ( k , i n n )
S i n g u l a r S = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( np . r e c i p r o c a l ( Ss ) , TopU )
S i n g u l a r T = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( np . r e c i p r o c a l ( S t ) , TopV )
o u t e r T = np . d o t ( inn low , np . d o t ( S i n g u l a r T . T , Ut . T ) )
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o u t e r S = np . d o t ( Vs . T , np . d o t ( S i n g u l a r S . T , o u t e r T ) )
B = np . d o t (U, np . d o t ( ou t e rS ,V) )
re turn B
def I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (A,m, n , k , a l p h a ) :
Ak = lowrank ( k , A)
t = i n t ( k / a l p h a )
v = i n t ( k / ( a l p h a ∗∗ 2 ) )
Ph i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , t , 1 / t )
P s i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( t ,m, 1 / t )
S = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v ,m, 1 / v )
T = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , v , 1 / v )
Ycolumn = np . d o t (A, Ph i )
Yrow = np . d o t ( Ps i , A)
Z = np . d o t ( S , np . d o t (A, T ) )
B =Upadhyay ( Ycolumn , Yrow , Z , S , T )
f r o b u p a d h y a y = l a . norm (A − B , ’ f r o ’ )
a c t u a l = l a . norm (A − Ak , ’ f r o ’ )
p r i n t (m, n , k , a lpha , f robupadhyay , a c t u a l )
i =1
n=50
whi le n< 200 :
m=9∗n+ i n t (50∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
a l p h a =0 .25
k=10
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 1 , 5 0 0 0 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (5000∗ np . random . r and (m, n ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n + i n t (50∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 1 , 5 0 0 0 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (5000∗ np . random . r and (m, n ) ,m, n , k , a l p h a )
n=50 + ( i ∗ i n t (20 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) ) )
i = i + 1
L.2 Source Code for Comparing Private Algorithms
In this section, we present our source code to compare our algorithm with that of Hardt and Roth [HR12].
import math
from numpy import l i n a l g as l a
def r andomGauss i anMat r ix ( rows , columns , v a r i a n c e ) :
G = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( columns ) :
G[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . normal ( 0 , v a r i a n c e )
re turn G
def randomMatr ix ( rows , columns , a , b ) :
A = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( columns ) :
A[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . r a n d i n t ( a , b )
re turn A
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def c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( s i n g u l a r , M a t r i x ) :
Sigma = np . z e r o s ( np . shape ( Ma t r i x ) )
i = 0
whi le i < l e n ( Ma t r i x ) and i < l e n ( Ma t r i x [ 0 ] ) :
Sigma [ i ] [ i ] = s i n g u l a r [ i ]
i += 1
re turn Sigma
def lowrank ( k , A ) :
a = np . z e r o s ( np . shape (A) )
Le f t , s i n g u l a r , R i g h t = np . l i n a l g . svd (A, f u l l m a t r i c e s =1 , compute uv =1)
s i n g u l a r m a t r i x = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( s i n g u l a r ,A)
t o p r i g h t = R i g h t [ : k , : ]
t o p l e f t = L e f t [ : , : k ]
t o p s i n g u l a r = s i n g u l a r m a t r i x [ : k , : k ]
a += np . d o t ( np . d o t ( t o p l e f t , t o p s i n g u l a r ) , t o p r i g h t )
re turn a
def Upadhyay ( Ycolumn , Yrow , Z , S , T ) :
U, sc , Vc = np . l i n a l g . svd ( Ycolumn )
Ur , s r , V = np . l i n a l g . svd ( Yrow )
t = l e n ( Yrow )
v = l e n ( S )
U = U [ : , : t ]
V = V [ : t , : ]
TopU = np . d o t ( S , U)
TopV = np . d o t (V, T )
Us , Ss , Vs = np . l i n a l g . svd ( TopU )
Ut , St , Vt = np . l i n a l g . svd ( TopV )
i n n = np . d o t ( Us . T , np . d o t ( Z , Vt . T ) )
inn low = lowrank ( k , i n n )
S i n g u l a r S = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( np . r e c i p r o c a l ( Ss ) , TopU )
S i n g u l a r T = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( np . r e c i p r o c a l ( S t ) , TopV )
o u t e r T = np . d o t ( inn low , np . d o t ( S i n g u l a r T . T , Ut . T ) )
o u t e r S = np . d o t ( Vs . T , np . d o t ( S i n g u l a r S . T , o u t e r T ) )
B = np . d o t (U, np . d o t ( ou t e rS ,V) )
re turn B
def I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (A,m, n , k , a l p h a ) :
Ak = lowrank ( k , A)
a c t u a l = l a . norm (A − Ak , ’ f r o ’ )
HR = Hard tRoth (A,m, n , k )
frobHR = l a . norm (A − HR, ’ f r o ’ )
m = m+n
e p s i l o n = 1
d e l t a = 1 / (m)
t = i n t ( k / a l p h a )
v = i n t ( k / ( a l p h a ∗∗ 2 ) )
Ph i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , t , 1 / t )
P s i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( t ,m, 1 / t )
S = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v ,m, 1 / v )
T = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , v , 1 / v )
s igma = 4∗math . l o g ( 1 / d e l t a )∗math . s q r t ( t ∗math . l o g ( 1 / d e l t a ) ) / e p s i l o n
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Ahat = A
s c a l e d I = sigma ∗np . i d e n t i t y ( n )
f o r i in range ( n ) :
Ahat = np . v s t a c k ( [ Ahat , s c a l e d I [ i ] ] )
f o r i in range ( n ) :
A = np . v s t a c k ( [ A, s c a l e d I [ i ] − s c a l e d I [ i ] ] )
rho1 = math . s q r t (−4∗math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2)
rho2 = math . s q r t (−6∗math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2)
Ycolumn = np . d o t ( Ahat , Ph i ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix (m, t , rho1 )
Yrow = np . d o t ( Ps i , Ahat )
Z = np . d o t ( S , np . d o t ( Ahat , T ) ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v , v , rho2 )
L = np . d o t ( Yrow , T )
N = np . d o t ( S , Ycolumn )
B =Upadhyay ( Ycolumn , Yrow , Z , S , T )
f r o b u p a d h y a y = l a . norm ( Ahat − B , ’ f r o ’ )
p r i n t (m, n , k , a lpha , f robupadhyay , frobHR , a c t u a l )
def Hard tRoth (A,m, n , k ) :
Omega = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , 2∗ k , 1 )
Y = np . d o t (A, Omega )
e p s i l o n = 1
d e l t a = 1 / (m)
sigma = − 32 ∗ k ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2
N = randomGauss i anMat r ix (m, 2∗k , s igma )
Y += N
Q = np . z e r o s (Y. shape )
f o r i in range (Y. shape [ 1 ] ) :
avec = Y [ : , i ]
q = avec
f o r j in range ( i ) :
q = q − np . d o t ( avec , Q [ : , j ] ) ∗ Q [ : , j ]
Q [ : , i ] = q / l a . norm ( q )
a = Q[ 0 ] [ 0 ]
f o r i in range (Y. shape [ 0 ] ) :
f o r j in range (Y. shape [ 1 ] ) :
i f a < Q[ i ] [ j ] :
a = Q[ i ] [ j ]
rho = 32∗ ( a ∗∗2)∗ k∗math . l o g (8∗ k / d e l t a )∗math . l o g ( 1 / d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2
i n n e r = np . d o t (Q. T , A) + randomGauss i anMat r ix (2∗ k , n , rho )
o u t p u t = np . d o t (Q, i n n e r )
re turn o u t p u t
i =1
n=50
whi le n < 200 :
m = 9 ∗ n + i n t (50∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
a l p h a = 0 . 2 5
k = 10
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 1 , 5 0 0 0 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (5000∗ np . random . r and (m, n ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n + i n t (50∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 1 , 5 0 0 0 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (5000∗ np . random . r and (m, n ) ,m, n , k , a l p h a )
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n = 50 + ( i ∗ i n t (20 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) ) )
i = i + 1
L.3 Source Code for Analyzing Additive Error for OPTIMAL-SPACE-PRIVATE-LRF
import numpy as np
import math
from numpy import l i n a l g as l a
def r andomGauss i anMat r ix ( rows , columns , v a r i a n c e ) :
G = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( columns ) :
G[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . normal ( 0 , v a r i a n c e )
re turn G
def r andomMat r ixUni t ( rows , columns , a , b ) :
re turn ( b−a ) ∗∗ np . random . r and ( rows , columns )
def randomMatr ix ( rows , columns , k , a , b ) :
A = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
a = 0
f o r j in range ( k ) :
A[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . r a n d i n t ( a , b )
re turn A
def c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( s i n g u l a r , M a t r i x ) :
Sigma = np . z e r o s ( np . shape ( Ma t r i x ) )
i = 0
whi le i < l e n ( Ma t r i x ) and i < l e n ( Ma t r i x [ 0 ] ) :
Sigma [ i ] [ i ] = s i n g u l a r [ i ]
i += 1
re turn Sigma
def lowrank ( k , A ) :
a = np . z e r o s ( np . shape (A) )
Le f t , s i n g u l a r , R i g h t = np . l i n a l g . svd (A, f u l l m a t r i c e s =1 , compute uv =1)
s i n g u l a r m a t r i x = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( s i n g u l a r , A)
t o p r i g h t = R i g h t [ : k , : ]
t o p l e f t = L e f t [ : , : k ]
t o p s i n g u l a r = s i n g u l a r m a t r i x [ : k , : k ]
a += np . d o t ( np . d o t ( t o p l e f t , t o p s i n g u l a r ) , t o p r i g h t )
re turn a
def Upadhyay (A, m, n , k , a lpha , e p s i l o n , d e l t a ) :
m = m + n
t = i n t ( 0 . 0 5 ∗ k / a l p h a )
v = i n t ( 0 . 0 5 ∗ k / ( a l p h a ∗∗ 2 ) )
Ph i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , t , 1 / t )
P s i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( t , m, 1 / t )
S = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v , m, 1 / v )
T = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , v , 1 / v )
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s igma = 4∗math . l o g (1 / d e l t a )∗math . s q r t ( t ∗math . l o g (1 / d e l t a ) ) / e p s i l o n
Ahat = A
s c a l e d I = sigma ∗ np . i d e n t i t y ( n )
f o r i in range ( n ) :
Ahat = np . v s t a c k ( [ Ahat , s c a l e d I [ i ] ] )
f o r i in range ( n ) :
A = np . v s t a c k ( [ A, s c a l e d I [ i ] − s c a l e d I [ i ] ] )
rho1 = math . s q r t (−4 ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗ 2)
rho2 = math . s q r t (−6 ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗ 2)
Ycolumn = np . d o t ( Ahat , Ph i ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix (m, t , rho1 )
Yrow = np . d o t ( Ps i , Ahat )
Z = np . d o t ( S , np . d o t ( Ahat , T ) ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v , v , rho2 )
U, sc , Vc = np . l i n a l g . svd ( Ycolumn )
Ur , s r , V = np . l i n a l g . svd ( Yrow )
U = U [ : , : t ]
V = V [ : t , : ]
TopU = np . d o t ( S , U)
TopV = np . d o t (V, T )
Us , Ss , Vs = np . l i n a l g . svd ( TopU )
Ut , St , Vt = np . l i n a l g . svd ( TopV )
i n n = np . d o t ( Us . T , np . d o t ( Z , Vt . T ) )
inn low = lowrank ( k , i n n )
S i n g u l a r S = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( np . r e c i p r o c a l ( Ss ) , TopU )
S i n g u l a r T = c o m p u t e S i n g u l a r ( np . r e c i p r o c a l ( S t ) , TopV )
o u t e r T = np . d o t ( innlow , np . d o t ( S i n g u l a r T . T , Ut . T ) )
o u t e r S = np . d o t ( Vs . T , np . d o t ( S i n g u l a r S . T , o u t e r T ) )
B = np . d o t (U, np . d o t ( ou t e rS , V) )
e x p e c t e d =sigma ∗ math . s q r t ( n ) + math . s q r t (−k ∗m ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) )
re turn (B , Ahat , e x p e c t e d )
def Hard tRoth (A, m, n , k , e p s i l o n , d e l t a ) :
Omega = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , 2 ∗ k , 1 )
Y = np . d o t (A, Omega )
e p s i l o n = 1
d e l t a = 1 / (m)
sigma = − 32 ∗ k ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗ 2
N = randomGauss i anMat r ix (m, 2 ∗ k , s igma )
Y += N
Q = np . z e r o s (Y. shape )
f o r i in range (Y. shape [ 1 ] ) :
avec = Y [ : , i ]
q = avec
f o r j in range ( i ) :
q = q − np . d o t ( avec , Q [ : , j ] ) ∗ Q [ : , j ]
Q [ : , i ] = q / l a . norm ( q )
a = Q[ 0 ] [ 0 ]
f o r i in range (Y. shape [ 0 ] ) :
f o r j in range (Y. shape [ 1 ] ) :
i f a < Q[ i ] [ j ] :
a = Q[ i ] [ j ]
rho = 32∗ ( a ∗∗2)∗ k∗math . l o g (8∗ k / d e l t a )∗math . l o g ( 1 / d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2
i n n e r = np . d o t (Q. T , A) + randomGauss i anMat r ix (2 ∗ k , n , rho )
o u t p u t = np . d o t (Q, i n n e r )
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re turn o u t p u t
def I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a ) :
e p s i l o n = 1
d e l t a = 1 / (m ∗∗ 2)
A = randomMatr ix (m, n , k , 1 , 2 0 )
Ak = lowrank ( k , A)
a c t u a l = l a . norm (A − Ak , ’ f r o ’ )
HR = Hard tRoth (A, m, n , k , e p s i l o n , d e l t a )
frobHR = l a . norm (A − HR, ’ f r o ’ )
( Upadhyay16 , Ahat , e x p e c t e d ) = Upadhyay (A, m, n , k , a lpha , e p s i l o n , d e l t a )
f r o b u p a d h y a y = l a . norm ( Ahat − Upadhyay16 , ’ f r o ’ )
p r i n t ( expec t ed , f robupadhyay , frobHR )
#Use t h i s p a r t o f t h e code f o r v a r y i n g d i m e n s i o n
i = 1
n = 50
whi le n < 200 :
m = 9 ∗ n + i n t (50 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
a l p h a = 0 . 1
k = 10
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 0 , 5 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n + i n t (5 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 0 , 5 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
n = 50 + ( i ∗ i n t (5 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) ) )
i = i + 1
#Use t h i s p a r t o f t h e code f o r v a r y i n g a lpha
n=200
a l p h a = 0 . 1 0
whi le a l p h a < 0 . 2 5 :
m = 9 ∗ n
k = 10
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
a l p h a = a l p h a + 0 . 0 2
#Use t h i s p a r t o f t h e code f o r v a r y i n g k
n=50
k = 10
a l p h a = 0 . 2 5
whi le k<20:
m = 9 ∗ n
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
k +=1
L.4 Source Code for PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF
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import math
from numpy import l i n a l g as l a
def r andomGauss i anMat r ix ( rows , columns , v a r i a n c e ) :
G = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( columns ) :
G[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . normal ( 0 , v a r i a n c e )
re turn G
def randomMatr ix ( rows , columns , a , b ) :
A = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( columns ) :
A[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . r a n d i n t ( a , b )
re turn A
def lowrank ( k , A ) :
a = np . z e r o s ( np . shape (A) )
Le f t , s i n g u l a r , R i g h t = np . l i n a l g . svd (A, f u l l m a t r i c e s =1 , compute uv =1)
t o p l e f t = L e f t [ : , : k ]
a += np . d o t ( np . d o t ( t o p l e f t , t o p l e f t . T ) ,A)
re turn a
def Loca l (A, Ycolumn , L , Z , S ) :
N = np . d o t ( S , Ycolumn )
Un , Sn , Vn = np . l i n a l g . svd (N)
Ul , Sl , Vl = np . l i n a l g . svd ( L )
i n n e r = np . d o t ( Un , np . d o t ( Un . T , np . d o t ( Z , np . d o t ( Vl . T , Vl ) ) ) )
i n n e r l o w r a n k = lowrank ( k , i n n e r )
o u t p u t = np . d o t ( l a . p inv (N) , np . d o t ( i n n e r l o w r a n k , l a . p inv ( L ) ) )
U, s , V = np . l i n a l g . svd ( o u t p u t )
Y = np . d o t ( Ycolumn , U)
Q = np . z e r o s (Y. shape )
f o r i in range (Y. shape [ 1 ] ) :
avec = Y [ : , i ]
q = avec
f o r j in range ( i ) :
q = q − np . d o t ( avec , Q [ : , j ] ) ∗ Q [ : , j ]
Q [ : , i ] = q / l a . norm ( q )
B = np . d o t (Q, np . d o t (Q. T ,A) )
re turn B
def I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (A,m, n , k , a l p h a ) :
t = i n t ( k / ( a l p h a ) )
v = i n t ( k / ( a l p h a ∗∗ 2 ) )
Ak = lowrank ( k , A)
a c t u a l = l a . norm (A − Ak , ’ f r o ’ )
e p s i l o n = 0 . 1
d e l t a = 1 / (m∗∗10)
Ph i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , t , 1 / t )
P s i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( t , m, 1 / t )
S = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v , m, 1 / v )
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T = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , v , 1 / v )
rho1 = math . s q r t (−4 ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2)
rho2 = m ∗ math . s q r t (−6 ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2)
Ycolumn = np . d o t (A, Ph i ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix (m, t , rho1 )
Yrow = np . d o t ( np . d o t ( Ps i , A) , T ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix ( t , v , rho2 )
Z = np . d o t ( S , np . d o t (A, T ) ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v , v , rho2 )
B = Loca l (A, Ycolumn , Yrow , Z , S )
f r o b u p a d h y a y = l a . norm (A − B , ’ f r o ’ )
p r i n t (m, n , k , a lpha , f robupadhyay , a c t u a l )
i =1
n=50
whi le n < 200 :
m = 9 ∗ n + i n t (50∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
a l p h a = 0 . 2 5
k = 10
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 1 , 5 0 0 0 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (5000∗ np . random . r and (m, n ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n + i n t (50∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 1 , 5 0 0 0 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (5000∗ np . random . r and (m, n ) ,m, n , k , a l p h a )
n = 50 + ( i ∗ i n t (20 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) ) )
i = i + 1
L.5 Source Code for Analyzing Additive Error for PRIVATE-LOCAL-LRF
import math
from numpy import l i n a l g as l a
def r andomGauss i anMat r ix ( rows , columns , v a r i a n c e ) :
G = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( columns ) :
G[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . normal ( 0 , v a r i a n c e )
re turn G
def randomMatr ix ( rows , columns , k , a , b ) :
A = np . z e r o s ( ( rows , columns ) )
f o r i in range ( rows ) :
f o r j in range ( k ) :
A[ i ] [ j ] = np . random . r a n d i n t ( a , b )
re turn A
def lowrank ( k , A ) :
a = np . z e r o s ( np . shape (A) )
Le f t , s i n g u l a r , R i g h t = np . l i n a l g . svd (A, f u l l m a t r i c e s =1 , compute uv =1)
t o p l e f t = L e f t [ : , : k ]
a += np . d o t ( np . d o t ( t o p l e f t , t o p l e f t . T ) ,A)
re turn a
def Loca l (A, Ycolumn , L , Z , S ) :
N = np . d o t ( S , Ycolumn )
Un , Sn , Vn = np . l i n a l g . svd (N)
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Ul , Sl , Vl = np . l i n a l g . svd ( L )
i n n e r = np . d o t ( Un , np . d o t ( Un . T , np . d o t ( Z , np . d o t ( Vl . T , Vl ) ) ) )
i n n e r l o w r a n k = lowrank ( k , i n n e r )
o u t p u t = np . d o t ( np . l i n a l g . p inv (N) , np . d o t ( i n n e r l o w r a n k , np . l i n a l g . p inv ( L ) ) )
U, s , V = np . l i n a l g . svd ( o u t p u t )
Y = np . d o t ( Ycolumn , U)
Q = np . z e r o s (Y. shape )
f o r i in range (Y. shape [ 1 ] ) :
avec = Y [ : , i ]
q = avec
f o r j in range ( i ) :
q = q − np . d o t ( avec , Q [ : , j ] ) ∗ Q [ : , j ]
Q [ : , i ] = q / l a . norm ( q )
B = np . d o t (Q, np . d o t (Q. T ,A) )
re turn B
def I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a ) :
t = i n t ( 0 . 0 5∗ k / ( a l p h a ) )
v = i n t ( 0 . 0 2∗ k / ( a l p h a ∗∗ 2 ) )
A = randomMatr ix (m, n , k , 1 , 2 0 )
Ak = lowrank ( k , A)
a c t u a l = l a . norm (A − Ak , ’ f r o ’ )
e p s i l o n = 0 . 1
d e l t a = 1 / (m∗∗2)
Ph i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , t , 1 / t )
P s i = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( t , m, 1 / t )
S = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v , m, 1 / v )
T = randomGauss i anMat r ix ( n , v , 1 / v )
rho1 = math . s q r t (−4 ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2)
rho2 = m ∗ math . s q r t (−6 ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) / e p s i l o n ∗∗2)
Ycolumn = np . d o t (A, Ph i ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix (m, t , rho1 )
Yrow = np . d o t ( np . d o t ( Ps i , A) , T ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix ( t , v , rho2 )
Z = np . d o t ( S , np . d o t (A, T ) ) + randomGauss i anMat r ix ( v , v , rho2 )
B = Loca l (A, Ycolumn , Yrow , Z , S )
f r o b u p a d h y a y = l a . norm (A − B , ’ f r o ’ )
e x p e c t e d = v ∗ math . s q r t (−m ∗ math . l o g ( d e l t a ) ) / e p s i l o n
p r i n t ( f robupadhyay , e x p e c t e d )
#Use t h i s p a r t o f t h e code f o r v a r y i n g d i m e n s i o n
i = 1
n = 50
whi le n < 200 :
m = 9 ∗ n + i n t (50 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
a l p h a = 0 . 1
k = 10
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 0 , 5 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n + i n t (5 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) )
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n ( randomMatr ix (m, n , 0 , 5 ) , m, n , k , a l p h a )
n = 50 + ( i ∗ i n t (5 ∗ np . random . r and ( ) ) )
i = i + 1
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#Use t h i s p a r t o f t h e code f o r v a r y i n g a lpha
i =1
n=200
a l p h a = 0 . 1 0
whi le a l p h a < 0 . 2 5 :
m = 9 ∗ n
k = 10
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
a l p h a = a l p h a + 0 . 0 2
#Use t h i s p a r t o f t h e code f o r v a r y i n g k
n=50
k = 10
a l p h a = 0 . 2 5
whi le k<20:
m = 9 ∗ n
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
m = 14 ∗ n
I n i t i a l i z a t i o n (m, n , k , a l p h a )
k +=1
68
References
[AFK+01] Yossi Azar, Amos Fiat, Anna Karlin, Frank McSherry, and Jared Saia. Spectral analysis of
data. In STOC, pages 619–626. ACM, 2001.
[AFKM01] Dimitris Achlioptas, Amos Fiat, Anna R Karlin, and Frank McSherry. Web search via hub
synthesis. In FOCS, pages 500–509. IEEE, 2001.
[AHP09] Shipra Agrawal, Jayant R Haritsa, and B Aditya Prakash. Frapp: a framework for high-
accuracy privacy-preserving mining. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, 18(1):101–
139, 2009.
[AM05] Dimitris Achlioptas and Frank McSherry. On spectral learning of mixtures of distributions.
In Learning Theory, pages 458–469. Springer, 2005.
[AM07] Dimitris Achlioptas and Frank McSherry. Fast computation of low-rank matrix approxima-
tions. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 54(2):9, 2007.
[App16] Apple. Apple tries to peek at user habits without violating privacy. The Wall Street Journal,
2016.
[AWBR09] Alekh Agarwal, Martin J Wainwright, Peter L. Bartlett, and Pradeep K. Ravikumar.
Information-theoretic lower bounds on the oracle complexity of convex optimization. In
Y. Bengio, D. Schuurmans, J. D. Lafferty, C. K. I. Williams, and A. Culotta, editors, Ad-
vances in Neural Information Processing Systems 22, pages 1–9. Curran Associates, Inc.,
2009.
[BBDS12] Jeremiah Blocki, Avrim Blum, Anupam Datta, and Or Sheffet. The Johnson-Lindenstrauss
Transform Itself Preserves Differential Privacy. In FOCS, pages 410–419, 2012.
[BBV06] Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, and Santosh Vempala. Kernels as features: On kernels,
margins, and low-dimensional mappings. Machine Learning, 65(1):79–94, 2006.
[BCL05] Zheng-Jian Bai, Raymond H Chan, and Franklin T Luk. Principal component analysis for
distributed data sets with updating. In International Workshop on Advanced Parallel Pro-
cessing Technologies, pages 471–483. Springer, 2005.
[BDDW08] Richard Baraniuk, Mark Davenport, Ronald DeVore, and Michael Wakin. A simple proof
of the restricted isometry property for random matrices. Constructive Approximation,
28(3):253–263, 2008.
[BDMN05] Avrim Blum, Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, and Kobbi Nissim. Practical privacy: the
sulq framework. In Chen Li, editor, PODS, pages 128–138. ACM, 2005.
[Bha13] Rajendra Bhatia. Matrix analysis, volume 169. Springer Science &amp; Business Media,
2013.
[BLR13] Avrim Blum, Katrina Ligett, and Aaron Roth. A learning theory approach to noninteractive
database privacy. J. ACM, 60(2):12, 2013.
[Bou85] Jean Bourgain. On lipschitz embedding of finite metric spaces in hilbert space. Israel Journal
of Mathematics, 52(1-2):46–52, 1985.
69
[BS15] Raef Bassily and Adam Smith. Local, private, efficient protocols for succinct histograms.
In Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Annual ACM on Symposium on Theory of Computing,
pages 127–135. ACM, 2015.
[BWZ16] Christos Boutsidis, David P. Woodruff, and Peilin Zhong. Optimal principal component
analysis in distributed and streaming models. In STOC, pages 236–249, 2016.
[CEM+15] Michael B Cohen, Sam Elder, Cameron Musco, Christopher Musco, and Madalina Persu.
Dimensionality reduction for k-means clustering and low rank approximation. In STOC,
pages 163–172. ACM, 2015.
[CMM17] Michael B Cohen, Cameron Musco, and Christopher Musco. Input sparsity time low-rank
approximation via ridge leverage score sampling. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth An-
nual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 1758–1777. SIAM, 2017.
[CSS11] T-H Hubert Chan, Elaine Shi, and Dawn Song. Private and continual release of statistics.
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 14(3):26, 2011.
[CSS12] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Anand D Sarwate, and Kaushik Sinha. Near-optimal differentially
private principal components. In NIPS, pages 998–1006, 2012.
[CW09] Kenneth L. Clarkson and David P. Woodruff. Numerical linear algebra in the streaming
model. In STOC, pages 205–214, 2009.
[CW12] Kenneth L Clarkson and David P Woodruff. Low rank approximation and regression in input
sparsity time. arXiv preprint arXiv:1207.6365, 2012.
[CW13] Kenneth L Clarkson and David P Woodruff. Low rank approximation and regression in input
sparsity time. In STOC, pages 81–90. ACM, 2013.
[CW17] Kenneth L Clarkson and David P Woodruff. Low-rank psd approximation in input-sparsity
time. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Al-
gorithms, pages 2061–2072. SIAM, 2017.
[DFK+04] Petros Drineas, Alan Frieze, Ravi Kannan, Santosh Vempala, and V Vinay. Clustering large
graphs via the singular value decomposition. Machine learning, 56(1-3):9–33, 2004.
[DJW13] John C Duchi, Michael I Jordan, and Martin J Wainwright. Local privacy and statistical
minimax rates. In Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2013 IEEE 54th Annual Sym-
posium on, pages 429–438. IEEE, 2013.
[DKM06a] Petros Drineas, Ravi Kannan, and Michael W Mahoney. Fast monte carlo algorithms for
matrices ii: Computing a low-rank approximation to a matrix. SIAM Journal on Computing,
36(1):158–183, 2006.
[DKM+06b] Cynthia Dwork, Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Frank McSherry, Ilya Mironov, and Moni Naor.
Our Data, Ourselves: Privacy Via Distributed Noise Generation. In EUROCRYPT, pages
486–503, 2006.
[DKR02] Petros Drineas, Iordanis Kerenidis, and Prabhakar Raghavan. Competitive recommendation
systems. In STOC, pages 82–90. ACM, 2002.
[DM05] Petros Drineas and Michael W Mahoney. Approximating a gram matrix for improved kernel-
based learning. In Learning Theory, pages 323–337. Springer, 2005.
70
[DMNS06] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim, and Adam Smith. Calibrating Noise to
Sensitivity in Private Data Analysis. In Shai Halevi and Tal Rabin, editors, TCC, volume
3876 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 265–284. Springer, 2006.
[DN03] Irit Dinur and Kobbi Nissim. Revealing information while preserving privacy. In PODS,
pages 202–210. ACM, 2003.
[DNPR10] Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, Toniann Pitassi, and Guy N. Rothblum. Differential privacy
under continual observation. In STOC, pages 715–724, 2010.
[DR14] Cynthia Dwork and Aaron Roth. The algorithmic foundations of differential privacy. Foun-
dations and Trends in Theoretical Computer Science, 9(3-4):211–407, 2014.
[DRV10] Cynthia Dwork, Guy N. Rothblum, and Salil P. Vadhan. Boosting and Differential Privacy.
In FOCS, pages 51–60. IEEE Computer Society, 2010.
[DRVW06] Amit Deshpande, Luis Rademacher, Santosh Vempala, and Grant Wang. Matrix approxima-
tion and projective clustering via volume sampling. In SODA, pages 1117–1126. Society for
Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 2006.
[DTTZ14] Cynthia Dwork, Kunal Talwar, Abhradeep Thakurta, and Li Zhang. Analyze Gauss: Optimal
Bounds for Privacy-Preserving Principal Component Analysis. In STOC, pages 11–20, 2014.
[DV06] Amit Deshpande and Santosh Vempala. Adaptive sampling and fast low-rank matrix approx-
imation. In Approximation, Randomization, and Combinatorial Optimization. Algorithms
and Techniques, pages 292–303. Springer, 2006.
[EGS03] Alexandre Evfimievski, Johannes Gehrke, and Ramakrishnan Srikant. Limiting privacy
breaches in privacy preserving data mining. In PODS, pages 211–222. ACM, 2003.
[EPK14] U´lfar Erlingsson, Vasyl Pihur, and Aleksandra Korolova. Rappor: Randomized aggregatable
privacy-preserving ordinal response. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC conference
on computer and communications security, pages 1054–1067. ACM, 2014.
[EY36] Carl Eckart and Gale Young. The approximation of one matrix by another of lower rank.
Psychometrika, 1(3):211–218, 1936.
[FKV04] Alan Frieze, Ravi Kannan, and Santosh Vempala. Fast monte-carlo algorithms for finding
low-rank approximations. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 51(6):1025–1041, 2004.
[GSS17] Dan Garber, Ohad Shamir, and Nathan Srebro. Communication-efficient algorithms for
distributed stochastic principal component analysis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.08169, 2017.
[HKR12] Justin Hsu, Sanjeev Khanna, and Aaron Roth. Distributed private heavy hitters. In Interna-
tional Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming, pages 461–472. Springer,
2012.
[HMT11] Nathan Halko, Per-Gunnar Martinsson, and Joel A Tropp. Finding structure with random-
ness: Probabilistic algorithms for constructing approximate matrix decompositions. SIAM
review, 53(2):217–288, 2011.
71
[HP14] Moritz Hardt and Eric Price. The noisy power method: A meta algorithm with applications.
In Z. Ghahramani, M. Welling, C. Cortes, N.d. Lawrence, and K.q. Weinberger, editors, Ad-
vances in Neural Information Processing Systems 27, pages 2861–2869. Curran Associates,
Inc., 2014.
[HR12] Moritz Hardt and Aaron Roth. Beating randomized response on incoherent matrices. In
STOC, pages 1255–1268, 2012.
[HR13] Moritz Hardt and Aaron Roth. Beyond worst-case analysis in private singular vector com-
putation. In STOC, pages 331–340, 2013.
[IM98] Piotr Indyk and Rajeev Motwani. Approximate nearest neighbors: Towards removing the
curse of dimensionality. In STOC, pages 604–613, 1998.
[JKT12] Prateek Jain, Pravesh Kothari, and Abhradeep Thakurta. Differentially Private Online Learn-
ing. In Shie Mannor, Nathan Srebro, and Robert C. Williamson, editors, COLT, volume 23
of JMLR Proceedings, pages 24.1–24.34. JMLR.org, 2012.
[JL84] William B Johnson and Joram Lindenstrauss. Extensions of Lipschitz mappings into a
Hilbert space. Contemporary mathematics, 26(189-206):1, 1984.
[JNS13] Prateek Jain, Praneeth Netrapalli, and Sujay Sanghavi. Low-rank matrix completion using
alternating minimization. In Proceedings of the forty-fifth annual ACM symposium on Theory
of computing, pages 665–674. ACM, 2013.
[JXZ15] Wuxuan Jiang, Cong Xie, and Zhihua Zhang. Wishart mechanism for differentially private
principal components analysis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1511.05680, 2015.
[KKMM12] Krishnaram Kenthapadi, Aleksandra Korolova, Ilya Mironov, and Nina Mishra. Privacy via
the johnson-lindenstrauss transform. arXiv preprint arXiv:1204.2606, 2012.
[Kle99] Jon M Kleinberg. Authoritative sources in a hyperlinked environment. Journal of the ACM
(JACM), 46(5):604–632, 1999.
[KLN+11] Shiva Prasad Kasiviswanathan, Homin K Lee, Kobbi Nissim, Sofya Raskhodnikova, and
Adam Smith. What can we learn privately? SIAM Journal on Computing, 40(3):793–826,
2011.
[KN14] Daniel M. Kane and Jelani Nelson. Sparser Johnson-Lindenstrauss Transforms. J. ACM,
61(1):4, 2014.
[KSV05] Ravindran Kannan, Hadi Salmasian, and Santosh Vempala. The spectral method for general
mixture models. In Learning Theory, pages 444–457. Springer, 2005.
[KT13] Michael Kapralov and Kunal Talwar. On differentially private low rank approximation. In
SODA, volume 5, page 1. SIAM, 2013.
[LBKW14] Yingyu Liang, Maria-Florina F Balcan, Vandana Kanchanapally, and David Woodruff. Im-
proved distributed principal component analysis. In Advances in Neural Information Pro-
cessing Systems, pages 3113–3121, 2014.
[LBRB08] Yann-Ae¨l Le Borgne, Sylvain Raybaud, and Gianluca Bontempi. Distributed principal com-
ponent analysis for wireless sensor networks. Sensors, 8(8):4821–4850, 2008.
72
[LKLS13] Joonseok Lee, Seungyeon Kim, Guy Lebanon, and Yoram Singer. Local low-rank matrix
approximation. ICML (2), 28:82–90, 2013.
[LLR95] Nathan Linial, Eran London, and Yuri Rabinovich. The geometry of graphs and some of its
algorithmic applications. Combinatorica, 15(2):215–245, 1995.
[LNW14] Yi Li, Huy L. Nguyen, and David P. Woodruff. Turnstile streaming algorithms might as well
be linear sketches. In Symposium on Theory of Computing, STOC 2014, New York, NY, USA,
May 31 - June 03, 2014, pages 174–183, 2014.
[Mah11] Michael W Mahoney. Randomized algorithms for matrices and data. Foundations and
Trends R© in Machine Learning, 3(2):123–224, 2011.
[Mar08] Ivan Markovsky. Structured low-rank approximation and its applications. Automatica,
44(4):891–909, 2008.
[Mar11] Ivan Markovsky. Low rank approximation: algorithms, implementation, applications.
Springer Science & Business Media, 2011.
[McS01] Frank McSherry. Spectral partitioning of random graphs. In FOCS, pages 529–537. IEEE,
2001.
[MM09] Frank McSherry and Ilya Mironov. Differentially private recommender systems: building
privacy into the net. In Proceedings of the 15th ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages 627–636. ACM, 2009.
[MM13] Xiangrui Meng and Michael W Mahoney. Low-distortion subspace embeddings in input-
sparsity time and applications to robust linear regression. In STOC, pages 91–100. ACM,
2013.
[MNSW95] Peter Bro Miltersen, Noam Nisan, Shmuel Safra, and Avi Wigderson. On data structures and
asymmetric communication complexity. In STOC, pages 103–111. ACM, 1995.
[MS06] Nina Mishra and Mark Sandler. Privacy via pseudorandom sketches. In Proceedings of the
twenty-fifth ACM SIGMOD-SIGACT-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems,
pages 143–152. ACM, 2006.
[Mut05] Shanmugavelayutham Muthukrishnan. Data streams: Algorithms and applications. Now
Publishers Inc, 2005.
[MW17] Cameron Musco and David P Woodruff. Sublinear time low-rank approximation of positive
semidefinite matrices. arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.03371, 2017.
[MZ11] Avner Magen and Anastasios Zouzias. Low rank matrix-valued chernoff bounds and ap-
proximate matrix multiplication. In SODA, pages 1422–1436. SIAM, 2011.
[NDT09] Nam H Nguyen, Thong T Do, and Trac D Tran. A fast and efficient algorithm for low-rank
approximation of a matrix. In STOC, pages 215–224. ACM, 2009.
[New06] Mark EJ Newman. Finding community structure in networks using the eigenvectors of ma-
trices. Physical review E, 74(3):036104, 2006.
[Ngu17] Huy L. Nguyen. Personal communication. 2017.
73
[Nir06] Nir Ailon and Bernard Chazelle. Approximate nearest neighbors and the fast Johnson-
Lindenstrauss transform. In STOC, pages 557–563, 2006.
[NS08] Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov. Robust de-anonymization of large sparse datasets.
In Security and Privacy, 2008. SP 2008. IEEE Symposium on, pages 111–125. IEEE, 2008.
[PMVdG+13] Jack Poulson, Bryan Marker, Robert A Van de Geijn, Jeff R Hammond, and Nichols A
Romero. Elemental: A new framework for distributed memory dense matrix computations.
ACM Transactions on Mathematical Software (TOMS), 39(2):13, 2013.
[PTRV98a] Christos H Papadimitriou, Hisao Tamaki, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Santosh Vempala. La-
tent semantic indexing: A probabilistic analysis. In Proceedings of the seventeenth ACM
SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems, pages 159–168.
ACM, 1998.
[PTRV98b] Christos H Papadimitriou, Hisao Tamaki, Prabhakar Raghavan, and Santosh Vempala. La-
tent semantic indexing: A probabilistic analysis. In Proceedings of the seventeenth ACM
SIGACT-SIGMOD-SIGART symposium on Principles of database systems, pages 159–168.
ACM, 1998.
[QOSG02] Yongming Qu, George Ostrouchov, Nagiza Samatova, and Al Geist. Principal component
analysis for dimension reduction in massive distributed data sets. In Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Data Mining (ICDM), 2002.
[RV07] Mark Rudelson and Roman Vershynin. Sampling from large matrices: An approach through
geometric functional analysis. Journal of the ACM (JACM), 54(4):21, 2007.
[Sar06] Tamas Sarlos. Improved approximation algorithms for large matrices via random projec-
tions. In FOCS, pages 143–152. IEEE, 2006.
[Sch00] Leonard J Schulman. Clustering for edge-cost minimization. In Proceedings of the thirty-
second annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 547–555. ACM, 2000.
[STC04] John Shawe-Taylor and Nello Cristianini. Kernel methods for pattern analysis. Cambridge
university press, 2004.
[Ste08] Alwin Stegeman. Low-rank approximation of generic p\timesq\times2 arrays and diverg-
ing components in the candecomp/parafac model. SIAM Journal on Matrix Analysis and
Applications, 30(3):988–1007, 2008.
[STU17] A. Smith, A. Thakurata, and J. Upadhyay. Is Interaction Necessary for Distributed Private
Learning? To Appear in IEEE Symposium for Security & Privacy, 2017.
[TD99] Franc¸oise Tisseur and Jack Dongarra. A parallel divide and conquer algorithm for the sym-
metric eigenvalue problem on distributed memory architectures. SIAM Journal on Scientific
Computing, 20(6):2223–2236, 1999.
[TS13] Abhradeep Guha Thakurta and Adam Smith. (nearly) optimal algorithms for private online
learning in full-information and bandit settings. In Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems, pages 2733–2741, 2013.
[Upa13] Jalaj Upadhyay. Random Projections, Graph Sparsification, and Differential Privacy. In
ASIACRYPT (1), pages 276–295, 2013.
74
[Upa14a] Jalaj Upadhyay. Differentially private linear algebra in the streaming model. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1409.5414, 2014.
[Upa14b] Jalaj Upadhyay. Randomness efficient fast-johnson-lindenstrauss transform with applica-
tions in differential privacy and compressed sensing. arXiv preprint arXiv:1410.2470, 2014.
[Vem05] Santosh S Vempala. The random projection method, volume 65. American Mathematical
Soc., 2005.
[WAH+97] Peter D Wentzell, Darren T Andrews, David C Hamilton, Klaas Faber, and Bruce R
Kowalski. Maximum likelihood principal component analysis. Journal of Chemometrics,
11(4):339–366, 1997.
[War65] Stanley L. Warner. Randomized response: A survey technique for eliminating evasive an-
swer bias. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 60(309):63–69, 1965.
[WJD12] Martin J Wainwright, Michael I Jordan, and John C Duchi. Privacy aware learning. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 1430–1438, 2012.
[Woo14] David P. Woodruff. Sketching as a tool for numerical linear algebra. Foundations and Trends
in Theoretical Computer Science, 10(1-2):1–157, 2014.
[Woo16] David P. Woodruff. Personal communication. 2016.
[YUTC17] Alp Yurtsever, Madeleine Udell, Joel A Tropp, and Volkan Cevher. Sketchy decisions: Con-
vex low-rank matrix optimization with optimal storage. arXiv preprint arXiv:1702.06838,
2017.
75
